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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on topics in health economics and public finance. I deal with questions that have
importance for health policy, and that are simultaneously of general economic interest; in particular, I
consider the efficiency impact of privatization, the effects of competition in health care markets, and the
effects of incomplete contracting and imperfect competition on rates of pass-through to consumers and
governments.
In Chapter One, I examine the extent to which contracting out by governments yields efficiency
improvements, by looking to Medicaid contracting in New York State. To identify the efficiency impact of
private, relative to public Medicaid, I exploit involuntary switching between the two; primarily, I leverage age-
based rules forcing individuals to switch from private to public Medicaid at 65. I also leverage unique
administrative data, which longitudinally tracks individual utilization across the public and private Medicaid
settings. I find evidence that private Medicaid yields efficiency improvements, but find no evidence that these
improvements are passed on to either governments or patients. Instead, I find that pass-through is
substantially limited by incomplete contracting, with plans shifting costs to medical services that remain
under government provision.
In Chapter Two, I examine the effects of cost-sharing among a previously understudied population-those
dually enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare. I leverage an exogenous court ruling that resulted in loss of
Medicaid coverage in Tennessee, among 25,000 individuals who had previously been dually-enrolled. This
disenrollment resulted in an increase in average cost-sharing rates, from around 0% to around 20%. I find that
this cost-sharing increase resulted in a utilization reduction of about 30%, implying an arc-elasticity in
spending of about -.2.
In Chapter Three, with Mark Duggan and Amanda Starc, we examine how contracts are affected by their
generosity, by looking to the Medicare Advantage program. In doing so, we exploit a substantial policy-
induced increase in MA reimbursement in metropolitan areas with a population of 250,000 or more relative to
MSAs below this threshold. Our findings also reveal that about one-eighth of the additional reimbursement is
passed through to consumers in the form of better coverage.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC FINANCE
Boris V. Vabson
Mark G. Duggan
This dissertation focuses on topics in health economics and public nance. I deal
with questions that have importance for health policy, and that are simultaneously of
general economic interest; in particular, I consider the e¢ ciency impact of privatiza-
tion, the e¤ects of competition in health care markets, and the e¤ects of incomplete
contracting and imperfect competition on rates of pass-through to consumers and
governments.
In Chapter One, I examine the extent to which contracting out by governments
yields e¢ ciency improvements, by looking to Medicaid contracting in New York State.
To identify the e¢ ciency impact of private, relative to public Medicaid, I exploit
involuntary switching between the two; primarily, I leverage age-based rules forcing
individuals to switch from private to public Medicaid at 65. I also leverage unique ad-
ministrative data, which longitudinally tracks individual utilization across the public
and private Medicaid settings. I nd evidence that private Medicaid yields e¢ ciency
improvements, but nd no evidence that these improvements are passed on to either
governments or patients. Instead, I nd that pass-through is substantially limited
by incomplete contracting, with plans shifting costs to medical services that remain
under government provision.
In Chapter Two, I examine the e¤ects of cost-sharing among a previously un-
derstudied population-those dually enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare. I leverage an
exogenous court ruling that resulted in loss of Medicaid coverage in Tennessee, among
25,000 individuals who had previously been dually-enrolled. This disenrollment re-
sulted in an increase in average cost-sharing rates, from around 0% to around 20%. I
nd that this cost-sharing increase resulted in a utilization reduction of about 30%,
implying an arc-elasticity in spending of about -.2.
In Chapter Three, with Mark Duggan and Amanda Starc, we examine how con-
tracts are a¤ected by their generosity, by looking to the Medicare Advantage program.
In doing so, we exploit a substantial policy-induced increase in MA reimbursement in
metropolitan areas with a population of 250,000 or more relative to MSAs below this
threshold. Our ndings reveal that about one-eighth of the additional reimbursement
is passed through to consumers in the form of better coverage.
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CHAPTER 1: The Magnitude and Incidence of
E¢ ciency Gains Under Contracting: Evidence
from Medicaid
Boris V. Vabson
1
1 Introduction
Governments contract a vast array of services to private rms, rather than admin-
istering these services directly; in the United States alone, contracting accounts for
almost 10% of GDP.
Governments contract with the expectation that private rms produce services
more e¢ ciently, and that e¢ ciency gains from contracting could be passed through
to either governments (via cost-savings) or program recipients (via quality improve-
ments) (Savas 1977, Savas 1987). Unfortunately, there has been limited examination
of contractings e¢ ciency impact, along with the magnitude of pass-through to various
parties.
To examine these questions, I focus on contracting in the public health insurance
setting, specically within Medicaid. While this setting should be generalizable to
other forms of contracting, Medicaid also has substantial policy importance, in its
own right. Medicaid expenditures for 2013 stood at $449 billion, or 2.5% of GDP,
and Medicaid currently covers more individuals (55 million) than any other insurance
program in America, including Medicare (CMS, 2013). In addition, contracting has
been pervasive in this setting, with private plans covering 60% of all Medicaid enrollees
(KFF, 2011) and taking in $130 billion annually (DHHS, 2013); by comparison, typical
annual spending on unemployment insurance is $30-40 billion (Whittaker et al, 2014).
This paper has additional policy relevance, given that it focuses on Medicaid
contracting among a specic group-the disabled. This group accounts for a dispro-
portionate 40% of Medicaid spending (while making up only 15% of enrollees), yet
has been understudied relative to lower cost groups. Moreover, government expendi-
tures on disabled programs are substantial, with health care accounting for the largest
share of this spending (surpassing spending on cash transfers).
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As is the case elsewhere, contracting within Medicaid involves the outsourcing of
provision to third parties (outside insurers); simultaneously, it involves a change in
the nature of that provision, with a shift from a fee-for-service to a capitated managed
care set-up.
To start, I examine the extent to which private Medicaid, through this combination
of managed care and capitation-yields e¢ ciency improvements, and the mechanisms
through which it does so. Here, I dene e¢ ciency improvements as reductions to care
that patients wouldnt want (such as unnecessary or preventable visits), as opposed to
care that patients would want (such as elective surgeries, which could improve patient
welfare). In doing so, I contribute to an existing literature (Cutler and Sheiner 1998,
Cutler et al 2000, Landon 2012, Pinkovskiy 2013), while overcoming two issues that
have hindered past research.
One issue is an identication problem (enrollment composition di¤erences between
managed & non-managed care), which I overcome through a novel approach. I lever-
age a New York rule barring most Medicaid recipients over 65 from private Medicaid;
this rule results in substantial involuntary switching from private to public Medicaid
at the age of 65. For my secondary identication strategy, I focus on cases of invol-
untary switching in the reverse direction-from public to private Medicaid.1 Finally,
where possible, I combine these two strategies as a robustness check, by instrumenting
for pre-65 private Medicaid status.
Another issue is data-related (limited information on activity within managed
care plans), which I overcome by linking together several unique administrative data
sets from New York State. In doing so, I construct an individual-level panel on
hospital and prescription drug utilization, across the private and public Medicaid
1This was driven by Medicaid managed care enrollment mandates, which have been featured in
previous literature (Duggan 2004; Aizer et al 2007; Duggan, 2013).
3
settings. Critically, inclusion in this panel is not conditional on utilization. Detailed
information in the data allows me to precisely construct treatment & control groups,
and to implement a rich set of controls.
I also examine the incidence of e¢ ciency gains under Medicaid contracting, while
measuring pass-through in a broader and more precise fashion than the existing lit-
erature (Duggan 2004, Aizer et al 2007, Duggan et al 2013). Further, I consider how
factors such as incomplete contracting limit the pass-through of e¢ ciency gains.2 In
this paper, I focus on a particular form of incomplete contracting (of limited scope),
and identify the benet from broadening an existing contract along that dimension.
Finally, I consider whether the for-prot status of a contracted insurer a¤ects the
size of e¢ ciency gains, contributing to an existing literature on for-prot status across
insurance and other rm types (Dafny et al 2013, Duggan 2000).
In examining these questions, I look to disabled Medicaid recipients in New York
during the period between 1999 and 2010. I focus on the disabled population, given
that e¢ ciency improvements may be easier to detect (and also bring about) among
a high-cost group, and also given that Medicaid policies pertaining to them remain
unsettled. I also focus on this population for empirical reasons; the disabled are
the primary group enrolled in Medicaid immediately pre-65 (the age discontinuity on
which I focus), and also experience less churn into and out of Medicaid than other
populations. Finally, I focus on New York, on account of unique administrative data
covering that state.
I rst consider private Medicaids e¤ect on inpatient and ER care, since this would
be a likely setting for e¢ ciency improvement. I nd that private Medicaid results in
2In the literature, incomplete contracting is dened as possible limitations in contractual moni-
toring, enforcement, or scope (Hart and Moore 1990, Hart 1995). While existing theory implies that
the incomplete nature of contracts imposes costs, such theory has not been empirically tested (Hart
1995; Hart, Shleifer, Vishny 1997).
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a highly signicant, 15% reduction in overall inpatient utilization. Four-fths of this
decrease can be attributed to a reduction in prevention sensitive visits, including
a 30% reduction in hospital readmissions, while non-preventable visits see a more
modest reduction. This utilization reduction does not appear to come from shifts to
more e¢ cient hospitals, but may instead arise from changes to outpatient care, or
from within-hospital changes to treatment. Given that these utilization reductions
do not appear to adversely a¤ect patient welfare, I conclude that they are e¢ ciency
improving.
In addition, I examine the incidence of e¢ ciency gains under contracting, nd-
ing no evidence of pass-through to governments via cost savings. Altogether, I can
rule out a reduction in government spending in excess of 6%, with 95% condence.
Further, I examine how incomplete contracting reduces pass-through, by identifying
counterfactual cost levels under a more complete contract. To do so, I look to med-
ical services, particularly prescription drugs, that were not nancially integrated into
private Medicaid contracts, and that remained covered by New York State. I nd evi-
dence that private plans cost-shifted to these services, as their use increased by about
15% following involuntary switching into private plans. In addition, eventual nancial
integration of these services into existing private contracts resulted in a comparable
15% drop in drug utilization (through the implementation of a formulary), and in a
4% decline in overall contracting costs (that is, in overall government spending).
Finally, I nd suggestive evidence that for-prot contractors (relative to not-for-
prots) are more e¢ cient, as they achieve lower inpatient utilization, and do so pri-
marily through reductions to prevention-sensitive visits.
Altogether, my ndings have substantial implications for Medicaid policy, given
the prevalence of Medicaid contracting and given proposals to further expand it. I
nd that Medicaid contracting may produce substantial e¢ ciency improvements, and
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I also identify the policy design that could maximize pass-through of these gains.
In Section 2, I review the basic characteristics of public and private Medicaid
systems, and go over relevant institutional features of New York Medicaid. In Section
3, I review the administrative data from New York State underlying my analyses. In
Section 4, I go over my empirical design and implementation. In Section 5 and 6, I
discuss my empirical ndings and concurrently test their robustness. In Section 7, I
conclude.
2 Contracting out of Medicaid Services
When Medicaid was initially introduced in 1965, only the public version of
it was o¤ered, which was administered directly by states, through a fee-for-service
framework. In the 1980s, however, governments increasingly began to contract out
Medicaid (along with other government services) to third parties, given theoretical
benets that could result from capitation and from competition (Hansmann 1980,
Donahue 1989). However, as governments contracted out Medicaid coverage, they not
only changed the source of that provision, but also the very nature of it; while pub-
lic Medicaid was based on a fee-for-service framework, private Medicaid was largely
based on capitated managed care. As such, the impact of contracting out Medicaid
services is not only dependent on the economics of contracting, but also dependent
on the economics of capitation & managed care. Below, I go over the basic char-
acteristics of managed care and fee-for-service delivery frameworks. I also go over
institutional aspects of the New York Medicaid program that are relevant to my
subsequent analyses.
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2.1 Background on Managed Care
Capitated managed care plans, which rst appeared in the 1980s, are characterized
by an active involvement in patient care, and by the variety of strategies they adopt
for improving e¢ ciency. Managed care plans are also characterized by the sharp
incentives they face, through capitation; under capitation, plans receive xed pay-
ments for each enrollee, irrespective of the amount of health care the enrollee uses. In
these respects, managed care di¤ers substantially from fee-for-service (FFS) delivery
systems, in which an insurer acts as little more than an intermediary, and does not
proactively shape enrolleescare.
Managed care plans could achieve e¢ ciency improvement, rst, through e¤orts at
care coordination; plans usually designate a primary care provider to oversee patient
care, especially for those with chronic conditions. Such coordination could miti-
gate acute health episodes, and thereby reduce preventable utilization. In addition,
managed care could achieve e¢ ciency improvement by requiring special approval for
certain visits and procedures; this occurs through a process called utilization review.
Finally, managed care plans could improve e¢ ciency by featuring more e¢ cient
providers in their networks. Given that enrollees would have to either pay higher cost
sharing for out-of-network utilization (or in some cases, be prohibited from it entirely),
this could directly translate into more e¢ cient care. More generally, provider network
formation could also reduce provider prices, through negotiation (Zwanziger et al
2000); however, within Medicaid, provider pricing is actually around 15% higher
under the private option, given administrative rate setting under the public option.
While previous literature has found evidence of lower provider prices under man-
aged care (Cutler et al 2000), evidence on its quantity impact is more mixed. The
most accepted ndings may come from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment,
which concluded that managed care reduces hospital utilization by around 40% (Man-
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ning et al 1987). However, the RAND experiment ndings are dated and could also
have limited external validity.
Previous studies have been constrained by enrollment di¤erences between man-
aged and non-managed care; these enrollment di¤erences, along with advantageous se-
lection into managed care, have been extensively documented (Morrissey 2012, Brown
et al 2014). Further, there is limited individual-level data available on treatment
within managed care plans, particularly in Medicaid and Medicare. Private managed
care plans participating in these programs are typically not required to turn over
claims data, and the limited data that are turned over appear to be of questionable
quality (Lewin Group 2012).
2.2 Private Medicaid Nationwide
Governments began contracting out Medicaid provision in the early 1980s, with
an aim towards quality improvements and cost savings. However, previous studies
have o¤ered no evidence of cost savings to governments, and in fact some evidence
of cost increases, as a result of Medicaid contracting (Duggan 2004, Song et al 2012,
Duggan et al 2013).
Medicaid currently serves over 65% of enrollees through some form of managed
care, although managed cares share is highest among lower-cost groups such as chil-
dren (at around 80%) and lowest among the disabled (at around 25%) (KFF 2012).
Given the limited number of high-cost Medicaid enrollees enrolled in managed care,
payments to these plans account for only about 20% of Medicaid expenditures. How-
ever, a number of states have or are in the process of shifting high-cost Medicaid
enrollees (including the disabled), into managed care plans.3
3Besides New York, these include California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio, and Texas (Sparer
2012).
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Incidentally, Medicare contracting also began during this period, with private
Medicare currently covering about 30% of Medicare recipients (McGuire et al 2011).
There is signicant heterogeneity across states in terms of the design of their
privatized Medicaid systems. For example, there is signicant variation in the types
of insurers that states contract with, such as for-prots, and heterogeneity in ease of
market entry. Moreover, there is heterogeneity in the scope of services that managed
care plans are allowed to cover. To this end, some states do not permit private
plans to cover long-term care or prescription drug care, or mental health care, and
instead administer these service on behalf of all Medicare recipients (including those
in the private option). Further, there is cross-state variation in whether enrollment
in private Medicaid is required, optional, or even available for a given group (Duggan
et al 2013).
2.3 Private Medicaid in New York State
New York State began contracting out Medicaid coverage in the 1990s, but re-
tained a public version of Medicaid alongside the private option. Initially, all Medicaid
recipients eligible for the private option could remain under the public system. Fur-
thermore, certain types of Medicaid recipients were ineligible for the private option;
these included long-term nursing home residents & dual-eligibles (those Medicaid re-
cipients who were simultaneously in Medicare). Consequently, most of those who
were enrolled in private Medicaid plans would get disenrolled at the age of 65, given
the typical onset of dual-Medicare/Medicaid enrollment at that age (Sparer 2008).
To increase the share of Medicaid recipients in private plans, New York started
making enrollment in these plans mandatory-rather than optional-beginning with
non-disabled Medicaid recipients. These requirements, referred to as enrollment
mandates, were rolled-out under a pre-planned timetable, county-by-county. The
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enrollment mandates initially applied only to children and TANF adults in New York
Medicaid. Disabled Medicaid recipients were not subject to these mandates until
2005, when they were introduced specically for this group (Sparer 2008). Just as
with the previous non-disabled mandates, these were rolled out on a pre-planned
timetable, and on a county by county basis (Sparer 2008). Concurrent with these
mandates, enrollment in private Medicaid plans increased from 600,000 in the mid
1990s to 2.5 million in 2009 (New York Medicaid & Medicaid Managed Care Enroll-
ment Data).
In terms of scope of coverage, New Yorks private Medicaid plans initially covered
inpatient, outpatient, and certain long-term care services; however, by law, these
plans could not cover particular medical services, such as prescription drugs and
mental health. These carved-outservices continued to be directly administered and
paid for by the state. Starting in October 2011, however, New York State integrated
prescription drug services into all existing private Medicaid contracts.
In terms of market access, insurers generally enjoyed free entry into the market-
place, so long as they provided basic proof of competence and qualication. Insurers
could enter the market at the county-level, and thereby be active in some counties
and not in others. While entry was open to all forms of insurers, including for-prot
and not-for-prot, the preponderance of active insurers were not-for-prot.
Payment levels to each insurer were determined through negotiation between that
insurer and the state government. Prior to 2008, New York state did not explicitly
risk-adjust payments, to account for the health status of each Medicaid recipient
(Sparer 2008).
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3 Data
In this paper, I use several administrative datasets from CMS and New York State,
containing information on overall Medicaid & on private Medicaid enrollment status,
along with inpatient, ER, and drug utilization. Uniquely, this utilization data is
structured as an individual-level panel, tracking those in private Medicaid, public
Medicaid, as well as those who switch between the public & private options. Another
unique feature of the data is that sample selection is not conditional on utilization;
even those with zero inpatient/ER activity remain included.
The structure of this data allows me to overcome issues hampering previous re-
search. First, the data source typically used in Medicaid research, stand-alone dis-
charge data, su¤ers from a sample selection issue; inclusion in it is conditional on
hospitalization (on a related point, stand-alone discharge data has a cross-sectional,
rather than panel structure). Further, the alternative-private Medicaid utilization
data-has been di¢ cult to obtain and has been of questionable quality even when
available (Lewin Group, 2012).
Using information contained in the administrative data, I can precisely construct
cohorts that are relevant to my analyses. First, I restrict to New York State Medic-
aid recipients, who qualied for the program as a result of disability (formally, this
group is referred to as non-elderly SSI recipients), and who were enrolled during that
particular month & year.
For my analyses of utilization e¤ects, I focus on those Medicaid recipients who
were not simultaneously-enrolled in Medicare, pre-65. I further restrict to individuals
who were in the original sample just before they reached the age of 65, while focusing
on the age range immediately around 65.
For my analyses of government spending e¤ects, for which I leverage mandates, I
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limit to individuals who were already enrolled in Medicaid (either public or private)
at the start of 2004. This restriction is meant to guard against sample composi-
tion changes, given that the implementation of mandates could result in changing
entry/exit into Medicaid (Currie and Fahr 2005).
3.1 Individual Characteristics and Enrollment Information
I use administrative data from CMS (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services),
which covers New York State for the 1999-2010 period. The data contains person-
month level demographic and Medicaid/Medicare enrollment information; it species
private Medicaid status, the general reason for Medicaid eligibility, and concurrent
Medicare enrollment status. Using this information, I can restrict to those who are
in Medicaid by virtue of disability. In addition, I can track whether individuals were
simultaneously eligible for Medicare. Finally, I can control for certain demographic
characteristics such as county of residence, age, and date of birth.
For those in private Medicaid, the CMS data also tracks the specic plan that
someones enrolled in, at a person-month level, based on a Plan ID. Using sup-
plemental data obtained from New York State, I identify which of these plans are
for-prot and which are not-for-prot.
3.2 Inpatient and ER Utilization Metrics
I track inpatient and emergency room usage for everyone in Medicaid, including
those enrolled in the private option. I do so by linking together Medicaid enrollment
data (obtained from CMS) and visit-level hospital/ER data (obtained from New York
State). This linking is facilitated through Social Security number information found
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in both data, which was obtained through special administrative permissions.4 The
data contains every single inpatient visit made by New York Medicaid recipients,
throughout the 1999-2010 period; the data on ER and ambulatory care visits, mean-
while, covers the 2005-2010 period.
Unfortunately, I do not have visit-level information on outpatient activities, which
account for 65% of health care spending for this population. This said, the inpatient
and ER settings could be likely sites for e¢ ciency improvements, as these represent
particularly expensive forms of treatment. As such, even if reductions in inpatient uti-
lization are o¤set by increases in outpatient utilization (o¤sets which-unfortunately-I
cant explicitly measure), such reductions should still be worthwhile. Further, vari-
ous information in the inpatient data can proxy for outpatient utilization, as I will
describe.
This data provides information on the timing of each hospital visit, at a month-
year level. The data also provides visit-level information on treatment intensity and
composition, including the length of hospital stay, types and number of procedures
performed, and total (pre-discounted) hospital charges. I also identify surgical and
non-surgical visits, using a DRG cross-walk obtained from the Dartmouth Institute
for Health Policy and Clinical Practice. In addition, this data provides information on
the source of care, such as whether a hospital admission originated from ER. Finally,
the data species the name and location of the hospital visited, allowing me to compile
additional hospital characteristics measures, and also measure each patients travel
time to the hospital (in miles and minutes).
4Linking was conducted using a combination of the last four digits of individualsSSN, dates
& years of birth, gender, and county of residence; in combination, these variables uniquely identify
Medicaid recipients over 99.9% of the time. The Medicaid recipients that were not uniquely identied
were excluded from the sample.
To obtain this identiable information, I applied for a special version of New Yorks SPARCS
data, containing these aforementioned elds. I also applied for special CMS data, containing SSN
identiers for every Medicaid recipient.
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For most of my analyses, I aggregate this data to a person-month level, and
include those without any utilization as part of the sample (as such, sample selection
is not conditional on having a hospital/ER visit). Information on each individuals
Medicaid status (as well as private Medicaid status) is taken from the original CMS
les, rather than from the discharge data; in doing so, I bypass possible issues of
payer mischaracterization/miscoding in the discharge data.
In Table 1, I present average, annualized utilization measures for my main analytic
sample (those between 63 and 67, who were Medicaid-only enrolled at 63). I break
these measures out for two separate groups-those initially in private Medicaid and
those in the public option-who correspond to our treatment and control groups. I
nd that those initially in private Medicaid have substantially lower utilization (by
20-30%) than those in the public option, although the extent to which this is driven
by enrollment composition rather than treatment di¤erences is not readily apparent.
3.3 Inpatient Quality of Care Metrics
To measure quality of care, I rely on outside measures of hospital quality. and also
construct metrics using existing algorithms.
To gauge inpatient care quality, I look to CMS quality measures. These measures
consist of risk-adjusted mortality and readmission rates for each hospital, for heart
attacks, heart failure, and pneumonia. As an additional metric of quality, I use the
60-day hospital readmission rate, which can proxy for the quality of inpatient as well
as outpatient care.
Given that I do not have outpatient claims data, I cannot directly identify the
quality of outpatient care. Instead, to gauge this, I combine my discharge and ER
data with existing algorithms. First, I use an algorithm developed by AHRQ, which
identies hospital visits that could have been prevented through improved outpatient
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treatment. In addition, I identify ER visits that were non-emergency or preventable,
using an algorithm developed by the NYU Center for Health and Public Service
Research.
In Table 1, I present average, annualized quality of care measures for my treatment
& control groups. These measures indicate that those in public Medicaid have higher
rates of readmissions and preventable ER visits, although this could partly be a
function of their higher overall levels of utilization.
3.4 Government Expenditures Metrics
I construct individual-level measures of government Medicaid expenditures, using
elds from the CMS administrative data. I track Medicaid spending at a person-
month level, including the overall level and spending on various subcategories of care
(such as long-term care, inpatient care, and pharmaceuticals). Separately, I track
government payments to private Medicaid plans, at a person-month level, for each
private Medicaid enrollee
3.5 Pharmaceutical Data
I track prescription drug utilization, using claims-level data obtained from CMS. This
data covers all Medicaid recipients in New York (including those in private Medicaid
plans), for the 1999-2011 period. Prior to October 2011, prescription drug utilization
was tracked directly by the state, for all Medicaid recipients (including private ones).
For the period subsequent to October 2011, the data also covers public and private
enrollees, but it comes from two di¤erent sources-New York state and private plans.5
5At that point, private plans started covering drug services directly, and also became responsible
for tracking these drug services, while the state tracked drug activity for public enrollees; fortunately,
all of these data make use of a standard format, and can be linked across time.
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This data includes information on the types of drugs bought, including individual
drug-identiers (NDC codes), as well as generic vs. non generic status. In addition,
the data species the quantity of each drug included in a prescription, the overall
cost of that drug, the ll date associated with each claim, along with the ID of the
prescribing physician. Finally, the data includes beneciary-level identiers, which
facilitate linking to other administrative Medicaid data.
3.6 Additional Data
I obtain county-level data, from the New York State Department of Health, on
the timetable of New Yorks private Medicaid Enrollment Mandates. These mandates
were implemented in a staggered fashion, across counties and across years. New York
State implemented two di¤erent types of enrollment mandates-one specic to children
& non-disabled adults (non-SSI) and the other specic to disabled & other populations
(SSI). For the timetable of disabled (SSI) mandates, see Appendix Table 11. Note
that the mandates were fully implemented about one year subsequent to the listed
o¢ cialdates.
4 Identication and Empirical Strategy
Public and private Medicaid not only di¤er in the treatment they provide patients,
but also in their enrollment composition; in fact, when the choice between public and
private Medicaid is voluntary, private Medicaid typically attracts a healthier set of
enrollees (Glied 2000, Morrissey 2012, Brown et al 2014). As such, any naive compari-
son between public and private Medicaid may capture patient composition di¤erences
between the two, rather than possible treatment di¤erences. To decompose the e¤ects
of treatment from those of patient composition, I focus on situations where individ-
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uals involuntarily switch between the public and private options; in such situations,
only private Medicaid enrollment status will change, while patient composition will
remain xed
For my primary identication strategy, I implement a di¤erences-in-discontinuities
strategy. This strategy leverages involuntary switching from private to public Med-
icaid at the age of 65, among those initially in the private option. This involuntary
switching is driven by a New York State rule prohibiting private Medicaid enrollment
among those simultaneously in Medicare; Medicare eligibility, meanwhile, typically
arises at 65. Given that my identication strategy relies, at least indirectly, on the
the age 65 Medicare eligibility rule, it relates to the approach taken by Card, Dobkin,
and Maestas (2008) in their study on Medicare. Altogether, those initially in the
private option, pre-65, will make-up the treatment group, while those initially in the
public option will form the control group. Both the treatment and control groups will
be restricted to those who were only in Medicaid (and not simultaneously enrolled in
Medicare), pre-65.
Not everyone in the treatment group will be subject to the actual treatment (a
small fraction will remain in private Medicaid, post-65, as some are ineligible for
Medicare post-65 6); as such, the results would capture an intent-to-treat e¤ect, and
would need scaling to reect the e¤ect of the actual treatment.
At 65, those switching from private to public Medicaid will concurrently gain
Medicare coverage, requiring that I separate out the e¤ect of Medicare. My research
design facilitates this, given that the control group gains Medicare coverage, but has
unchanging Medicaid status. As such, the di¤erential between the treatment and
control group e¤ects would reect the impact of private Medicaid disenrollment.
6To be eligible for Medicare at 65, an individual must be a U.S. citizen or permanent resident,
and must have resided in the U.S. for a minimum of ve years.
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The primary identifying assumption is that Medicares e¤ect is identical across
the privately and publicly Medicaid enrolled. This identifying assumption could be
threatened if Medicares e¤ect is heterogeneous across sickness levels. To address
this concern, I re-run all of these analyses using an instrumented measure of private
(as opposed to public) Medicaid status, immediately pre-65; this instrument can be
constructed using my secondary identication strategy, which I review below. With
this instrument, I can set private Medicaid status to be independent of health and
other characteristics, and thereby satisfy the identifying assumption.
Another identifying assumption is that no di¤erential pre-trends exist between the
treatment and control groups. As part of this, the assumption is that individuals are
not strategically delaying or hastening care, in anticipation of coverage changes at
65. To conrm the validity of this assumption, I check for visual as well as statistical
evidence of di¤erential pre-trends.
A nal identifying assumption here is that no concurrent changes are taking place
at 65 (apart from those mentioned above), which would di¤erentially impact the
treatment group. One potential concern, that individualsemployment status often
changes at that age, should not be applicable to the sample here; the treatment as
well as control groups are made up entirely of SSI disability recipients, who have
limited labor market activity. No other relevant changes appear to take place then,
such as to medical coverage, disability status, or employment.
Altogether, the estimating equation for the primary analysis takes the following
form, for individual i, at time t.
yit=  + 0  InitiallyPvti+1  Post65it+2InitiallyPvti  Post65it +Xit   + "it
(Equation #1)
I also include gender, quarter-year, and county xed e¤ects, along with a exible
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control for age. For this baseline specication, the sample is restricted to disabled
Medicaid enrollees in New York in 1999-2010.
Since the estimated value of 2 will reect the intent-to-treat impact, it needs
to be scaled to reect the actual e¤ect of treatment, based on the fraction of those
initially in private Medicaid actually switching to the public option, at 65.
As part of my secondary identication strategy, I focus on involuntary switching
from public to private Medicaid plans; this takes place under newly introduced enroll-
ment requirements-or mandates-that required certain groups of Medicaid recipients
to enroll in the private option. As previously discussed, I also combine this secondary
strategy with my primary strategy, as a robustness test of the results from the pri-
mary strategy alone. My identifying variation is based o¤ county-time heterogeneity
in the implementation of these enrollment requirements. For disabled Medicaid recip-
ients, the introduction of these enrollment requirements began in 2005 and continued
through the end of my study period.7
Even among this treatment group, of Medicaid-only enrollees, some individuals
may be exempt from mandated private Medicaid enrollment. Unfortunately, the
nature of these exemptions makes it di¢ cult to identify who is and who isnt exempt;
moreover, since exemption status may be endogenous to health status, individuals
with exemptions remain as part of the sample.8
Altogether, the key instrument here is based on whether an enrollment mandate
was ALREADY in e¤ect in an individuals county of residence. Below, I present the
rst stage regression for this, estimating the e¤ect of mandates on private Medicaid
7By the end of the study period, about 80% of disabled New York Medicaid recipients lived
in a county with an enrollmentmandate in e¤ect. Note that before the implementation of these
mandates, Medicaid recipients had the option to voluntarily enroll in private Medicaid, and about
35% of them did so.
8Exemptions were made for those qualifying as dual-eligibles, mental health patients, long-term
nursing home residents, and for participants in a number of special treatment programs.
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enrollment status, for individual i, in county c, at time t. I also include exible
controls for age, along with a county specic time trend, as well as county, gender
and quarter-year xed e¤ects.
PvtMedicaidStatusict=  + 0  PostMandatect+Xict   + "ict
(Equation #2)
In the second stage regression, shown below, I estimate the e¤ect of private Med-
icaid on outcome variable y, for individual i, in county c, at time t. I include a
linear control for age, along with gender, year, and county xed e¤ects. I also include
controls for county and group-specic linear trends, across the treatment and control
groups.
The coe¢ cient, 0, captures the causal e¤ect of private Medicaid enrollment on
various outcome variables of interest.
yict=  + 0 \PvtMedicaidStatusct+Xict   + "ict
(Equation #3)
For this identication strategy to be valid, on its own, mandate counties must be
on parallel trends to non-mandate counties, or the non-parallel trends should be fully
captured by my linear and trend controls. However, when this strategy is combined
with my primary one, these identication assumptions can be substantially relaxed.
5 Results
5.1 The Impact of Age 65 & of Enrollment Mandates on
Managed Care Enrollment Status
The Impact of Age 65
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In Figure 1, I graphically document a sharp drop in private Medicaid enrollment
rates-at age 65-among those initially in private Medicaid (as of age 63). This decline at
65 is much sharper than the prevailing pre-65 downward trend in Medicaid enrollment
rates. Further, no corresponding change is observed at 65, among the group initially
in public Medicaid.
Next, I statistically document this relationship, and nd that about two-thirds of
those initially in private Medicaid switch to the public option, at age 65 (the relevant
point estimate is found in Table 2, column one, under the Post65*InitiallyPrivate
term). For these analyses, I use the baseline specication (Equation 1), where the
outcome of interest is at a person-month level, and the sample is restricted to those
who were in Medicaid-only (by virtue of disability) at age 63, and to the 63 to 67 age
range.
The measured e¤ect is two-thirds, rather than complete (that is, not all of those
initially in private Medicaid involuntarily switch to the public option, at 65). This can
be partly attributed to ongoing switching from private to public Medicaid over the
pre-period, among 20% of the original cohort (as implied by the point estimate on the
Initially Private term, in column one). Further, many of those in private Medicaid will
not be forced to switch to the public option at 65, as not all will be Medicare-eligible
at that age (which is the underlying driver of private Medicaid disenrollment).9 Given
that private Medicaid disenrollment only a¤ects part of my treatmentgroup, at 65,
my main estimates will reect an intent-to-treate¤ect rather than the impact on
those actually treated. As such, to get at the actual treatment e¤ect, my results
will need to be scaled by 1.5.
I perform an additional robustness check, examining whether the treatment and
9To be eligible for Medicare at 65, an individual must be a U.S. citizen or permanent resident,
and must have resided in the U.S. for a minimum of ve years.
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control groups gain supplemental Medicare coverage at the same rate, at 65. I nd
no statistically signicant di¤erence in the rates at which these groups obtain such
coverage at 65 (around 80% gain coverage, as reported in column 2).
The Impact of Enrollment Mandates
I also explore the impact of enrollment mandates on switching from public to
private Medicaid. Altogether, I nd that the imposition of mandates was associated
with a 20-30% increase in the corresponding share of Medicaid recipients in the pri-
vate option. The results are presented in Appendix Table 1, based on the baseline
specication (from Equation 2). These estimates are robust to the inclusion of addi-
tional controls and sample restrictions, including the use of dual-enrollees in Medicaid
and Medicare as a control group (since these individuals are exempt from mandates).
The e¤ect of mandates on private Medicaid status is somewhat limited, since
certain Medicaid recipients (such as long-time nursing home residents) are not subject
to them. Unfortunately, there is no way to precisely identify individuals who are
exempt, based on the information contained in the administrative data, resulting in
some exempt individuals being assigned to my treatment group.
5.2 The Impact of Private Medicaid on Overall Inpatient
Utilization
Using my primary instrument for private/public Medicaid status, I consider
its e¤ect on overall inpatient hospital use, as well as inpatient use on the extensive
margin. While hospital care accounts for over one-third of health care spending,
the e¤ects observed in this setting might not carry over to other settings; rather,
hospital care reductions may be o¤set by outpatient care increases. However, previous
studies provide no evidence of such o¤sets (Manning et al 1987), meaning that any
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osensible e¢ ciency improvements in this setting might not be an artifact of e¢ ciency
deteriorations elsewhere.
Further, the hospital setting may be a sensible setting for detecting e¢ ciency
improvement, given that hospital care is expensive relative to other medical services.
As a corollary, the magnitude of e¢ ciency improvement in the inpatient setting-from
managed care-might not be representative of the impact on other care settings.
In my main results, my instrument for private (as opposed to public) Medicaid en-
rollment status is based on whether someone initially in private Medicaid has reached
65. My sample restrictions remain unchanged from before, with the observation-
level being at a person-month level and sample selection not being conditional on
utilization. I present a companion set of results, based o¤ my secondary instrument
(enrollment mandates), in the Appendix.
In Figures 1 and 2, I document a sharp jump in annual inpatient days and total
hospital visits, at 65, among those initially in private Medicaid. Further, I show
that this discontinuity is absent among those initially in public Medicaid. Finally,
I document an absence of di¤erential pre-trends and nd no evidence of di¤erential
post-trends (suggesting that my results are not driven by pent-up demand). Since
the colored bands in this graph reect 95% condence intervals, these e¤ects appear
to be statistically signicant.
I proceed to statistically examine the e¤ect of age 65 on various annualized mea-
sures of inpatient utilization, such as the number of visits and the inpatient days
stayed. My estimates, which are presented in Table 3, imply that switching from
private to public Medicaid results in an approximately 20% increase in individual
inpatient utilization. The e¤ects on number of hospital visits and other utilization
metrics (such as annualized days in hospital) appear comparable, suggesting that
much of overall impact may be through the extensive margin. However, decompos-
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ing the extensive (vs intensive) margin e¤ects could be challenging, given possible
extensive margin changes to visit composition. As shown in the bottom two panels,
my estimates are also robust to using a narrower age window (64 to 66), and also
to instrumenting for initial private status using my secondary strategy. The latter
strategy is meant to conrm that the main e¤ect is not driven by di¤erential impact
of supplementary Medicare coverage, particularly across health levels.
In Table 3, the key point estimates are found under the Initially Private*Post 65
term, and need to be scaled by 1.5 to get at the actual e¤ect of switching from private
to public Medicaid (given that 65% of those initially in private Medicaid switched
to public Medicaid, at 65). For example, for total days stayed (under column 1),
the point estimate of .335 in the top panel implies that switching from private to
public Medicaid results in .50 (or 18%) more annual days in the hospital. Given the
corresponding standard error, I can rule out an increase under 9%, or above 27%, with
95% condence. In addition, I nd that the point estimate on the Post 65 term is a
relatively modest -.064, and is not highly signicant; this suggests that the additional
onset of Medicare eligibility, at 65, does not have a meaningful e¤ect on utilization
among the control group. This limited impact should ease concerns about possible
threats to identication, from onset of supplemental Medicare eligibility. Finally,
I nd that the point estimate on the Initially Private Medicaid term is a highly
signicant -1.201; this estimate reects the magnitude of advantageous selection into
private Medicaid.
In Appendix Table 3, I present results for these same outcome variables, using
an alternate identication strategy (enrollment mandates). While the main point
estimates for these results are not signicant, this could be largely a function of larger
standard errors. In fact, the 95% condence intervals from this approach contain the
point estimates from my primary identication strategy.
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5.3 The E¤ect of Private Medicaid on E¢ ciency of Inpatient
Care
I then examine whether lower hospital utilization under private Medicaid comes from
e¢ ciency improvements, or instead comes from reduced patient welfare. To do so,
I divide hospital visits into prevention-sensitive and non-prevention sensitive cate-
gories. Prevention sensitive visits, such as readmissions or ER visits, could be re-
duced through improved inpatient & outpatient care, and without adverse impact
to patients. Meanwhile, a reduction in non-prevention sensitive visits, such as joint
surgeries, may not reect increased e¢ ciency and would be more likely to adversely
impact patients. The sample selection and empirical approach here is consistent with
the previous sections.
In Figure 3, I document a sharp jump in readmissions among the treatment group,
at 65, without any corresponding change among the control group. In addition, the
gure provides no evidence of di¤erential pre-trends across the treatment and control
groups, and no evidence of attenuation of the e¤ect over the post-period.
In statistical analyses, I nd that switching from private to public Medicaid is
accompanied by a substantial increase in prevention-sensitive visits, which include
readmissions, admissions from the ER, and avoidableadmissions (per AHRQs clas-
sication). Simultaneously, I nd a much less pronounced increase in non-prevention
sensitive care, such as general surgeries and joint/hip replacements. These results are
presented Table 4, with the estimates being consistent across the three panels. For
example, I nd that switching from private to public Medicaid is accompanied by
an increase in person-year readmissions of .027 (or 25%), given the point estimate of
.018 on the Initially Private*Post 65 term in the top panel (which needs to be scaled
by 1.5 to reect the actual treatment e¤ect). Hospital readmission reductions could
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result from improved inpatient as well as outpatient care. Meanwhile, I nd that
under switching, non ER and non-readmission visits, per person-year, increase only
by about .010 (or 7%), which represents a much more modest increase.
I also statistically examine the e¤ect of switching from private to public Medicaid
on additional measures of patient welfare, such as distance traveled to hospital and
the quality of hospitals visited. Given that these measures are conditional on hos-
pitalization, I structure the analytic data to be at a hospitalization (rather than at
a person-month) level. I also include DRG (diagnosis group) xed e¤ects as part of
these analyses, so that my estimates are robust to potential compositional changes to
hospitalizations. In the results, which are shown in Table 5, I nd that such switching
has no signicant impact on patientstravel times to hospitals, and can rule out a
change of greater than 2%, with 95% condence. More generally, in results not shown
here, I nd no e¤ect from private Medicaid on hospital network breadth, as private
plansnetworks appear comparable in completeness to the FFS network. I also nd
no evidence of a meaningful e¤ect on the quality or type of hospital visited, based on
hospital-level measures such as risk-adjusted mortality and readmissions rates. For
these measures, I nd the estimated e¤ects to be insignicant, and can generally rule
out e¤ects of greater than 1% of the baseline, with 95% condence.
Altogether, these results suggest that reduced inpatient utilization under private
Medicaid may reect e¢ ciency improvement, rather than reduced patient welfare.
In Appendix Table 3, I focus on these same outcome variables, while using an
alternate instrument for private Medicaid enrollment status (enrollment mandates).
There, I nd no signicant e¤ect of private Medicaid enrollment on these measures;
however, the standard errors are again quite large, with the 95% condence intervals
again encompassing my main estimates.
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5.4 Private Medicaids Impact on Quantity and E¢ ciency of
Outpatient Hospital Care
I also examine the causal e¤ect of private vs. public Medicaid enrollment on outpa-
tient hospital utilization; given that some outpatient hospital care is relatively ex-
pensive and also potentially preventable, a reduction in such visits could also reect
e¢ ciency improvements. As previously, my measures reect annualized utilization at
a person-month level; I also implement the baseline controls and sample restrictions
from before.
I statistically examine the e¤ect of switching from private to public Medicaid on
prevention sensitive types of outpatient visits (such as ER ones), along with visits that
are less sensitive to prevention (such as outpatient surgeries). I nd a substantial and
highly signicant e¤ect on overall ER Visits (including those that do not result in
inpatient admissions), along with an e¤ect on a subclass of ER visits that is designated
as particularly preventable. Meanwhile, I nd no signicant e¤ect on outpatient
surgeries. Altogether, this suggests that private Medicaid a¤ects outpatient hospital
utilization primarily through reductions to prevention-sensitive visits. The results are
reported in Table 6.
For general ER visits, the point estimate of .055 on the key term of interest, Init
Private*Post 65, and when properly scaled implies that there about .082 (or about
11%) more ER visits per year under public than under private Medicaid. In addition,
for outpatient hospital surgeries, the key point estimate is insignicant, and suggests
that a reduction of more than 10% can be ruled out with 95% condence.
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5.5 Mechanisms Behind Private Medicaids E¢ ciency Im-
pact
In the previous tables, I provided some evidence that private Medicaid enhances ef-
ciency. I proceed by focusing on a specic type of prevention sensitive visit-inpatient
readmissions.
First, I show that most of the reduction in these readmissions-under private
Medicaid-cannot be explained by compositional changes to initial visits. Rather,
the e¤ect on readmissions remains even when holding the composition of initial ad-
missions xed; this suggests that reduced readmission rates could reect improved
e¢ ciency, rather than something unrelated. In addition, I show that the reduction in
readmissions cannot be explained by shifts to more e¢ cient hospitals.
In these analyses, I structure my data to be at an individual hospitalization level
and restrict the data to initial admissions. Otherwise, I incorporate the baseline
sample restrictions and controls from before. The outcome variable of interest denotes
the likelihood of readmission within 60-days of the initial admission, and as such is
binary. I present estimates for various analyses in Table 7, for the key variable,
Initially Private*Post 65; these need to be further scaled by 1.5 to reect the actual
e¤ect of switching from private to public Medicaid.
When not conditioning on either the site of the initial hospitalization, nor on
the type of initial hospitalization, the point estimate (in column one) implies that
the conditional probability of a readmission is 3.6% higher under public than under
private Medicaid (the baseline likelihood is 16%). I nd that this e¤ect is attenuated
by one-eighth when including diagnostic class (DRG) xed e¤ects, and that about one-
third of the e¤ect disappears when including more granular diagnosis (ICD-9) xed
e¤ects. Finally, I nd that these results are not sensitive to the inclusion of individual
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hospital xed e¤ects (corresponding to the site of initial hospitalization). Since the
aforementioned mechanisms may explain only about a third of private Medicaids
e¤ect, the mechanisms for the remaining two-thirds of the e¤ect remain unaccounted
for. Based on conversations with various stakeholders, these mechanisms may include
supply shifts, in terms of changing within-hospital behavior. These mechanisms could
also include changes to outpatient care, such as increased home care immediately
following a hospitalization.
I perform additional statistical analyses on whether this readmissions e¤ect could
be explained by shifts to more e¢ cient hospitals. As part of my implementation, I
rst construct a hospital-level measure of readmissions rates. This measure is derived
by looking to the public Medicaid population, regressing on likelihood of readmission
(conditional on initial admission), and subsequently backing out hospital-level xed
e¤ects. In identifying these hospital-level xed e¤ects, I also control for individual
level demographics (age and race) and for the nature of the initial hospitalization
(using ICD-9 xed e¤ects). The results, which are presented in Table 8, suggest that
only 5% of the estimated e¤ect on readmissions (or .001 readmissions out of .024, per
person-year), are attributable to shifts to other hospitals.
Unfortunately, I am unable to further delve into these mechanisms, given my
current data.
5.6 Pass-Through to Governments
In the previous section, I provided evidence of e¢ ciency gains, under Medicaid pri-
vatization, and also showed that theres no evidence of pass-through to patients. I
proceed to further explore the incidence of e¢ ciency gains under Medicaid privatiza-
tion, by examining possible pass-through to governments, in the form of cost savings.
Unfortunately, I cannot identify privatizations e¤ect on spending, using my pri-
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mary identication strategy, as I am unable to track spending among those concur-
rently in Medicare (hence, I am largely unable to track spending in the post-period).
Instead, I instrument for private Medicaid status using my secondary strategy, of
enrollment mandates. In constructing a measure of total government spending, at a
person-quarter level, I include government spending on all those in public Medicaid
(in the form of fee-for-service payments) and those in private Medicaid (in the form
of premium payments to insurers). I also include government spending on medical
services that remain directly administered and paid for by the government, even for
those in private Medicaid plans (such services are referred to as carve-outs). Given
that managed care implementation may alter the overall composition of enrollees in
Medicaid (Currie and Fahr 2005), I restrict my sample to those in Medicaid in the
year preceding the mandates (2004). The results of these analyses are presented in
Table 9.
First, I nd no evidence of a reduction in overall government spending, under
privatization. Rather, given the point estimate and standard error shown in column
1, I can rule out a spending reduction from privatization in excess of 5%, with 95%
condence. This result is robust to di¤erent time trends.
In addition, I examine the e¤ect of Medicaid privatization on government spend-
ing on carved-in services; such services are nancially and logistically covered by
private plans (for anyone enrolled in them). By focusing on these services, I am able
to get at privatizations scal impact, independent of certain manifestations of in-
complete contracting (such as cost-shifting to services that are universally covered by
the government, even for those in private Medicaid). I nd that when looking to such
carved-inspending, the point estimate on my instrument is not statistically signi-
cant, even though it is negative. Part of the limited cost-savings observed here-even
in the absence of cost shifting-could be attributable to di¤erences in provider reim-
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bursement levels, which are about 15% higher under private than public Medicaid.
As such, limited pass-through to governments could partly be explained by provider
capture of some portion of e¢ ciency gains.
I also nd evidence that pass-through could be further limited by incomplete
contracting. To this end, under privatization, I identify a 15% increase in expenditures
on carved-outservices, or services that were covered by the government (even for
those in private Medicaid). This increase could be an attempt by plans to cost-shift
towards services for which they dont bear costs, while substituting away from those
services for which they are nancially responsible. In the following section, I further
explore this phenomenon, and examine whether it is a causal result of incomplete
contracting, or an artifact of something unrelated.
5.7 Identifying the Extent to Which Incomplete Contracting
Reduces Pass-Through
While spending on carved-out services, such as prescription drugs, is higher under
private than under public Medicaid, this isnt necessarily indicative of cost shifting
by plans. For instance, such carved-out services may coincide with relatively e¢ cient
forms of care; as such, private Medicaid plans (or managed care plans generally)
may use more of these services, even if incurring the complete cost. To decompose
the e¤ects of incomplete contracting from those of private/managed care, I focus on
prescription drug services, which accounted for the plurality of all carved-out ser-
vices spending. I rst examine the e¤ect of private Medicaid (relative to public) on
the use of these services, while these were excluded from private Medicaid contracts;
the result of this analysis captures the combined e¤ects of managed care and incom-
plete contracting. In addition, I consider how utilization of these services changes in
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October 2011, when they were bundled into existing contracts (and plans were made
nancially responsible for them); here, only the e¤ect of incomplete contracting would
be captured, separate from that of managed care.
E¤ect of Incomplete Contracting: Under Switch Between Public & Pri-
vate Medicaid
When examining the impact of private Medicaid enrollment on prescription drug
utilization, I instrument for private Medicaid status using enrollment mandates (my
secondary identication strategy, involving involuntary shifts from public to private
Medicaid). The results, which can be found in the top panel of Table 10, indicate that
individual-level switching from public to private Medicaid is associated with a highly
signicant 15-20% increase in prescription drug spending (by the government). This
increase is not accompanied by a corresponding change in the number of prescriptions,
and I can rule out an increase in excess of 9%, with 95% condence. As such, increases
in drug spending could instead come through changing prescription composition, such
as the use of more branded or of fewer generic drugs. These more expensive drugs
could more e¤ectively substitute for other types of care, such as hospital or outpatient
services; as such, plans would have every incentive to use these expensive drugs (given
they dont bear their cost), since these could substitute for services that plans would
otherwise have to pay for.
I also instrument for private Medicaid status using my primary strategy, involving
age 65. However, the results from this strategy might not reect the true magnitude
of cost changes; individuals here would be switching from private to public Medicaid,
and inertia could bias against downgrading to less expensive drugs, but might not
bias against upgrading to more expensive ones. This said, while the estimates here
are more modest, they still imply 10% higher drug expenditures under public than
under private Medicaid, with the results presented in the bottom panel. Note that
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to ensure consistency with the top panel, I invert the coe¢ cient of interest to be
Initially Private*Pre 65 (rather than Initially Private*Post 65). While the top panel
focuses on the mandate period of 2004-2010, the bottom panel extends from 1999
to 2005. The bottom panel excludes the subsequent period, given the 2006 shift in
drug coverage from Medicaid to Medicare (from the intro of Part D), for those with
supplementary Medicare coverage.
E¤ect of Incomplete Contracting: Under Bundling of Prev. Excluded
Services
I proceed to examine the e¤ect of bundling prescription drug services into existing
private Medicaid contracts, which was implemented in October 2011. I try to capture
the di¤erence between an incomplete contract and a (more) complete counterfactual
(at least with respect to prescription drug services), while holding other factors con-
stant. For example, the set of active contracts does not change throughout the period
on which I focus (three months pre and post), making my results robust to compo-
sitional changes in contracts. Further, I hold xed the set of enrollees, focusing on
disabled individuals who were enrolled in private Medicaid three months prior to the
carve-in (July 2011), and still enrolled as of December 2011 (note that this amounts
to about 95% of the original July cohort). Unfortunately, since my data only extends
through December 2011, I will mostly be capturing the short-run and not the long-run
e¤ect.
Altogether, I nd that bundling reduces prescription drug expenditures, and that
this reduction is driven primarily by shifts to less expensive drugs (rather than by
a decrease in the overall number of prescriptions). I also demonstrate that these
results are not driven by pre-trends. This said, I do nd evidence of a post-trend,
which suggests the e¤ect of bundling isnt instantaneous. The estimates using this
approach-which isolates the e¤ect of incomplete contracting-are consistent with those
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from previous approach (which captures the combined e¤ect of incomplete contracting
and managed care). Throughout these analyses, which are shown in Table 11, all
observations and outcome variables are set at a person-month level. In addition,
all point estimates are denoted relative to the baseline month-September 2011-which
immediately precedes the carve-in.
Looking at changes in person-month prescriptions from September to December
2011, I nd an increase of .366 in overall prescriptions (amounting to 15%), which
breaks down to a decrease in branded prescriptions of .212 (or about 20%), and
an increase in generics of .441 (also about 20%).10 To measure utilization, I also
construct a standardized measure of drug costs11, and nd a decrease of about $57
per person-month (or 17%) from September to December 2011.
Finally, I nd that actual government spending, per individual in private Medic-
aid, decreases by a highly signicant $35/month (or 4%) from September to December
2011. This result suggests that just one form of incomplete contracting-the exclusion
of prescription drugs from private Medicaid contracts-increased contracting costs by
4%. This estimate provides empirical support for existing theory, showing that in-
complete contracting can indeed substantially increase contracting costs. In addition,
since I look at only one type of incomplete contracting, this nding should be viewed
as a oor estimate for incomplete contractings overall impact.
In results not shown here, I examine whether the reduction in drug spending,
through the carve-in, is accompanied by an inpatient utilization o¤set. I nd no
signicant change to inpatient utilization following the change, and can rule out an
increase in excess of 5% of the baseline, although this only reects short-run impact.
10Note that these classications were not available for all drugs, and hence that the sum of the
following estimates wont correspond to the main result.
11This reect average drug prices in public Medicaid. As such, this measure is not a¤ected by
potential price di¤erences (pre & post-carve in) for the same drug.
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In other results not shown here, I consider the mechanisms by which plans a¤ect
drug use, following bundling. Anecdotally, these e¤ects could come from restrictive
formularies implemented by plans, placing more stringent limits on use of branded
and expensive drugs than exist under the public option.
I also consider the extent to which an additional mechanism drives these results-
a shift to di¤erent providers. To do so, I use prescription-level data, and look at
whether the e¤ect of the carve-in on proportion of branded drugs is at all sensitive to
the inclusion of provider FEs (corresponding to the prescribing provider); I nd that
the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these FEs, suggesting that the e¤ect is
mediated through within-provider behavioral changes, rather than shifts to di¤erent
providers. The imposition of stringent formularies, which was mentioned previously,
could explain some of this changing physician behavior.
5.8 Is E¢ ciency Dependent on For-Prot Status?
On the whole, private Medicaid appears to produce e¢ ciency improvements, relative
to the public option; however, there could be heterogeneity across contractors-within
Medicaid as well as elsewhere-in their capacity for e¢ ciency improvements. Di¤er-
ences in contractor performance could be driven by heterogeneity in a variety of
underlying contractor characteristics, and here I focus in on a specic characteristic:
the contractors for-prot status. Unfortunately, in the private Medicaid setting, for-
prot status is correlated with a variety of other characteristics, as for-prot insurers
tend to be large, multi-state entities, while not-for-prot insurers tend to be smaller
and more limited in terms of geography, and also in the patients they serve (some
only o¤er Medicaid products). As such, these results on the e¤ects of for-prot status
should be viewed as suggestive, rather than causal.
I rst examine whether for-prot plans produced lower hospital utilization than
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not-for-prot ones; such analyses are complicated by potential patient composition
di¤erences across plan types. To identify this e¤ect, independent of patient com-
position, I leverage my primary identication strategy of involuntary disenrollment
from private Medicaid, at 65; individuals will converge to the same type of coverage,
post-65, regardless of whether they were in a for-prot or not-for-prot plan, pre-65.
Using this strategy, I can identify treatment di¤erences between these plans (based
on di¤erential changes at 65), as well as selection di¤erences (based on di¤erent lev-
els of utilization, post-65). Throughout these analyses, I make use of my baseline,
person-month level sample, and denote initial for-prot enrollment status as of age
63.
Figure 4 provides evidence that for-prot plans are much more e¤ective at reducing
utilization than not-for-prots, as it documents a sharp jump in days stayed among
those initially in for-prot plans, at 65, alongside a substantially more modest jump
among the not-for-prot cohort. Simultaneously, the gure does not provide any
evidence of di¤erential pre-trends.
In statistical analyses, I conrm this result and nd that for-prot insurers appear
to achieve greater utilization reductions across various utilization measures; when
properly scaled, the relevant point estimates imply 20-30% lower relative inpatient
utilization under for-prot, than under not-for-prot plans (based on the relevant
interaction term). The results for these analyses are presented in Table 12.
In these analyses, I am also able to identify selection di¤erences between for-prot
and not-for-prot plans, independent of treatment. In doing so, I nd that not-for-
prot plans attract healthier enrollees (relative to not-for-prots). This information
can be gleaned from the For Prot Status term, which identies post-65 di¤erences
in utilization, among those originally enrolled in for-prot and not-for-prot plans,
respectively. After all, 80% of the original for-prot and not-for-prot populations
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experience the same coverage type (public Medicaid), post-65.
Finally, I examine whether the reduction in inpatient utilization, under for-prot
plans, reects possible e¢ ciency improvements or instead might come at the expense
of patient welfare. Following the same approach as in my primary analyses, I nd that
the e¤ect comes disproportionately through reductions to prevention sensitive visits
(which could reect e¢ ciency improvement), with the results presented in Table 13.
6 Robustness
My primary identifying assumption is the absence of di¤erential trends across my
treatment and control groups. An additional identifying assumption is that the e¤ect
of supplemental Medicare coverage (at 65) on the treatment group is no greater than
it is on the control group. In the following section, I demonstrate that the e¤ect of
supplemental Medicare coverage is consistent across the treatment and control groups.
In addition, I document the absence of di¤erential pre-trends across my treatment and
control groups; I also nd only modest evidence of di¤erential post-trends, suggesting
that my results arent being driven by pent-up demand. Finally, I also show that my
results are robust to additional controls and to narrower bandwidth restrictions.
6.1 Validity of Instrument
One concern about my primary identication strategy is that private Medicaid disen-
rollment, at 65, is accompanied by the addition of supplementary Medicare coverage;
to address this concern, I have constructed a control group that also gains supplemen-
tary Medicare coverage, at 65, but that remains in public Medicaid (pre as well as
post 65). This strategy presumes that the impact of supplementary Medicare coverage
is the same across the treatment and control group (or those initially in private and
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public Medicaid, respectively); given that the treatment group is on average healthier,
this presumes that the e¤ect of supplementary Medicare is not heterogeneous across
health status.
Critically, I nd no signicant impact on the control group, from supplemental
Medicare coverage at 65; this suggests that these could be second-order concerns, even
if supplementary Medicare does have a di¤erential impact on the treatment group.
As an additional robustness check, I implement my two identication strategies in
tandem. I construct an instrument for an individuals private Medicaid status, pre-
65, using my secondary identication strategy. I then examine the age-65 e¤ect on
utilization, and how its magnitude varies with instrumented pre-65 private Medicaid
status (note that this instrumented term is not signicantly correlated with health
status). As noted previously and as shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4, this approach and
my primary one yield comparable estimates.
6.2 Di¤erential Trends
One of my identifying assumptions is that there are no di¤erential pre-trends in the
outcome measures, immediately preceding 65, which a¤ect the treatment but not the
control group.
However, I nd no statistical evidence of di¤erential pre-trends across my treat-
ment and control groups, when looking to my baseline sample. Rather, there appears
to be sharp jump in utilization among my treatment group at 65, relative to the
control group, and the spread between the two appears to increase further over the
post-period. This suggests that my main result is not being driven by di¤erential pre-
trends, and also that it isnt being driven by pent-up demand. Rather, these ndings
suggest that the long-run e¤ects of switching from private to public Medicaid may
actually exceed those from the short-run; as such, my main estimates, which reect
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the short-run e¤ect, could understate the long-run impact.
The ndings discussed above are presented in Appendix Table 5, with the co-
e¢ cients reecting the utilization spread between the initially private and public
Medicaid cohorts for di¤erent half year time periods; this is relative to the spread in
the half-year preceding 65.
6.3 Bandwidth Tests and Control Sensitivities
Consistent with Altonji et al (2005), I also examine whether my primary results-on
the utilization and e¢ ciency e¤ects of private Medicaid-are sensitive to the bandwidth
and controls chosen. In Appendix Table 7 and Appendix Table 8, I show that my
results hold up when focusing in on narrower sets of bandwidths (64 to 66, and 64.5
to 65.5). Meanwhile, In Appendix Table 9 and Appendix Table 10, I show that the
results hold up under di¤erent types of age controls, including linear, quadratic, cubic
controls. Finally, these results hold up when including treatment and control group
specic age controls, and also when incorporating separate age controls on either side
of the discontinuity.
7 Conclusion
While government contracting is pervasive, there is limited understanding of whether
it improves e¢ ciency, whether these e¢ ciency improvements are passed-through, and
whether certain contract designs are optimal. Looking to the Medicaid setting, I
show that private contractors are able to reduce inpatient utilization, relative to
government provision. I nd that this utilization reduction is driven by reductions to
preventable/unnecessary visits, and not by reductions to surgeries or other valuable
care. As such, my ndings suggest that private contractors (at least in this setting)
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reduce costs through e¢ ciency improvement, rather than at the expense of enrollee
welfare. Additional research is needed on privatizations impact across other health
care settings (such as non-inpatient), and on the attenuating or magnifying e¤ects of
market structure. Further research is also needed to identify the mechanisms driving
e¢ ciency improvement, and to decompose the e¤ect of incentives (in this setting,
capitation) from that of proprietary technology (in this setting, care management).
In this draft, I also show that incomplete contracting substantially limits pass-
through of e¢ ciency gains. As such, this research points to the value of broader
contracts, at least in terms of the scope of services covered. As I focus on only
a single form of incomplete contracting, future work could examine other types of
incomplete contracting.
Finally, I nd that the magnitude of e¢ ciency improvement is greater under for-
prot contractors, relative to not-for-prots, although factors other than for-prot
status could be at play here. Additional work is needed on the relationship between
a contractors characteristics, including for-prot status, and that contractors per-
formance.
40
8 Bibliography
2013 Actuarial Report on the Financial Outlook for Medicaid.Department of Health
and Human Services, 2013.
Aizer, A., Currie, J., and Moretti, E. Does Managed Care Hurt Health? Evidence
from Medicaid Mothers.The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2007, 89(3), 385-
399.
Altonji, J., Elder, T., and Taber, C. Selection on Observed and Unobserved Vari-
ables: Assessing the E¤ectiveness of Catholic Schools .Journal of Political Economy,
2005, 113(1), 151-184.
Baker, L & Brown, M. Managed Care, Consolidation Among Health Care Providers,
and Health Care: Evidence from Mammography. RAND Journal of Economics,
1999, 30(2), 351-374.
Brown, J., Duggan, M., Kuziemko, I, & Woolston, W. How does risk selection re-
spond to risk adjustment? New evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program.
Forthcoming, American Economic Review, 2014.
Card, D., Dobkin, C., & Maestas, N. The Impact of Nearly Universal Insurance
Coverage on Health Care Utilization.American Economic Review, 2008, 98(5), 2242-
2258.
Cutler, D., McClellan, M., and Newhouse, J. How Does Managed Care Do It?
RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, 31(3), 526-548.
Cutler D. and Sheiner L. Managed Care and the Growth of Medical Expenditures.
Forum for Health Economics & Policy, 1998, 1(1), 1-41.
Currie, J. and Fahr, J. Medicaid Managed Care: E¤ects on Childrens Medicaid
Coverage and Utilization.Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89(1), 85-108.
Dafny, L. & Ramanarayanan, S. Does it Matter if Your Health Insurer is For-Prot?
E¤ects of Ownership on Premiums, Insurance Coverage, and Medical Spending.
NBER Working Paper No 18266, 2013.
Damler, R. & Winkelman, R. Risk Adjustment in State Medicaid Programs.Health
Watch, 2008.
Duggan, M. Does Contracting Out Increase The E¢ ciency Of Government Pro-
41
grams? Evidence From Medicaid HMOs,Journal of Public Economics, 2004, 88(12),
2549-2572.
Duggan, M. Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending. Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 2000, 115 (4), 1343-1374.
Duggan, M. and Hayford, T. Has the Shift to Managed Care Reduced Medicaid
Spending? Evidence from State and Local-Level Mandates.Journal of Policy Analy-
sis and Management, 2013, 32(3), 505-535.
Evaluating Encounter Data Completeness.Lewin Group, 2012.
Glaeser, Edward and Shleifer, Andrei. Not-for-prot entrepreneurs. Journal of
Public Economics, 2001, 81(1), 99-115.
Glied, S.A. Managed Care.Handbook of Health Economics, 2000.
Gold, M et al. Medicare Advantage 2012 Data Spotlight. Kaiser Family Foun-
dation, 2012. Available at: http://www.k¤.org/medicare/upload/8323.pdf
Gowrisankaran, G., Town, R. & Barrette, E. Managed Care, Drug Benets, and
Mortality: An Analysis of the Elderly.Mimeo, January 2011.
Hansmann, Henry B. The Role of Nonprot Enterprise. The Yale Law Journal.
Vol. 89 (Apr., 1980) pp. 835-901
Hansmann, Henry B. Economic Theories of Nonprot Organization. In W.W. Pow-
ell, ed., The Nonprot Sector: A Research Handbook. New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1987.
Hansmann, Henry B. The Ownership of Enterprise. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1996.
Hart, O. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995).
Hart, O., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. The Proper Scope of Government: Theory
and an Application to Prisons. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112(4),
1127-1161
Landon, B, Zaslavsky, A., Saunders, R., Pawlson, L., Newhouse, J., and Ayanian, J.
Analysis Of Medicare Advantage HMOs compared with traditional Medicare shows
42
lower use of many services during 2003-09.Health A¤airs, 2012, 31, 2609-2617.
Manning, W., Newhouse J., Duan, N., Keeler E., and Leibowitz, A. Health Insur-
ance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment.
American Economic Review, 1987, 77(3), 251-277.
McGuire, T., Newhouse, J., and Sinaiko, A. An Economic History of Medicare Part
C.The Millbank Quarterly, 2011, 89, 289-323.
Medicaid Enrollment in Comprehensive Risk-Based Managed Care. Kaiser Fam-
ily Foundation, 2011.
Medicare Advantage Rate Setting and Risk Adjustment. Center for Health Strate-
gies Inc, October 2006.
Mello, M. M., Stearns, S. C., Norton, E. C. and Ricketts, T. C. (2003). Under-
standing biased selection in Medicare HMOs.Health Services Research, 38, 961-992.
Morrisey, M. A., Kilgore, M. L., Becker, D. J., Smith, W. and Delzell, E. Favorable
Selection, Risk Adjustment, and the Medicare Advantage Program.Health Services
Research, 2012.
National Health Expenditure Projections: 2013. Centers for Medicare & Medic-
aid Services, 2014.
Neal, Derek. The E¤ects of Catholic Secondary Schooling on Educational Achieve-
ment.Journal of Labor Economics, 1997, 15(1), 98-123.
Pinkovskiy, Maxim. The Impact of the Managed Care Backlash on Health Care
Costs.MIT, 2013, mimeo
People with Disabilities and Medicaid Managed Care: Key Issues to Consider.
Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012.
Report to the Congress: March 2010.MedPac, March 2010.
Rouse, Cecilia. Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evalua-
tion of the Miwaukee Parental Choice Program. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
1998, 113(2), 553-602
Savas, E. S. The Organization and E¢ ciency of Solid Waste Collection Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977.
43
Savas, E.S. Privatizing the Public Sector: How to Shrink Government. Chatham,
N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1982.
Savas, E. S. Privatization: The Key to Better Government. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham
House Publishers, 1987.
Shepard, M. Hospital Network Competition and Adverse Selection: Evidence from
the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange.Harvard University, mimeo, 2015.
Song Z., Cutler D.M., and Chernow M.E. Potential Consequences of Reforming
Medicare Into a Competitive Bidding System.The Journal of the American Medical
Association, 2012, 308(5), 459-460.
Sparer, M. Medicaid Managed Care Reexamined.Medicaid Institute at United Hos-
pital Fund, 2008. Available at http://www.medicaidinstitute.org/assets/493
Sparer, M. Medicaid managed care: Costs, access, and quality of care. Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation, 2012.
Whittaker, J. and Isaacs, K. Unemployment Insurance: Programs and Benets.
Congressional Research Service, 2014.
Zwanziger, J., Melnick, G, and Bamezai, A. The E¤ect of Selective Contracting
on Hospital Costs and Revenue.Health Services Research, 2000, 35(4), 849-867.
44
Figure 1: Inpatient Length of Stay Around Discontinuity
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Figure 2: Number of Inpatient Visits Around Discontinuity
.3
.3
5
.4
.4
5
N
o.
 o
f V
is
its
63 64 65 66 67
Age
Blue: Initially in Private Medicaid (Treatment)
Red: Initially in Public Medicaid (Control)
46
Figure 3: Number of Inpatient Readmissions Around Discontinuity
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Figure 4: Inpatient Length of Stay Around Discontinuity, for For-Prot and Not-For-
Prot Cohorts
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Initially Private Initially Public
Inp Utilization
Hosp Visits 0.331 0.402
(2.209) (2.474)
LOS 2.107 3.022
(23.284) (38.844)
Num Proc 0.722 0.849
(7.047) (7.626)
ER Admits 0.191 0.194
(1.613) (1.648)
Charges 9,896 11,371
(117,421) (129,294)
Inp Composition
Readmissions 0.079 0.111
(1.141) (1.391)
Prevent Hosp 0.071 0.093
(0.966) (1.128)
Surgeries 0.024 0.044
(0.539) (0.736)
ER Utilization
ER Visits 0.666 0.770
(3.496) (3.863)
Pharma
No. of Presc 4.477 4.736
(4.364) (4.823)
Presc Spending 3,171 3,555
(4,766) (5,538)
N 944,405 2,965,365
Notes: Panel presents summary statistics for my primary treatment and
control groups (those in private and public Medicaid at age 63, respec-
tively). This data covers the 1999-2010 period, and is aggregated at the
person-month level; however, the measures shown here have been annu-
alized. The sample is restricted to the age range between 63 and 67; it is
further restricted to those who were in New York and in Medicaid-only
at 63, by virtue of disability. This data was constructed using discharge-
level hospital data from New York State and person-month level Medic-
aid enrollment records from CMS; these two datasets were linked using
SSN and other elds, and subsequently aggregated to a person-month
level. Sample inclusion is not conditional on utilization.
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Table 2: E¤ect of Age 65 of Private Medicaid Status
(1) (2)
Private Medicaid Dual Medicaid and
Enrolled Medicare Enrolled
Mean (Pre-65) 0.298 0.026
(0.457) (0.159)
Init. Private*Post 65 -0.659*** 0.011*
(0.008) (0.006)
Post 65 -0.029*** 0.789***
(0.005) (0.009)
Initially Private 0.798*** 0.010***
(0.006) (0.002)
Restriction Ages 63 to 67
N 3,909,770
Init. Private*Post 65 -0.662*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.003)
Post 65 0.012*** 0.800***
(0.001) (0.002)
Initially Private 0.897*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.001)
Restriction Ages 64 to 66
N 2,329,769
\Init:Private*Post 65 -0.646*** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.005)
Post 65 0.010*** 0.764***
(0.002) (0.002)
\Init; Private 0.952*** 0.050***
(0.011) (0.008)
Restriction Ages 64 to 66
N 2,329,769
Notes: Table presents results of my rst-stage regression, a linear model with
private Medicaid enrollment status as the outcome and the interaction of Init.
Private*Post 65 as the instrument of interest. Init Private is dened as those
enrolled in private Medicaid, at the age of 63. The unit of observation is at the
person-month level, for the 1999-2010 period. Year-quarter, county, and gender
xed e¤ects are included as part of the analysis. The sample is restricted to
those enrolled in Medicaid-only at 63, by virtue of disability; the sample is also
restricted to New York State only. Finally, the sample is restricted to the 63
to 67 age range. Standard-errors are clustered at the individual level. The
original Medicaid enrollment administrative data is taken from CMS.
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Table 3: E¤ect of Private Medicaid on Inpatient Utilization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tot Len Sty Tot Procs Tot Chg Log Tot Chg Tot Visits
Mean 2.801 0.818 11,015 0.345 0.385
(35.714) (7.491) (126,530) (2.040) (2.413)
Init Private*Post 65 0.335*** 0.065*** 1,303*** 0.025*** 0.034***
(0.088) (0.024) (402) (0.007) (0.008)
Post 65 -0.064 0.037** 335 0.011** 0.010
(0.101) (0.019) (316) (0.005) (0.006)
Init. Private -1.201*** -0.204*** -4,408*** -0.092*** -0.107***
(0.067) (0.018) (284) (0.006) (0.007)
Sample Restriction Ages 63 to 67
N 3,909,770
Init Private*Post 65 0.479*** 0.106*** 1,859*** 0.028*** 0.039***
(0.103) (0.026) (441) (0.007) (0.009)
Post 65 -0.003 0.036 550 0.014** 0.010
(0.139) (0.023) (393) (0.006) (0.008)
Init. Private -1.398*** -0.270*** -5,180*** -0.113*** -0.133***
(0.085) (0.021) (332) (0.007) (0.008)
Sample Restriction Ages 64 to 66
N 2,329,769
\Init:Private*Post 65 0.370* 0.098* 1,732* 0.041*** 0.058***
(0.216) (0.054) (949) (0.015) (0.018)
Post 65 0.026 0.038 581 0.011 0.005
(0.154) (0.026) (439) (0.007) (0.009)
\Init:Private 0.643 0.170 349 0.077** 0.092**
(0.429) (0.107) (1568) (0.035) (0.042)
Sample Restriction Ages 64 to 66
N 2,329,769
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are annualized
measures of individual inpatient utilization. The key variable of interest is Init Private*Post
65, which captures the e¤ect of involuntary switching from private to public Medicaid; the
share of this group actually switching corresponds to about 65 %, based on my rst stage
estimates. Init Private is dened as those enrolled in private Medicaid, at the age of 63.
Year-quarter, county, and gender xed e¤ects are included as part of the analysis. The
unit of observation is at the person-month level, for the 1999-2010 period. The sample is
restricted to those enrolled in Medicaid-only at 63, by virtue of disability; the sample is
also restricted to New York State only. Finally, the sample is restricted to the 63 to 67 age
range. This data was constructed using discharge-level hospital data from New York State
and person-month level Medicaid enrollment records from CMS; these two datasets were
linked using SSN and other elds, and subsequently aggregated to a person-month level.
Sample inclusion is not conditional on utilization.
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Table 6: E¤ect of Private Medicaid on Outpatient Hospital Utilization
(1) (2) (3)
ER Visits Outp Surg Visits
All Avoidable All
Init. Private*Post 65 0.055*** 0.021* -0.001
(0.020) (0.011) (0.007)
Post 65 0.006 0.007 0.015***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.005)
Initially Private -0.173*** -0.061*** 0.009*
(0.016) (0.009) (0.005)
Male 0.052*** -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.015) (0.008) (0.004)
Age -0.619* -0.328 0.049
(0.354) (0.210) (0.139)
AgeSq 0.005* 0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Cohort Restriction At age 63, enrolled in Medicaid
AND NOT simultaneously enrolled in Medicare.
Age Restriction 63 to 67
Mean 0.736 0.370 0.206
(3.746) (2.372) (1.686)
N 2,294,206
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are annual-
ized measures of individual outpatient hospital utilization. The key variable of interest
is Init Private*Post 65, which captures the e¤ect of involuntary switching from private
to public Medicaid; the share of this group actually switching corresponds to about
65 %, based on my rst stage estimates. Init Private is dened as those enrolled in
private Medicaid, at the age of 63. Year-quarter, county, and gender xed e¤ects are
included as part of the analysis. The unit of observation is at the person-month level,
for the 1999-2010 period. The sample is restricted to those enrolled in Medicaid-only
at 63, by virtue of disability; the sample is also restricted to New York State only.
Finally, the sample is restricted to the 63 to 67 age range. This data was constructed
using visit-level hospital data from New York State and person-month level Medicaid
enrollment records from CMS; these two datasets were linked using SSN and other
elds, and subsequently aggregated to a person-month level. Sample inclusion is not
conditional on utilization.
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Table 7: Mechanisms for Private Medicaids E¤ect on Readmissions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Readm. Rate, Conditional on Hospitalization
Init. Private*Post 65 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.020** 0.017** 0.016** 0.022***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Initial DRG FES X X
Initial ICD-9 FEs X X
Initial Hosp FEs X X X
Mean 0.218
N 82,503
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variable is readmission
status, following initial hospitalization. The coe¢ cient reects the value of my private
Medicaid instrument, capturing the impact of private to public Medicaid switching (for the
65% of the initial cohort switching, at 65). The unit of observation is at the hospitalization
level, for the 1999-2010 period. The sample is restricted to initial hospitalizations, for those
enrolled in Medicaid-only at 63, by virtue of disability; the sample is also restricted to New
York State only. Finally, the sample is restricted to the 63 to 67 age range. This data was
constructed using discharge-level hospital data from New York State and person-month level
Medicaid enrollment records from CMS; these two datasets were linked using SSN and other
elds.
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Table 8: Decomposing Private Medicaids Readmissions E¤ect
(1) (2) (3)
Hosp Readm. Index
Init. Private*Post 65 0.001* 0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DRG FES X
ICD-9 FEs X
Mean -0.140
N 82,503
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variable
is a hospital-level readmission likelihood index, constructed previously by
me. Coe¢ cientreects the value of my private Medicaid instrument,
capturing the impact of private to public Medicaid switching (for the
65% of the initial cohort switching, at 65). The unit of observation is at
the initial hospitalization level, for the 1999-2010 period. The sample is
restricted to initial hospitalizations, for those enrolled in Medicaid-only
at 63, by virtue of disability; the sample is also restricted to New York
State only. Finally, the sample is restricted to the 63 to 67 age range.
This data was constructed using discharge-level hospital data from New
York State and person-month level Medicaid enrollment records from
CMS; these two datasets were linked using SSN and other elds.
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Table 9: Pass-Through of E¢ ciency Gains to Government
(1) (2) (3)
Spending
Overall Carved-In Carved-Out
\Priv:MedicaidEnrolled 730 -282 1,008***
(1,049) (981) (276)
Year Range 2004-2010
Mean 24,274 17,644 6,631
N 1,607,790
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variable is annualized
government Medicaid spending, per-enrollee. The private Medicaid instrument is
constructed based o¤enrollment mandates. Year, county, gender, and age xed e¤ects
are also included, along with various time-trend controls. The unit of observation
is at the person-year level, for the 2004-2010 period. The sample is restricted to
those enrolled in Medicaid-only as of 2004, by virtue of disability; the sample is
also restricted to New York State only. This data was constructed using person-year
Medicaid spending records and person-month Medicaid enrollment records, both from
CMS.
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Table 10: E¤ect on Utilization of Excluded Prescription Services
(1) (2) (3)
No. of Presc Log Pharma
Presc Spend Spend
\Priv:MedicaidEnrolled 0.188 416** 0.196**
(0.282) (170) (0.083)
Year Range: 2004-2010
Mean 8.141 2,985 4.499
N 10,778,876
Init. Private*Pre 65 0.015 -11 0.071*
(0.047) (54) (0.036)
Pre 65 0.005 29 -0.013
(0.017) (22) (0.014)
Init. Private -0.349*** -521*** 0.027
(0.042) (42) (0.034)
Year Range: 1999-2005
Mean 4.703 3,507 5.833
N 2,009,680
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome vari-
ables are monthly measures of individual drug utilization. The top panel
leverages an instrument for private Medicaid enrollment, based o¤man-
dates, the sample here is restricted to those in Medicaid-only as of 2004,
by virtue of disability, and is further restricted to the 2004 to 2010 pe-
riod. Year-quarter, county, and gender xed e¤ects are included as part
of the analysis. The unit of observation is at the person-month level.
This data was constructed using claim-level prescription drug utilization
and person-month level Medicaid enrollment records from CMS; these
two datasets were linked using beneciary IDs, and subsequently aggre-
gated to a person-month level. Sample inclusion is not conditional on
utilization.
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Table 12: Overall Utilization Di¤erences Based on For-Prot Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tot LOS Tot Procs Tot Chrg Log Tot Chrg Tot Visits
For Prot Plan*Post 65 0.307* 0.110** 2,077** 0.030** 0.041**
(0.157) (0.052) (908) (0.014) (0.017)
For Prot Plan -0.527*** -0.157*** -1,940*** -0.069*** -0.080***
(0.101) (0.032) (481) (0.010) (0.011)
Post 65 0.161 0.030 835 0.010 0.011
(0.130) (0.038) (629) (0.010) (0.012)
Male 0.722*** 0.238*** 3,384*** 0.073*** 0.085***
(0.086) (0.026) (407) (0.008) (0.010)
Age 2.057 0.658 14,301 -0.223 -0.406
(3.171) (0.974) (15,572) (0.278) (0.328)
Age Sq -0.016 -0.005 -110 0.002 0.003
(0.025) (0.008) (121) (0.002) (0.003)
Cohort Restriction Enrolled in Private Medicaid, at Age 63
Age Restriction 63 to 67
Mean 2.107 0.722 9,896 0.302 0.331
(23.284) (7.047) (117,421) (1.915) (2.209)
N 936,200
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are annualized measures of indi-
vidual inpatient utilization. The key variable of interest is For Prot*Post 65, which the di¤erential impact
of private to public Medicaid switching between those enrolled in for-prot and not-for-prot plans; the
share of this group actually switching corresponds to about 65 %, based on my rst stage estimates. Init
Private is dened as those enrolled in private Medicaid, at the age of 63, and For Prot plan is also based
on plan enrollment as of age 63. Year-quarter, county, and gender xed e¤ects are included as part of the
analysis. The unit of observation is at the person-month level, for the 1999-2010 period. The sample is
restricted to those enrolled in Medicaid-only at 63, by virtue of disability, who are also in private Medicaid
at that age; the sample is also restricted to New York State only. Finally, the sample is restricted to the 63
to 67 age range. This data was constructed using discharge-level hospital data from New York State and
person-month level Medicaid enrollment records from CMS; these two datasets were linked using SSN and
other elds, and subsequently aggregated to a person-month level. Sample inclusion is not conditional on
utilization.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Alternate Identication Strategy: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private Medicaid Enrollment Status
Init. Non Dual*Post Mandate 0.224*** 0.287*** 0.230*** 0.286*** 0.232***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.037)
Post Mandate -0.055*** -0.015 -0.044** -0.006
(0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011)
Init. Non Dual 0.214*** 0.153*** 0.132*** 0.037**
(0.025) (0.021) (0.028) (0.017)
Male -0.064*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Time Trends X X X X X
Include Dual Eligibles as Control X X X X
Mandate Counties Only X X
Group Specic Time Trends X X
Mean 0.209 0.301 0.301 0.189 0.189
(0.403) (0.454) (0.454) (0.388) (0.388)
N 7,723,534 9,020,373 9,020,373 10,778,876 10,778,876
R-squared 0.156 0.229 0.233 0.241 0.248
Notes: Table presents resu lts of my rst-stage regression , a linear model w ith private M edicaid enrollm ent status as the
outcom e and the interaction of In it. Non Dual*Post Mandate as the instrum ent of interest. In it Non Dual is dened as
those enrolled in M edicaid -on ly, as of 2004. The unit of observation is at the p erson-quarter level, for the 2004-2010 p eriod .
Year-quarter, county, age, and gender xed e¤ects are included as part of the analysis. The sample is restricted to those
enrolled in M edicaid (or dually enrolled in M edicare), by virtue of d isab ility, as of 2004; the sample is a lso restricted to New
York State on ly. Standard-errors are clustered at the ind iv idual level. The orig inal M edica id enrollm ent data is taken from
CMS.
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Table A.2: Alt Identication Strategy: E¤ect on Inpatient Utilization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tot LOS Tot Hosp Visits Tot Procs Tot Chrg Log Chrg
\PrivateMedicaidEnrolled 0.221 0.022 -0.097 1,852 0.030
(0.358) (0.037) (0.074) (1,317) (0.070)
Medicaid Only Enrolled -0.585*** -0.032*** -0.084*** -2,065*** -0.072***
(0.080) (0.007) (0.027) (313) (0.014)
Male 0.189*** -0.019*** -0.036*** 102 -0.072***
(0.057) (0.006) (0.011) (103) (0.010)
Mean 2.693 0.343 0.646 9,928 0.699
(20.854) (1.578) (4.263) (77,102) (2.742)
N 10,778,876
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are annualized
measures of individual inpatient utilization. The instrument for private Medicaid enrollment
is based o¤ enrollment mandates. Year-quarter, county, age, and gender xed e¤ects are
included as part of the analysis, along with an indicator for whether a mandate is in e¤ect.
I also include county and treatment group/control group specic time trends. The unit of
observation is at the person-quarter level, for the 2004-2010 period. The sample is restricted
to those enrolled in Medicaid (or dually enrolled in Medicare), by virtue of disability, as
of 2004; the sample is also restricted to New York State only. This data was constructed
using discharge-level hospital data from New York State and person-month level Medicaid
enrollment records from CMS; these two datasets were linked using SSN and other elds,
and subsequently aggregated to a person-quarter level. Sample inclusion is not conditional
on utilization.
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Table A.5: Robustness Test: Bandwidth Sensitivities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tot LOS Tot Hosp Visits Tot Readm. Tot ER Adm Tot ER Vis
Mean (Baseline) 2.801 0.385 0.103 0.193 0.736
Init. Priv*Post 65 0.335*** 0.034*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.055***
(0.088) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.020)
Post 65 -0.064 0.010 0.002 -0.009** 0.006
(0.101) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013)
Initially Private -1.201*** -0.107*** -0.048*** -0.070*** -0.173***
(0.067) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.016)
N 3,909,770 3,909,770 3,909,770 3,909,770 2,294,206
Baseline Bandwidth: 63 to 67
Init. Priv*Post 65 0.479*** 0.039*** 0.025*** 0.011* 0.041**
(0.103) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.019)
Post 65 -0.003 0.010 -0.007 -0.006 0.013
(0.139) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.017)
Initially Private -1.397*** -0.133*** -0.058*** -0.079*** -0.178***
(0.085) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018)
N 2,329,769 2,329,769 2,329,769 2,329,769 1,239,260
Narrower Bandwidth: 64 to 66
Init. Priv*Post 65 0.431*** 0.034*** 0.018*** 0.004 0.022
(0.141) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.021)
Post 65 0.160 0.015 (0.003) 0.003 0.032
(0.170) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.023)
Initially Private -1.601*** -0.156*** -0.067*** -0.091*** -0.199***
(0.116) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.021)
N 1,312,489 1,312,489 1,312,489 1,312,489 670,760
Narrowest Bandwidth: 64.5 to 65.5
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are annualized
measures of individual inpatient utilization. The panels present under variying bandwidths.
TYear-quarter, county, and gender xed e¤ects are included as part of the analysis. The
unit of observation is at the person-month level, for the 1999-2010 period. The sample is
restricted to those enrolled in Medicaid-only at the beginning of the specied bandwidth, by
virtue of disability; the sample is also restricted to New York State only. Finally, the sample
is restricted to the age range specied. This data was constructed using discharge-level
hospital data from New York State and person-month level Medicaid enrollment records
from CMS; these two datasets were linked using SSN and other elds, and subsequently
aggregated to a person-month level. Sample inclusion is not conditional on utilization.
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Table A.6: Robustness Test: Bandwidth Sensitivities
(1) (2) (3)
Tot No Presc Tot Pharma Spend Log Pharma Spend
Mean (Baseline) 4.703 3,507 5.833
Initially Private*Post 65 -0.015 11 -0.071*
(0.047) (55) (0.036)
Post 65 -0.005 -30 0.013
(0.017) (23) (0.014)
Initially Private -0.349*** -521*** 0.027
(0.042) (42) (0.034)
N 2,009,680
Baseline Bandwidth: 63 to 67
Initially Private*Post 65 -0.044 -34 -0.094***
(0.033) (44) (0.029)
Post 65 0.016 -17 0.015
(0.014) (19) (0.013)
Initially Private -0.374*** -537*** 0.011
(0.042) (45) (0.034)
N 1,305,288
Narrower Bandwidth: 64 to 66
Initially Private*Post 65 -0.037 -11 -0.053**
(0.028) (38) (0.027)
Post 65 -0.022 -30 -0.0311**
(0.015) (19) (0.013)
Initially Private -0.446*** -620*** -0.039
(0.042) (45) (0.035)
N 758,085
Narrowest Bandwidth: 64.5 to 65.5
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are annualized measures
of individual inpatient utilization. The panels present under variying bandwidths. TYear-quarter,
county, and gender xed e¤ects are included as part of the analysis. The unit of observation is
at the person-month level, for the 1999-2010 period. The sample is restricted to those enrolled in
Medicaid-only at the beginning of the specied bandwidth, by virtue of disability; the sample is
also restricted to New York State only. Finally, the sample is restricted to the age range specied.
This data was constructed using discharge-level hospital data from New York State and person-
month level Medicaid enrollment records from CMS; these two datasets were linked using SSN
and other elds, and subsequently aggregated to a person-month level. Sample inclusion is not
conditional on utilization.
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Table A.9: Timeline of NYs Managed Care Mandates: Disabled/SSI Recipients
Date Areas/Counties A¤ected
Nov. 2005 NYC
Oct. 2007 Nassau, Onondaga, Oswego, Su¤olk, Westchester
Apr. 2008 Allegany, Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Erie, Genesee, Niagara, Orleans, Rockland
Jun. 2008 Livingston, Monroe, Ontario, Seneca, Yates
Sep. 2008 Albany, Broome, Columbia, Cortland, Greene, Herkimer, Oneida, Rensselaer, Saratoga
Oct. 2008 Dutchess, Fulton, Montgomery, Orange, Otsego, Putnam, Schenectady, Sullivan, Ulster
Table A.10: Population & Medicaid Enrollment Figures for NY State, by Year
Year Population Private Medicaid Enrollment Overall Medicaid Enrollment
Disabled Non-Disabled Disabled Non-Disabled
2000 18,976,457 48,346 606,868 1,270,892 2,371,011
2001 19,082,838 54,346 626,488 1,289,483 2,430,202
2002 19,137,800 59,595 771,835 1,318,894 2,928,692
2003 19,171,814 70,660 1,326,144 1,349,346 3,095,709
2004 19,171,567 75,783 1,694,806 1,355,664 3,339,993
2005 19,132,610 87,799 1,863,675 1,381,186 3,482,820
2006 19,104,631 102,050 1,922,745 1,459,118 3,473,079
2007 19,132,335 136,130 1,873,121 1,470,607 3,346,334
2008 19,212,436 211,531 1,900,232 1,500,781 3,272,951
2009 19,307,066 250,458 2,060,058 1,552,833 3,557,718
2010 19,378,102 278,470 2,409,256 1,617,300 4,080,285
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CHAPTER 2: Cost Sharing Amongst Those Who
Cant Pay: Evidence from Medicaid
Disenrollments
Boris V. Vabson
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1 Introduction
Medicaid and Medicare together constitute the two largest government programs in
America, accounting for almost a trillion dollars of annual spending (or over 5% of
GDP). Both programs were introduced 50 years ago, as part of the Social Security
Amendments Act. Medicaid was created as a health care program for the poor, while
Medicare was primarily meant to serve the elderly, although both now serve a sizeable
number of disabled individuals.
While Medicaid and Medicare were not originally designed to work together, there
are presently over 9 million individuals enrolled in both. Those qualifying for both
programs are typically either disabled individuals (who simultaneously receive SSI
and SSDI), or the poor elderly (who receive SSI only). These individuals, who are
referred to as dual-eligibles, account for a disproportionate 34% of Medicaid and
Medicare spending, while amounting to only 13% of enrollees (CBO, 2013).
Given the substantial amount of federal as well as state funds spent on dual-
eligibles (almost 2% of GDP), this population constitutes an important topic for
public nance and policy research. Moreover, this populations experiences could be
generalizable to Medicare recipients with other types of secondary insurance, since
such insurance is carried by almost 90% of all Medicare recipients. As such, this re-
search may relate to existingMedicare work on employer sponsored coverage (Chandra
et al, 2010) and Medigap (Cabral et al, 2014).
In addition, dual-eligible care relates to questions of more general economic and
theoretical interest. For example, cost-sharing is an important theme in dual-eligible
care, given that this population is subject to minimal amounts of it. As such, iden-
tifying cost sharings impact on this populations spending constitutes an important
and unanswered empirical question, especially since the impact of cost-sharing might
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be di¤erent for this population than for others; to this end, the impact of cost sharing
could be heterogeneous across health and economic status.
Moreover, this research ties into existing theory on cost-sharing, particularly on
the theoretical mechanisms driving cost-sharings e¤ects. Cost sharing could reduce
utilization through reduced moral hazard (Manning et al 1987), but also increase
it through reduced preventative care and resulting o¤sets in preventable utilization
(Chandra et al, 2010), and it is valuable to understand the relative importance of each
mechanism. Moreover, the magnitude of these o¤sets could vary by health status,
and be greatest for sicker individuals (Chandra et al, 2010).
To start, I examine the e¤ect of supplemental Medicaid coverage on those already
in Medicare. Supplemental Medicaid coverage would a¤ect treatment composition
and spending primarily through the e¤ective elimination of cost-sharing, which would
otherwise be at around 20% under Medicare-only coverage (MedPAC, 2004).
Past work has been hindered by a number of empirical issues, which I attempt to
overcome in this paper. First, given compositional di¤erences between those simulta-
neously in Medicare and Medicaid, and those in Medicare-only, it has been di¢ cult
to separate out the e¤ect of supplemental Medicaid coverage from that of underlying
enrollee characteristics. As part of a novel identication strategy, I leverage involun-
tary disenrollments from Medicaid among those who were previously dually-enrolled
in Medicaid and Medicare. Critically, disenrollment is not concurrent with individual-
level changes to health or economic status. Rather, the disenrollments resulted from
a 2009 Tennessee court decision, which allowed Tennessee to check the eligibility of
existing Medicaid enrollees, and to disenroll anyone who no longer met the eligibility
requirements.Prior to this ruling, Tennessee could not check the eligibility of a subset
of Medicaid recipients (those who initially qualied via SSI), nor could it disenroll
those no longer eligible, as a result of a 20-year long court prohibition (Wadhwani,
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2010).1
In my analyses, I focus on Tennessee residents who were simultaneously in Med-
icaid and Medicare as of 2008. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, I examine
health utilization among those who were and those who werent exogenously dis-
enrolled, before and after disenrollment,. As part of my analysis, I focus on those
disenrollees who no longer met the economic requirements for Medicaid, but who
otherwise still met the disability qualications. By construction, this group is better
o¤ than typical Medicaid or typical dual-enrollees, but probably only marginally so,
meaning that my ndings could still have external validity. After all, these individ-
uals maintained their Medicaid coverage for an extended period of time, when they
could have voluntarily dropped coverage. Throughout these analyses, I make use
of Medicare administrative data, which comprehensively tracks health utilization for
those in Medicare-only as well as for those dually-enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid
(seeing as Medicare functions as the primary payer for both groups).
Altogether, I nd that Medicaid disenrollment is associated with a 25-30% de-
crease in overall utilization and spending, which is highly signicant. My results also
suggest that moral hazard dominates over prevention-driven o¤sets in this setting,
although both are present to some extent. To this end, I nd that Medicaid dis-
enrollment is associated with a substantial, 30% decrease in outpatient care, driven
disproportionately by a reduction in elective care; at the same time, I nd evidence
of o¤sets-albeit less pronounced-in the form of increased inpatient utilization, dispro-
portionately driven by increases to potentially avoidable care. Unfortunately, I am
not able to e¤ectively identify the accompanying e¤ect on health outcomes or overall
patient welfare.
1Incidentally, the 2009 Medicaid disenrollment is distinct from the one used in Garthwaite et al
(2014), given that the 2009 episode is judicially rather than legislatively driven (although coinciden-
tally, both take place in the same state).
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These results have substantial relevance for policy, suggesting that part of the
high spending on dual-enrollees in Medicaid and Medicare is attributable to a lack
of cost-sharing. The absence of cost sharing also results in increases to potentially
low-value care. While my results imply that the imposition of cost-sharing could
reduce spending and improve care e¢ ciency, even for low-income populations, this
justiably raises concerns about a¤ordability (and also about health outcomes and
patient welfare, which I do not address here). One worthwhile approach could be to
o¤set increased cost-sharing with cash voucher payments (which could also be used for
non-health expenses), and thereby nancially incentivize e¢ cient care while ensuring
that it remains a¤ordable. A similar approach has already been adopted in Indiana,
and proposed in several other states (Saloner et al 2014).
In Section 2, I go over relevant institutional features of Medicaid, Medicare, as
well as overlaps between them. I also review the dynamics of Medicaid disenrollment
in Tennessee. In Section 3, I go over the data used in these analyses. In Section 4, I
review my empirical design and implementation. In Section 5, I go over the results.
In Section 6, I conclude.
2 Medicaid and Medicare
2.1 Background
Medicare and Medicaid were created in 1965, through the Social Security Amend-
ments act. Medicare is federally nanced and controlled, and has a uniform program
design across all states. Medicaid, meanwhile, is directly administered by individual
states, with each state having some latitude over program design, subject to federally
imposed limits. Each state also bears up to 50% of the cost of Medicaid, with the
remainder of the cost shouldered by the federal government (KFF, 2012).
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While Medicaid and Medicare had little overlap at their time of formation, subse-
quent expansions have yielded a sizeable population that is enrolled in both, currently
amounting to over 9 million people. This simultaneous enrollment (referred to as
dual-eligibility) is most prevalent among the under-65 disabled who receive SSI and
SSDI, as well as poor elderly (over 65) who are the recipients of SSI (CBO, 2013).
To this end, Medicare was originally restricted to elderly individuals over 65, who
had been legal U.S. residents for over ve years. Meanwhile, Medicaid was initially
restricted to poor families with children, who were the recipients of cash assistance
(through AFDC). In 1972, both programs were expanded to cover individuals who
were disabled, with Medicare covering disabled recipients of SSDI2, and Medicaid
covering disabled recipients of SSI3; as a result, those receiving SSDI and SSI could
be in Medicaid and Medicare simultaneously (SSA, 2011).
Meanwhile, Medicare originally covered only inpatient care (through Part A) and
outpatient care (through Part B), along with short-term nursing home stays that
take place within 30 days of a hospital discharge (through Part A). In 2003, the
program was expanded to also cover prescription drugs, through Part D (SSA, 2011).
Meanwhile, Medicaid was originally designed to cover all types of care, including long
term nursing homes stays. However, for services such as home care, there is not a
clear delineation of payment responsibilities, leading to coordination issues between
Medicaid andMedicare for those dually enrolled; further, Medicare pays for all nursing
home costs in the 30 days following inpatient hospitalization for duals, while Medicaid
pays for all other nursing home care (MedPAC, 2011)
For dual-eligibles, Medicare functions as the primary payer for most services, with
2To qualify for SSDI, individuals needed to be disabled and also have a certain amount of work
experiences, with the aforementioned work requirement varying by age.
3Some states retained more stringent nancial requirements than exist for SSI, which had been
in place prior to 1972.
76
Medicaid serving as the secondary payer. For these individuals, Medicare would pay
its typical share of expenses (about 80% of the underlying cost) for traditionally
covered services, and 0% for uncovered services. Medicaid, meanwhile, would pick up
cost sharing expenses on the patients behalf (such as deductibles and co-pays), which
equate to about 20% of medical costs. Further, Medicaid would also cover 100% of
the cost of services outside the scope of Medicare (such as long-term institutional
care). Those who are dual-eligible, meanwhile, would largely not be responsible for
their medical expenses (Carpenter, 1998).
While dual-eligibles make up about 15% of Medicare and Medicaid enrollees, they
account for a disproportionate 35% of all Medicaid and Medicare spending. Such
high spending could be partly attributable to the populations health characteristics.
To this end, the dual-eligible population consists almost entirely of the elderly or
disabled, and has higher accompanying rates of disease than the general Medicare or
Medicaid population (CBO, 2013). That said, the high spending on this population
could also be partly attributable to issues of program design. One specic culprit
could be the complete absence of cost-sharing among dual-eligibles, which contrasts
with meaningful cost sharing among the Medicare-only population.4
Some states, particularly Indiana, have increased the exposure of their Medicaid
and dual-eligible populations to cost-sharing, in attempt at reducing unnecessary and
wasteful care. As such, understanding the e¤ects of cost-sharing on the dual eligible
population can provide insight on the overall e¤ectiveness of these policies (Saloner
et al, 2014).
Other factors, such as poor coordination of care between Medicaid & Medicare,
along with cost-shifting and provided-based gaming, could also partly account for
4Note that since 90% of Medicare-only recipients are enrolled in secondary insurance, cost-sharing
rates for this population will typically not be the full 20% of traditional Medicare, since some out
of pocket costs will be picked up by the secondary insurer.
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dual-eligiblesdisproportionately high spending (MedPAC, 2011).5 That said, these
issues would be most salient for an institutionalized population, which is not the focus
of the study here.
2.2 Medicaid Disenrollment in Tennessee
Since 1972, SSI recipients in Tennessee qualied automatically for Medicaid. Likewise,
for this group, the loss of SSI receipt would mean automatic disenrollment from
Medicaid. Some of those disenrolled in this way led a lawsuit in the 1980s, claiming
that they were unjustiably dropped from Medicaid (this case became designated as
Cluster Daniels, in reference to the main plainti¤). In 1987, a federal court issued
an injunction, pending nal resolution of the case, which prevented Tennessee from
dropping anyone from Medicaid who had originally qualied for it through SSI (even
if that particular individual was no longer on SSI). Following this decision, the state
could not drop these individuals from Medicaid, although individuals could drop out
on their own accord (Wadhwani, 2010).
In January 2009, this case was nally resolved, allowing Tennessee to check on the
Medicaid eligibility of those in the protected class (individuals originally qualifying for
Medicaid through SSI); these individuals now accounted for about 150,000 Medicaid
recipients (or about 13% of all Tennessee Medicaid enrollees) and about $1.2 billion
in annual Medicaid spending. Some members of the group were enrolled in Medicaid-
only, whereas others were dual-eligibles and simultaneously in Medicaid andMedicare;
as such, this group included elderly as well as non-elderly individuals, and those who
5Anecdotally, some of cost-shifting between the two programs could be driven by ambiguity on
whether Medicaid or Medicare is primarily responsible for covering certain services, particularly
relating to home care. Provided-based gaming, meanwhile, could be driven by higher nursing reim-
bursement rates under Medicare rather than Medicaid. This would incentivize hospital readmissions
for nursing home providers, given that the Medicare, and not Medicaid, reimbursement rate would
apply for the rst 30 days following return from the hospital.
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qualied for Medicare by virtue of SSDI rather than by age (Wadhwani, 2010).
Of the 150,000 Medicaid recipients in the protected class, about 60,000 individuals
were ultimately disenrolled following the ruling (presumably, the rest were found to
be eligible); of these 60,000, about 25,000 had also been Medicare enrolled.
Tennessee implemented this disenrollment about seven to eight months following
the court ruling (in August and September of 2009). Given this interval between noti-
cation and disenrollment, there may have been some anticipatory e¤ects, as Medicaid
recipients may have loaded up on care on the expectation of eventual disenrollment.
3 Data
In this paper, I use several administrative datasets from CMS, covering Tennessee
for the 2008-2011 period. These datasets contain information on demographic char-
acteristics, inpatient and outpatient utilization, and on concurrent Medicaid enroll-
ment status. Critically, this data comprehensively tracks utilization among those in
Medicare-only, and also among those concurrently in Medicare and Medicaid (dual-
eligibles), since Medicare serves as the primary payer for both groups. In addition,
I am able to structure the data as an individual-level panel, ensuring that sample
selection is not conditional on utilization.
My research design, in combination with this existing data, allows me to over-
come issues hampering previous Medicaid research. For example, previous research
on Medicaid disenrollments focused on those who were not concurrently enrolled in
Medicare, and hence could not make use of Medicare claims data (Finkelstein et al,
2012). Instead, these studies made use of stand-alone discharge data, along with
patient-reported data; however, discharge data specically su¤ers from a sample se-
lection issue, as inclusion is conditional on hospitalization.
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Using information contained in the CMS administrative data, I can precisely con-
struct cohorts that are relevant to my analyses. First, I restrict to residents of Ten-
nessee who were simultaneously enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare, as of the be-
ginning of my study period (early 2008). I further restrict to those who originally
qualied for Medicaid (and SSI) by virtue of disability, and who remained disabled as
of the start of the study period. In addition, I restrict to those who were not enrolled
in the private version of Medicare (Medicare Advantage) at any point in the study
period.6
Finally, throughout my primary analyses, I focus on the under-65 population, for
reasons that I will describe in the next section. In secondary analyses, meanwhile,
I focus on the over-65 population. Throughout both analyses, I focus on the period
from 2008 to 2011, which corresponds to the six quarters preceding and following the
Tennessee Medicaid disenrollment.
3.1 Individual Characteristics and Enrollment Information
This data comes from CMS, and contains person-month level Medicare/Medicaid en-
rollment information; it species Medicare enrollment status, along with concurrent
Medicaid status, and the reasons for Medicaid and Medicare eligibility (such as age or
disability). This data also species private Medicare enrollment status. Finally, it in-
cludes various demographic information, which allows me to control for characteristics
such as county of residence, age, and date of birth.
While this data tracks enrollment into and out of Medicare, it does not provide the
explicit reason for any disenrollments. As such, I identify those who were disenrolled
as a result of the Cluster Danielsmatter based on the timing of that disenrollment
6This restriction is necessary, given that claims data from private Medicare plans is not provided
by CMS.
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(that is, based on whether this disenrollment took place in July, August, or Septem-
ber of 2009). This approach will not produce a completely accurate measure, given
that some disenrollments over that period might not be Cluster Daniels related.
That said, the rate of Medicaid disenrollment for the sample population (particu-
larly, disabled individuals) should be su¢ ciently low to make such mismeasurement
of second-order concern.7
3.2 Inpatient and Outpatient Utilization Metrics
I track inpatient and outpatient usage for everyone in Medicare, regardless of whether
they are concurrently in Medicaid. I do so by linking together person-year level
Medicare enrollment data, claims-level inpatient data, and claims-level outpatient
data. This linking is facilitated through beneciary ID information found across all
these data.
This data contains every single inpatient and outpatient claim made by Tennessee
Medicare recipients, throughout the 2008-2011 period. This data provides information
on the timing of each visit, at a month-year level. The data also provides visit-level
information on treatment intensity and composition, including the length of stay (for
inpatient visits), types and number of procedures performed, and total cost of the
visit. Note that the cost measures used in these analyses correspond to administrative
Medicare charges, and reect the amounts that providers actually got paid; since
these are inclusive of cost sharing and remain constant across Medicare-only and
dual-coverage, they are not mechanically a¤ected by changes to coverage status.
For most of my analyses, I aggregate this data to a person-quarter level, and
include those without any utilization as part of the sample (as such, sample selection
7Based on prevailing rates of Medicaid disenrollment for this population, I estimate that fewer
that 5% of the disenrollments during this period were unrelated to Cluster Daniels.
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is not conditional on having an inpatient or outpatient visit).
In Table I, I present average, quarter-based utilization measures for my main an-
alytic sample (those in Tennessee simultaneously enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid,
as of the start of 2008). I break these measures out for two separate groups-those who
were involuntarily (and exogenously) disenrolled from Medicaid as a result of Cluster
Danielsand those who werent thus disenrolled. I nd that those who were disen-
rolled have substantially lower overall utilization (~30%) than those who werent,
although the extent to which this is attributable to enrollment composition rather
than to treatment di¤erences is not readily apparent.
3.3 Utilization Composition Metrics
Tomeasure treatment composition and treatment e¤ectiveness, I rely on existing elds
in the claims data, and also construct additional metrics using internal algorithms.
For one measure of treatment composition, I look to data elds specifying the site
of care, and separate out visits that are inpatient-hospital based, outpatient-hospital
based (including ER visits), and those that take place in non-institutional outpatient
settings (such as physician o¢ ces or labs). Heterogeneity in the impact of Medicaid
disenrollment across these setting could provide insight on the mechanisms for its
e¤ect.
As another measure of treatment composition, I look to the types of care per-
formed, based on the BETOScode assigned to a claim. In doing so, I separate out
procedure-oriented, test-oriented, and primary care oriented claims from all others,
and construct utilization measures accordingly. These measures are geared towards
identifying the e¤ect of Medicaid disenrollment on elective care, relative to its e¤ect
on preventative and preventable care.
Using algorithms put together by the Dartmouth Institute, I construct even more
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explicit identiers of preventable and elective care. First, I measure rates of pre-
ventable care by identifying the inpatient visits that could be avoided through im-
proved outpatient care, based on the output from this algorithm. I also identify
inpatient visits that are elective, using an alternate Dartmouth algorithm.
4 Identication and Empirical Strategy
Those in Medicare-only and those simultaneously in Medicaid and Medicare (dual-
eligibles) di¤er not only in the cost-sharing they are subject to, but also in their
underlying health and demographic characteristics; dual-eligibles typically su¤er from
worse health and a greater number of co-morbidities than Medicare-only enrollees,
even within the disabled population (CBO, 2013). As such, any naïve comparison
between those in Medicare-only and those simultaneously in Medicare and Medicaid
may reect patient composition di¤erences between the two, rather than reecting
di¤erences in cost-sharing requirements. To decompose the e¤ect of cost-sharing
from that of underlying patient composition, I focus on situations where individuals
involuntarily switch from enrollment in both programs to enrollment in Medicare-
only, where the timing of that switch is exogenous; in such situations; only Medicaid
enrollment status will change, while patient composition will remain xed.
As part of my identication strategy, I implement a di¤erences-in-di¤erences ap-
proach, which leverages involuntary disenrollment from Medicaid among those previ-
ously in Medicaid and Medicare. This identication approach is somewhat analogous
to the research approach of Finkelstein et al (2012), which instrumented for Medicaid
status using Oregons lottery for Medicaid coverage. This approach is also analo-
gous to that of Garthwaite et al (2014), which used a legislative-driven Medicaid
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disenrollment in a study on labor outcomes.8
Here, the treatment group is made up of individuals who were simultaneously in
Medicare and Medicaid, as of the start of the study period (2008), who were disabled,
and who were disenrolled fromMedicaid following the Cluster Danielsdecision (from
being found ineligible). The treatment group was not disenrolled from Medicaid for
health reasons-as they remained disabled at the time-but rather due to economic
ineligibility.9 The control group, meanwhile, is made up of those simultaneously in
Medicaid and Medicare as of the start of the study period, who were not disenrolled
following Cluster Daniels. My primary analyses focus on the under-65 population,
while a companion set of analyses focuses on those over 65.
Not everyone in the treatment group will be subject to the actual treatment at
all points in the post-period (a small fraction will re-enroll in Medicaid, after again
becoming eligible); as such, the results would capture an intent-to-treat e¤ect, and
would need scaling to reect the e¤ect of the actual treatment.
The primary identifying assumption is that the timing of Medicaid disenrollment is
exogenous, and does not coincide with health developments or other changes among
the treatment group. This assumption could be considered reasonable, since the
treatment groups disenrollment is entirely driven by economic ineligibility (rather
than being health-based); to this end, the treatment group consists of those who
remain disabled, at the time of the disenrollments. Further, while the treatment
group was no longer economically eligible for Medicaid, few members of the group
probably experienced nancial improvement at the time of disenrollment, and most
8Coincidentally, that disenrollment also took place in Tennessee, although it was driven by leg-
islative action, rather than judicial process. Further, that disenrollment a¤ected a very di¤erent
population from the one examined here, as it impacted adults who werent disabled and who werent
simultaneously in Medicare.
9These economic requirements, which coincide with the requirements for SSI, are income as well
as asset based.
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likely experienced them far before. After all, Tennessee could not unilaterly kick
members of this group o¤ Medicaid for 20 years-from 1987 through 2009-meaning
that many probably became economically ineligible many years before 2009.
A related identifying assumption is that no concurrent developments were taking
place in Tennessee at the time of disenrollment, which would di¤erentially impact the
treatment group. This identifying assumption is aided by the nature of the disen-
rollments that I focus on, since they were judicially driven rather than legislatively
driven. The judicial, rather than political roots of these disenrollments, makes it
less likely that their timing is endogenous to concurrent developments in Tennessee.
To further test the validity of this identifying assumption, I check for di¤erential
pre-trends using visual as well as statistical approaches.
An addiitonal implicit assumption is that dual-eligiblesdisenrollment from Med-
icaid a¤ects care through the imposition of cost-sharing, and not through any other
mechanisms. However, dual-eligible care could also di¤er from Medicare-only care
in terms of program interactions. These interactions could manifest themselves in
cost-shifting between Medicaid and Medicare, and also in provider gaming of care
(given Medicares higher rates of nursing home reimbursement, institutions would
prot from having their residents readmitted to hospitals at higher rates).10 That
said, these program interaction issues are likely a second order concern; such inter-
actions would be most material to long-term nursing home residents, who are very
unlikely to be part of the treatment group.
A potential threat to my research design is the availability of other forms of sec-
ondary insurance, in the absence of Medicaid coverage. By enrolling in other forms
of secondary insurance, following Medicaid disenrollment, individuals could continue
10Medicaid would continue paying for the residents nursing home while theyre in hospital; further,
for the rst 30 days following a hospital discharge, Medicare-rather than Medicaid-has responsibility
for nursing home reimbursement (MedPAC, 2011)
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being subject to minimal cost sharing.11 Among the Medicare population, the most
common types of secondary insurance are employer-sponsored commercial plans and
Medigap plans (employer as well as non-employer sponsored). While Medicare Ad-
vantage could also qualify as a form of secondary insurance, it is not material to this
analysis, as Medicare Advantage enrollees have been excluded from the sample12
However, there are compelling reasons to not consider the availability of secondary
insurance, in the form of employer-sponsored or Medigap coverage, as a rst-order
threat to my research design. Turning rst to employer-sponsored coverage, rates
of enrollment conditional on not being in Medigap or Medicare Advantage stand
at around 35% (Jacobson et al, 2014); however, rates among my study population
are likely to be substantially lower, given socioeconomic considerations. Turning
next to Medigap, aggregate-level enrollment data from Tennessee show no change in
Medigap enrollment rates following this large-scale Medicaid disenrollment (AHIP,
2009-2011).13 Finally, for members of my study population under 65, Medigap is
likely to have been fairly inaccessible throughout the study period, given that it was
not o¤ered on a guaranteed issue basis.Altogether, this suggest that even under a
conservative approach, we can assume that fewer than 35% of my study population
will be subject to secondary insurance. As such, to obtain an upper bound for the
e¤ect of cost-sharing cessation, my results existing estimates should be further scaled
by 1.5.
An additional concern about this research design is that the results might not be
generalizable to all dual-eligibles, and instead might be specic to the study popula-
11Unfortunately, the Medicare administrative data does not track individualsenrollment status
in secondary insurance.
12Among those Medicare recipients not enrolled in Medicaid or Medicare-Advantage, about 35%
were covered by employer-sponsored secondary insurance, while about 32% were covered by Medigap;
meanwhile, about 20% were not covered by any kind of secondary insurance (Jacobson et al, 2014).
13Medigap enrollment rates stayed at in Tennessee over the 2008-2010 period.
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tion. After all, the dual-eligibles on which I focus were no longer nancially eligible
for Medicaid, and so by construction are not representative of all dual-eligibles. That
said, the study population is not likely to be substantially wealthier than typical
dual-eligibles, given that it also consists of disabled individuals and furthermore con-
sists of those who did not voluntarily drop Medicaid coverage. Altogether, these
considerations augment the external validity of my results.
Furthermore, these results might not be generalizable to all dual-eligibles, given
treatment non-compliance over the course of the post-period, in the form of some
re-enrolling into Medicaid; while we scale our results to correspond to the impact on
those actuallytreated, those who are actually treated (that is, those who dont end
up re-enrolling into Medicaid) might not be perfectly representative of dual-eligibles
as a whole.
Altogether, the estimating equation for my analysis takes the following form, for
individual i, at time t, where the underlying data is aggregated to an individual-
quarter level. Also included below are gender, quarter-year, county, and age xed
e¤ects.
yit=  + 0 GroupDisenrolledit+1PostDisenrollmentt
+2 GroupDisenrolleditPostDisenrollmentt+Xit   + "it
Since the estimated value of 2 will reect the intent-to-treat impact, it needs
to be scaled to reect the actual e¤ect of treatment, based on the fraction of those
initially disenrolled from Medicaid that remain disenrolled, at any given point in the
post period. To obtain an upper-bound estimate of the e¤ect of cost-sharing cessation,
these results would need to be further scaled by a factor of 1.5, per earlier discussion.
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5 Results
5.1 E¤ect of Disenrollment on Medicaid, Drug, and Misc.
Coverage Rates
In Figure 1, I document a precipitous drop in Medicaid coverage rates, at the time
of the Cluster Danielsdisenrollments (taking place Summer of 2009), among my
treatment group; note that this is by construction, given how the treatment group
is dened. Further, among this treatment group, I document a steady increase in
Medicaid coverage rates over the course of the post-period, implying that some of
those disenrolled later regained eligibility for Medicaid. Meanwhile, among the control
group, which consists of Tennessee dual eligibles who werent Medicaid disenrolled
through Cluster Daniels, Medicaid coverage rates are stable and are close to 100%
over the pre as well as post-periods.
I proceed by statistically documenting this relationship, and nd that 97.5% of
my treatment group loses Medicaid coverage at the time of the Cluster Daniels
disenrollments (between the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 2009). The relevant point
estimate can be found in Table 2, under column one, under Medicaid Dis.*Q of
Disenroll. For these analyses, I use my baseline specication, where the outcome of
interest is at a person-quarter level, and the sample is restricted to those under 65 and
disabled, who are dually-enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid in Tennessee, as of the
beginning of 2008; it is further restricted to those who werent in Medicare Advantage
at any point in the pre or post period. Finally, individuals are only included in the
sample for the quarters in which theyre Medicare enrolled.
I also nd that the treatments e¤ect on Medicaid status attenuates over the
course of the post-period, with the point estimates suggesting that only 2/3 of the
original treatment group remains outside of Medicaid, ve quarters after the initial
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disenrollment; meanwhile, at that point, about 1/3 of the cohort has re-enrolled in
Medicaid. This can be attributed to individuals becoming re-eligible for Medicaid,
as a result of deteriorating nances (such deterioration could, in turn, be driven by
deteriorating health). Given that an incomplete fraction of the original treatment
group remains Medicaid disenrolled, over the course of the post-period, my main esti-
mates will reect an intent-to-treate¤ect rather than the impact on those actually
treated. As such, my main estimates will need to be accordingly scaled, to get at
the actual treatment e¤ect; for the last quarter of the post period, the appropriate
scaling factor would be 1.5, given that 2/3 of the original treatment group is Medicaid
disenrolled then.
I perform an additional robustness check, examining how individualsdrug cov-
erage is a¤ected by the loss of Medicaid; while dual-eligibles as well as Medicare-
only enrollees would receive drug coverage through Part D for the study period,
only for dual-eligibles is such coverage automatic; to this end,Medicare-only enrollees
could theoretically opt out of such coverage. However, a statistical examination indi-
cates that drug coverage (Part D) rates are not meaningfully impacted by Medicaid
disenrollment, and that drug coverage remains near universal even among those in
Medicare-only. One lingering concern is that the type of drug coverage under Part
D may be changing, even if its prevalence is not; while dual-eligibles are randomly
assigned to a Part D plan, those in Medicare-only can actively select a plan from a
number of options. This is not a concern I further address here, although it is may
be of second-order importance given that all Part D plans adhere to a standardized
benet design.
Given that my primary sample excludes those in Medicare Advantage at any point
in the study period, I perform an additional robustness check, examining whether
Medicaid disenrollment among dual-eligibles precipitates enrollment into Medicare
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Advantage. Estimates from this analysis, presented in Table A.1, suggest that Med-
icaid disenrollment among this dual population does not appear to increase Medicare
Advantage enrollment rates in excess of 2%, with this precise to within 1% with 95%
condence.
In Table A.2, I examine the e¤ects of Cluster Danielsdisenrollments on Medicaid
and drug coverage for an alternate sample: the over-65 population (in contrast to the
under-65 population, which is the focus of my main analyses). The results suggest
that the e¤ect of the Cluster Danielsdisenrollments across these two populations is
comparable, at least when it comes to Medicaid and drug coverage.
5.2 E¤ect of Disenrollment on Utilization and Spending
Using involuntary Medicaid disenrollment as an instrument, I consider the e¤ect of
supplemental Medicaid coverage on spending and utilization measures. Given that
supplemental Medicaid coverage, in this setting, is primarily associated with a cost
sharing reduction, I view such involuntary Medicaid disenrollment as an e¤ective
instrument for cost sharing. In my main results, my sample restrictions remain the
same as before, with the observation-level being at a person-quarter level, and the
outcome measures also reecting person-quarter level utilization and spending. In
addition, as before, my main results focus on individuals under the age of 65.
In Figure 2, I document a sharp drop in overall spending (logged) among the
treatment group, immediately following involuntary Medicaid disenrollment (which
corresponds to the right-most vertical line, while the leftmost corresponds to the
time of disenrollment notication). Meanwhile, the control group over this period
experiences only a steady upward trend in spending, which remained unchanged at
the time of disenrollment notication, as well as at the time of actual disenrollment.
In Figures 3 and 4, I break out spending based on whether it takes place in the
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inpatient or outpatient setting. Looking at the treatment group relative to the control,
I document a substantial drop in spending at the time of actual disenrollment, across
the inpatient as well as outpatient settings. However, I document a precipitous rise in
inpatient, following disenrollment notication; this could reect anticipatory e¤ects,
as individuals push forward care (such as surgeries) to avoid future cost-sharing.
Further, when comparing spending preceding disenrollment notication to spending
following actual disenrollment, I nd that there is an overall decrease in inpatient
spending alongside an increase in outpatient spending.
I proceed to statistically examine the e¤ect of Medicaid disenrollment, and of cost-
sharing imposition by extension, on these spending measures, with the results shown
in Table 3. These analyses indicate that Medicaid disenrollment results in a 25-30%
decrease in overall spending. If assuming average cost-sharing under Medicare-only
coverage of 20%, as is postulated in previous literature (Cabral et al 2014)14, these
estimates would imply an arc-elasticity of -.17515; this arc-elasticity is consistent with
the -.2 estimate from RANDs health insurance experiment (looking at a commercial
setting) and Cabral et al (2014)s estimate of -.11 (looking at Medicare and Medigap).
Given that individuals may have secondary insurance that covers cost-sharing,
even in the event of Medicaid disenrollment, these estimates should be viewed as
a lower bound for cost sharings e¤ects, with these estimates and the implied arc-
elasticity needing to be further scaled by about 1.5 to arrive at an upper bound.
Furthermore, these results are not tainted by possible anticipatory e¤ects, given that
I dene the pre-period as preceding disenrollment notication, and the post period
14This represents an approximation, given that a 20% coinsurance applies only to outpatient
Medicare services, while a copay applies for inpatient services and is charged for each day in hospital.
Further, deductibles are in place for Part A as well as Part B services.
15The arc-elasticity is given by [q2-q1/((q2+q1)/2)]/[(p2-p1)/(p2+p1)/2)], where q1 and p1 cor-
respond to dual-eligiblesutilizations and prices, and q2 and p2 correspond to those of Medicare-only
enrolled; note that for dual-eligibles, p1 is dened as 0.
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as following actual disenrollment. Finally, this e¤ect does not appear to be driven by
di¤erential pre-trends, and also does not appear to attenuate over the post-period.
While I do nd increases in inpatient spending for the treatment group between dis-
enrollment notication and actual disenrollment, these could reect attempts to push
care forward, particularly since theyre concentrated in procedure-based inpatient
care (as I determine in separate analyses).
I proceed by decomposing this e¤ect based on care setting, nding a spending
decrease of 30% for the outpatient setting, accompanied by a spending increase on
inpatient care of about 10%. The increases in inpatient spending, while not always
statistically signicant, are accompanied by substantial extensive margin increases to
inpatient utilization, as documented in Table A.3.
Table 3 presents the specic estimates for the key interaction term from the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence specication, which need to be scaled to reect treatment non-
compliance for each quarter; these estimates are broken out for each quarter, relative
to a baseline period-the quarter immediately before the time of disenrollment noti-
cation (and three quarters before actual disenrollment). For example, for log of total
spending, the point estimate of -.189 on Medicaid Dis.*Post-5Q suggests that being
disenrolled from Medicaid results in a 28.5% reduction in overall spending from the
baseline time period (with scaling by 1.5, based on estimates from Table 2). Given
the corresponding standard error, I can rule out a decrease in excess of 38% or below
18%, with 95% condence.
5.3 Mechanisms Driving Cost-Sharing E¤ects
The opposing e¤ects I estimate across the inpatient and outpatient margins could
reect the e¤ects of two mechanisms operating simultaneously: those of moral haz-
ard (which would be reduced following Medicaid disenrollment) and preventive care
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(which could decrease following Medicaid disenrollment, yielding increases in pre-
ventable care). After all, moral hazard may manifest itself most in outpatient care,
given that typical outpatient treatment is relatively more discretionary. Likewise, the
e¤ects of decreased prevention could be most pronounced in the inpatient setting,
given that inpatient care is more prevention sensitive. To further test this, I examine
the e¤ects of cost sharing on the composition of care within each setting, rather than
merely across settings.
Focusing rst on outpatient care, I look at whether the e¤ect is heterogeneous
across care types, particularly among procedures, tests, and other forms of spending.
Procedures and tests are generally considered less discretionary forms of outpatient
care, and are generally thought to be physician driven (Finkelstein et al 2014). Mean-
while, other types of outpatient care, such as specialist visits, are thought to be more
patient-driven, and hence more discretionary. The results, which are displayed in
Table 4, suggest that outpatient spending reductions, under cost sharing, are driven
disproportionately by discretionary care (non test and non procedure based); my esti-
mates imply a 30% reduction in such care following Medicaid disenrollment, compared
to a 10% reduction in procedure spending, and a 15% reduction in spending on tests.
I then turn to inpatient care, and examine whether the e¤ect is heterogeneous
across preventable and non-preventable care types. I gauge the preventability of an
admission based on whether the admission originated from the ER; ER admissions
are generally thought to be more prevention-sensitive than non-ER ones. In addition,
I classify whether an admission is preventable based on whether it could have been
averted through improved outpatient care (that is, whether it is ambulatory-sensitive),
using a DRG-based Dartmouth algorithm.
In the results, which are presented in Table 5, I nd that the e¤ect of Medicaid
disenrollment is disproportionately higher across prevention sensitive admissions; my
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estimates imply that such disenrollment results in a increase in the number of ER
admissions, per person-quarter of .02 (or about 28% of the baseline), the results also
imply that the e¤ect is between 16% and 40% of the baseline, with 95% condence.
Meanwhile, non-ER admissions only increase by about 2% of their baseline. The
same pattern holds when comparing ambulatory-sensitive visits to non-ambulatory
sensitive ones. When looking at these measures in terms of spending (regardless of
whether in log or level forms), these di¤erentials become much less pronounced; the
e¤ects are comparable across prevention and non-prevention sensitive care. Given
that preventable care increases much more substantially in terms of visit numbers
than spending levels, the marginal prevention-sensitive visit may be relatively low-
cost.
In Table 6, I follow up on these results by breaking out inpatient visits into elective
and non-elective types; for these results to be consistent with the previous ones,
there would need to be a disproportionate increase in non-elective visits, given that
non-elective care is more prevention-sensitive. Meanwhile, the actual results imply
that Medicaid disenrollment is associated with an approximately 20% increase in the
number of non-elective inpatient visits, and a 15% increase in non-elective inpatient
spending. Furthermore, there does not appear to be a statistically signicant change
to the number of elective inpatient visits.
Finally, in Table 7, I look for evidence of decreases to preventative care from Med-
icaid disenrollment, which could help explain the preceding ndings of increases in
prevention-sensitive care. Focusing specically on outpatient primary care and out-
patient specialist visits, I nd no evidence of decreases in primary care visit numbers,
and can rule out a reduction in excess of 5% with 95% condence. Meanwhile, I do
nd evidence of decreases to the number of specialist visits, with reductions on the
order of 10-15%. However, I am not able to ascertain whether these reductions are
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associated with decreases in preventative care.
5.4 Heterogeneity in Cost Sharing E¤ects
Previous research has found that the magnitude of prevention-sensitive o¤sets, under
cost-sharing, could be greater for sicker patients (Chandra et al 2010). To examine
whether this pattern holds true among dual-eligibles, I turn my attention to those
over 65, who are generally sicker than the under-65 population comprising my primary
sample; average spending among this over-65 cohort, relative to those under-65, is
over 50% higher. Further, the over-65 dual population is of substantial policy interest,
in its own right, given that it makes up a signicant share of Medicare/Medicaid
enrollment and an even higher share of spending. I present the results of analyses on
the e¤ects of Medicaid disenrollment for this population, along with the associated
underlying mechanisms, in Table A.4. These results should be viewed as suggestive,
rather than causal, given that the under and over-65 populations could di¤er in other
respects besides health status.
First, I nd that Medicaid disenrollment leads to an approximately 35% decrease
in this populations overall spending; this estimate is based on the original point
estimates in Table A.4, which I subsequently scale to reect the degree of treatment
compliance in the post-period (that is, the share of those disenrolled that remain
outside of Medicaid, given the estimates in Table A.3). This estimate implies an
arc-elasticity of -.21. I then turn my attention to outpatient spending and nd that
the implied e¤ect corresponds to a 40% reduction. Looking at inpatient spending, I
nd an implied 20-30% spending increase for the over-65 population, compared to a
10% increase for those under-65. As such, the cohort thats sicker-those over 65-also
happens to experience greater inpatient (or prevention sensitive) o¤sets, consistent
with Chandra et al (2010).
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One empirical concern is that treatment non-compliance, over the post-period,
could be heterogeneous across the under and over 65 groups. This concern is al-
ready partially addressed above, given that the results are scaled to reect such non-
compliance, and thereby reect treatments e¤ect on those actually treated. However,
there could be di¤erent selection dynamics for non-compliance, for each of these pop-
ulations. For example, among those over-65, the compliant set (those remaining out-
side of Medicaid) might consist of those most susceptible to prevention-based o¤sets.
Meanwhile, among those under-65, the compliant set might consist of those less sus-
ceptible to such o¤sets. As such, for these analyses to reect the impact of sickness (as
opposed to di¤erences in non-compliance), di¤erential selection for non-compliance
must be absent across these populations. One factor supporting this assumption is
these populationscomparable rates of non-compliance.
In future analyses, I hope to study heterogeneous e¤ects across health status more
systematically, by comparing individuals based on their ex-ante health (as measured
by their Charlson Co-Morbidity Index). Again, heterogeneity in non-compliance could
be a threat to such a research approach.
6 Conclusion
I examine the e¤ects of cost-sharing among a previously understudied population-
those dually enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare-a population that critically accounts
for 35% of all Medicare and Medicaid spending. While cost-sharing has previously
been examined in other settings, my results are nonetheless useful from a policy and
economic perspective, since the e¤ects of cost-sharing may not generalizable from one
setting to another. I also undertake needed work to identify the mechanisms behind
cost-sharings e¤ects; I nd suggestive evidence that spending reductions-under cost
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sharing-come through reduced moral hazard, but that these reductions are somewhat
o¤set by increases in prevention-sensitive care. I also nd that these o¤sets are greater
among a sicker population, those over-65. However, one limitation of this study is that
it does not identify the impact of cost-sharing on patient outcomes, nor on patient
welfare more generally.
Future work is needed to better understand heterogeneity in cost sharings ef-
fects across health and socioeconomic status, while also better gauging the impact
on patient welfare. Such work could inform more e¤ective cost-sharing policies in
Medicaid, Medicare, and other settings, which could be tailored based on individuals
characteristics as well as the type of treatment.
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Figure 1: E¤ect of Cluster Danielson Medicaid Enrollment Status
Blue: Invol. & Exogenously Disenrolled from Medicaid, via Cluster Daniels (Treat-
ment)
Red: Not Disenrolled via Cluster Daniels (Control)
100
Figure 2: E¤ect of Medicaid Disenrollment on Overall Medical Spending (Logged)
Blue: Invol. and Exogenously Disenrolled fromMedicaid, via Cluster Daniels (Treat-
ment)
Red: Not Disenrolled via Cluster Daniels (Control)
101
Figure 3: E¤ect of Medicaid Disenrollment on Non-Inpatient Spending (Logged)
Blue: Invol. and Exogenously Disenrolled fromMedicaid, via Cluster Daniels (Treat-
ment)
Red: Not Disenrolled via Cluster Daniels (Control)
102
Figure 4: E¤ect of Medicaid Disenrollment on Inpatient Spending (Logged)
Blue: Invol. & Exog. Disenrolled from Medicaid, through Cluster Daniels (Treat-
ment)
Red: Not Disenrolled via Cluster Daniels (Control)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Disenroll Group Non-Disenroll Group
Coverage
Medicaid Enrollment Status 0.585 0.944
(0.493) (0.228)
Drug Coverage Status 0.999 0.999
(0.016) (0.015)
Total Utilization
Total Spending 2,078 -2,824
(7,415) (8,585)
Inpatient Spending 978 1,363
(5,751) (6,658)
Outpatient Spending 1,100 1,461
(2,912) (3,342)
Electability of Care
Outp Procedure Spending 235 306
(739) (827)
Outpatient Non-Procedure Spending 865 1,155
(2,492) (2,908)
Inp Elective Spending 298 444
(2,910) (3,461)
Inp Non-Elective Spending 680 920
(4,493) (5,041)
Prevention
Primary Care Visits 0.893 1.200
(1.973) (2.354)
Inp Preventable Spending 141 201
(1,471) (1,821)
Inp Non-Preventable Spending 837 1,162
(5,407) (6,192)
N 144,158 682,314
Notes: Table presents summary statistics for various outcome variables of interest, where the unit
of observation is at an individual-quarter level, for the 2008-2011 period. Summary statistics are
broken out for those who were and who werent disenrolled from Medicaid as part of the Cluster
Danielsmatter (in mid 2008). The sample is restricted to those under 65 and disabled, who were
dually-enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare at the start of 2008; the sample is also restricted to
Tennessee only. In addition, the sample is restricted to those Standard-errors are clustered at the
individual level. Data is taken from CMS Administrative les.
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Table 2: E¤ect of Disenrollment on Medicaid and Drug Status
Simult. in Medicaid Drug Coverage
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-5 Q -0.006*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-4 Q 0.009*** -0.000**
(0.001) (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-3 Q Baseline
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-2 Q 0.007*** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-1 Q 0.009*** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Q of Disenroll -0.975*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-1 Q -0.810*** -0.000
(0.004) (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-2 Q -0.753*** -0.000
(0.004) (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-3 Q -0.717*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-4 Q -0.686*** -0.000
(0.004) (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-5 Q -0.664*** -0.001**
(0.005) (0.000)
Mean 0.881 0.999
N 826,472
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where the outcome variables include Medicaid and
drug coverage status. The terms of interest are Medicaid Disen., interacted with pre and post terms.
Medicaid Disen. is dened as those dual-eligibles involuntarily disenrolled from Medicaid as a result
of Cluster Daniels, but who remain in Medicare. The unit of observation is at the individual-
quarter level, for the 2008-2011 period. Year-quarter, county, age, and gender xed e¤ects are
included as part of the analysis. The sample is restricted to those under 65 and disabled, who
were dually-enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare at the start of 2008; the sample is also restricted
to Tennessee only. Finally, the sample is restricted to those who were not in Medicare Advantage
at any point in the pre or post period. Standard-errors are clustered at the individual level. Data
is taken from CMS Administrative les.
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Table 3: E¤ect of Disenrollment on Medical Spending
Log Spending
Outp.+Inp. Outpatient Inpatient
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-5 Q -0.004 -0.006 -0.043
(0.027) (0.025) (0.030)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-4 Q 0.047* 0.039 0.013
(0.027) (0.025) (0.031)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-3 Q Baseline
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-2 Q -0.008 -0.022 0.055*
(0.028) (0.026) (0.031)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-1 Q -0.068** -0.094*** 0.111***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.032)
Medicaid Disen.*Q of Disen. -0.341*** -0.361*** 0.011
(0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-1 Q -0.182*** -0.208*** 0.061*
(0.032) (0.030) (0.033)
Medicaid Disen.Post-2 Q -0.266*** -0.293*** 0.022
(0.033) (0.031) (0.033)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-3 Q -0.276*** -0.290*** 0.004
(0.034) (0.032) (0.033)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-4 Q -0.193*** -0.220*** 0.058*
(0.034) (0.032) (0.033)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-5 Q -0.189*** -0.219*** 0.089***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034)
Mean 5.24 5.1 0.83
N 826,472
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where the outcome variables are person-quarter
aggregated spending measures. The terms of interest are Medicaid Disen., interacted with pre
and post terms. Medicaid Disen. is dened as those dual-eligibles involuntarily disenrolled from
Medicaid as a result of Cluster Daniels, but who remain in Medicare. The unit of observation has
been aggregated to the individual-quarter level, for the 2008-2011 period. Year-quarter, county,
age, and gender xed e¤ects are included as part of the analysis. The sample is restricted to those
under 65 and disabled, who were dually-enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare at the start of 2008;
the sample is also restricted to Tennessee only. Finally, the sample is restricted to those who were
not in Medicare Advantage at any point in the pre or post period. Standard-errors are clustered
at the individual level. Data is taken from CMS Administrative les.
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Table 4: Moral Hazard: Medicaid Disenrollments E¤ect on Various Outp Spending
Log Outp Spending
Proc Tests Non Proc/Tests
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-5 Q -0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.026) (0.027) (0.024)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-4 Q 0.028 0.031 0.020
(0.026) (0.027) (0.024)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-3 Q Baseline
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-2 Q -0.028 0.006 -0.033
(0.028) (0.028) (0.024)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-1 Q -0.056** -0.063** -0.084***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.026)
Medicaid Disen.*Q of Disen. -0.114*** -0.183*** -0.308***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.027)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-1 Q -0.096*** -0.089*** -0.174***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Medicaid Disen.Post-2 Q -0.124*** -0.163*** -0.261***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-3 Q -0.138*** -0.156*** -0.270***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-4 Q -0.078*** -0.068** -0.209***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-5 Q -0.061** -0.104*** -0.204***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Mean 1.22 2.309 4.264
N 826,472
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where the outcome variables are person-
quarter aggregated spending measures. The terms of interest are Medicaid Disen., interacted
with pre and post terms. Medicaid Disen. is dened as those dual-eligibles involuntarily
disenrolled from Medicaid as a result of Cluster Daniels, but who remain in Medicare.
The unit of observation has been aggregated to the individual-quarter level, for the 2008-
2011 period. Year-quarter, county, age, and gender xed e¤ects are included as part of the
analysis. The sample is restricted to those under 65 and disabled, who were dually-enrolled
in Medicaid and Medicare at the start of 2008; the sample is also restricted to Tennessee
only. Finally, the sample is restricted to those who were not in Medicare Advantage at any
point in the pre or post period. Standard-errors are clustered at the individual level. Data
is taken from CMS Administrative les.
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Table 7: E¤ect on Outpatient Preventative Care
Outp Visits
Prim Care Visits Spec Visits
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-5 Q 0.003 -0.026
(0.021) (0.024)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-4 Q 0.019 -0.001
(0.021) (0.026)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-3 Q
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-2 Q 0.043* 0.011
(0.023) (0.026)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-1 Q 0.024 -0.017
(0.024) (0.029)
Medicaid Disen.*Q of Disen. -0.017 -0.058*
(0.024) (0.030)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-1 Q 0.038 -0.034
(0.025) (0.030)
Medicaid Disen.Post-2 Q -0.032 -0.088***
(0.023) (0.031)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-3 Q -0.038 -0.094***
(0.024) (0.031)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-4 Q -0.002 -0.062**
(0.025) (0.030)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-5 Q 0.000 -0.014
(0.026) (0.034)
Mean 1.147 1.248
N 826,472
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where the outcome variables are outpatient
utilization measures, aggregated at a person-quarter level. The terms of interest are Medicaid
Disen., interacted with pre and post terms. Medicaid Disen. is dened as those dual-eligibles
involuntarily disenrolled from Medicaid as a result of Cluster Daniels, but who remain in
Medicare. The unit of observation has been aggregated to the individual-quarter level, for
the 2008-2011 period. Year-quarter, county, age, and gender xed e¤ects are included as
part of the analysis. The sample is restricted to those under 65 and disabled, who were
dually-enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare at the start of 2008; the sample is also restricted
to Tennessee only. Finally, the sample is restricted to those who were not in Medicare
Advantage at any point in the pre or post period. Standard-errors are clustered at the
individual level. Data is taken from CMS Administrative les.
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Table A.1: E¤ect of Medicaid Disenrollment on MA Enroll.
MA Enrollment Status
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-5 Q -0.003***
(0.001)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-4 Q -0.002**
(0.001)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-3 Q Baseline
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-2 Q -0.011***
(0.001)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-1 Q -0.017***
(0.002)
Medicaid Disen.*Q of Disen. 0.019***
(0.002)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-1 Q -0.002
(0.003)
Medicaid Disen.Post-2 Q -0.013***
(0.003)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-3 Q -0.018***
(0.003)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-4 Q -0.019***
(0.003)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-5 Q -0.004
(0.004)
Mean 0.213
N 1,409,420
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where the outcome variable is
Medicare Advantage enrollment status, at a person-quarter level. The terms of in-
terest are Medicaid Disen., interacted with pre and post terms. Medicaid Disen. is
dened as those dual-eligibles involuntarily disenrolled from Medicaid as a result of
Cluster Daniels, but who remain in Medicare. The unit of observation has been
aggregated to the individual-quarter level, for the 2008-2011 period. Year-quarter,
county, age, and gender xed e¤ects are included as part of the analysis. The sample
is restricted to those under 65 and disabled, who were dually-enrolled in Medicaid
and Medicare at the start of 2008; the sample is also restricted to Tennessee only.
Standard-errors are clustered at the individual level. Data is taken from CMS Ad-
ministrative les.
112
Table A.2: Over 65: E¤ect of Disenrollment on Medicaid and Drug Cov
Simult. in Medicaid Drug Coverage
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-5 Q -0.006*** -0.000
-0.002 (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-4 Q 0.010*** -0.000*
-0.002 (0.000)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-3 Q
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-2 Q 0.010*** 0.001
-0.002 (0.001)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-1 Q 0.006*** 0.001
-0.002 (0.001)
Medicaid Disen.*First Q of Disenroll -0.978*** 0.001
-0.002 (0.001)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-1 Q -0.809*** 0.001
-0.009 (0.001)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-2 Q -0.768*** 0.001
-0.01 (0.001)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-3 Q -0.739*** 0.001
-0.01 (0.001)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-4 Q -0.714*** 0.001
-0.011 (0.001)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-5 Q -0.689*** 0.001
-0.011 (0.001)
Mean 0.915 0.999
N 204,394
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where the outcome variables are Medicaid
and drug coverage status, at a person-quarter level. The terms of interest are Medicaid
Disen., interacted with pre and post terms. Medicaid Disen. is dened as those dual-
eligibles involuntarily disenrolled from Medicaid as a result of Cluster Daniels, but who
remain in Medicare. The unit of observation has been aggregated to the individual-quarter
level, for the 2008-2011 period. Year-quarter, county, age, and gender xed e¤ects are
included as part of the analysis. The sample is restricted to those over 65 and disabled,
who were dually-enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare at the start of 2008; the sample is also
restricted to Tennessee only. Finally, the sample is restricted to those who were not in
Medicare Advantage at any point in the pre or post period. Standard-errors are clustered
at the individual level. Data is taken from CMS Administrative les.
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Table A.3: E¤ect of Medicaid Disenrollment on Inp. Utilization
Inpatient Utilization
Hospitalizations LOS Procedures
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-5 Q -0.011** -0.063 -0.005
(0.005) (0.045) (0.010)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-4 Q 0.002 0.081 0.007
(0.005) (0.049) (0.010)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-3 Q Baseline
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-2 Q 0.013** 0.141*** 0.021**
(0.005) (0.049) (0.010)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-1 Q 0.022*** 0.238*** 0.068***
(0.006) (0.054) (0.012)
Medicaid Disen.*Q of Disen. 0.013** 0.140*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.051) (0.011)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-1 Q 0.013** 0.165*** 0.021*
(0.006) (0.053) (0.011)
Medicaid Disen.Post-2 Q 0.012** 0.162*** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.052) (0.011)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-3 Q 0.009 0.128** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.054) (0.012)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-4 Q 0.010* 0.132** 0.024**
(0.006) (0.052) (0.011)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-5 Q 0.015** 0.189*** 0.035***
(0.006) (0.056) (0.013)
Mean 0.128 0.894 0.166
N 826,472
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where the outcome variable is Medicare
Advantage enrollment status, at a person-quarter level. The terms of interest are Medicaid
Disen., interacted with pre and post terms. Medicaid Disen. is dened as those dual-eligibles
involuntarily disenrolled from Medicaid as a result of Cluster Daniels, but who remain in
Medicare. The unit of observation has been aggregated to the individual-quarter level, for
the 2008-2011 period. Year-quarter, county, age, and gender xed e¤ects are included as
part of the analysis. The sample is restricted to those under 65 and disabled, who were
dually-enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare at the start of 2008; the sample is also restricted
to Tennessee only. Standard-errors are clustered at the individual level. Data is taken from
CMS Administrative les.
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Table A.4: Over 65: E¤ect of Disenrollment on Spending
Log Spending
Outpatient+Inpatient Outpatient Inpatient
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-5 Q -0.100 -0.114** 0.034
(0.062) (0.055) (0.087)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-4 Q 0.041 0.020 0.042
(0.061) (0.054) (0.090)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-3 Q Baseline
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-2 Q 0.149** 0.066 0.456***
(0.065) (0.057) (0.095)
Medicaid Disen.*Pre-1 Q 0.113* -0.010 0.597***
(0.068) (0.060) (0.098)
Medicaid Disen.*Q of Disen. -0.662*** -0.732*** 0.078
(0.081) (0.074) (0.091)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-1 Q -0.248*** -0.281*** 0.112
(0.077) (0.069) (0.099)
Medicaid Disen.Post-2 Q -0.247*** -0.295*** 0.196**
(0.078) (0.070) (0.098)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-3 Q -0.235*** -0.284*** 0.167*
(0.078) (0.071) (0.099)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-4 Q -0.266*** -0.324*** 0.179*
(0.079) (0.071) (0.098)
Medicaid Disen.*Post-5 Q -0.237*** -0.292*** 0.206**
(0.083) (0.075) (0.102)
N 204,394
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where the outcome variables are medical
spending measures, aggregated at a person-quarter level. The terms of interest are Medicaid
Disen., interacted with pre and post terms. Medicaid Disen. is dened as those dual-eligibles
involuntarily disenrolled from Medicaid as a result of Cluster Daniels, but who remain in
Medicare. The unit of observation has been aggregated to the individual-quarter level, for
the 2008-2011 period. Year-quarter, county, age, and gender xed e¤ects are included as
part of the analysis. The sample is restricted to those over 65 and disabled, who were
dually-enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare at the start of 2008; the sample is also restricted
to Tennessee only. Finally, the sample is restricted to those who were not in Medicare
Advantage at any point in the pre or post period. Standard-errors are clustered at the
individual level. Data is taken from CMS Administrative les.
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1 Introduction
Governments often contract with private rms to provide publicly nanced goods and ser-
vices. The scope of these contracting arrangements is large, representing 10% of GDP in the
U.S. in 2008 (OECD, 2011). The range of industries, goods and services is also vast, rang-
ing from defense contractors making military helicopters to landscaping companies mowing
the lawns of publicly-owned property. Private rms are also increasingly involved in social
services such as education and health care. Theoretically, "contracting out" could lead
to improved e¢ ciency, given that private rms have powerful incentives to control costs.
Additionally, if the government contracts with multiple rms (or includes a government
option), consumers may have access to more choice. This can improve consumer surplus in
two ways: additional competition can lead to quality improvements and private rms may
more e¤ectively cater to heterogeneous consumer preferences.
An important example of "contracting out" can be seen in the Medicare program,
which currently provides health insurance to 55 million U.S. residents, with total expen-
ditures estimated to have exceeded $600 billion in 2013 (CMS, 2013; CBO, 2013). For
most Medicare recipients, the federal government directly reimburses hospitals, physicians,
and other health care providers on a fee-for-service basis. However, for 17 million (and
31 percent of all) Medicare recipients, the federal government instead contracts with pri-
vate insurers and other organizations to coordinate and nance medical care as part of the
Medicare Advantage (MA) program. This paper examines the MA market and explores
how the quality of private provision changes as the generosity of the contract increases.
A large body of previous research has investigated the e¤ect of Medicare Advan-
tage on Medicare expenditures, health care utilization, and health outcomes (Afendulis et
al. 2013, Landon et al. 2012, Lemieux et al. 2012). A related strand of research has
explored how MA enrollment is a¤ected by the generosity of plan reimbursement (Cawley
et al. 2005, Pope et al. 2006). Yet, surprisingly little research has investigated how the
characteristics of Medicare Advantage coverage vary with the generosity of plan reimburse-
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ment.1 Theoretically, one would expect plan payment rates to inuence both the quality
of coverage o¤ered by private insurers and the entry decisions of some insurers. This gap
in the literature is unfortunate, given that a key feature of the recently enacted A¤ordable
Care Act gradually lowers reimbursement to MA plans by an estimated $156 billion from
2013-22 (CBO, 2012). While the Congressional Budget O¢ ce and others have estimated
that these lower payment rates will reduce MA enrollment, there is little evidence on how
the number of options and the quality of coverage will change for those who remain in the
program.
In this study, we aim to partially ll this gap in the literature by exploiting policy-
induced variation in the generosity of MA plan reimbursement. In counties with relatively
low Medicare Fee-for-Service (FFS) spending, benchmarks are set at a payment oor, so
that payments to MA plans do not fall below a certain level. The payment oor is 10.5
percent higher in counties that belong to metropolitan areas with more than 250,000 res-
idents than in all other counties. We exploit this cross-sectional variation using data for
the 2007 through 2011 period to explore the impact of the additional reimbursement on
MA enrollment and on the generosity of MA coverage. This period represents a substantial
expansion of the MA program, as show in Figure 1. We compare outcomes in urban coun-
ties (which are in metropolitan areas with a population of 250,000 or more) with similar
counties below this threshold. Our specications control exibly for both the county and
the MSA population and for county per-capita Medicare FFS expenditures. To obtain a
more comparable set of urban and non-urban counties, we focus on counties in metropolitan
areas with populations between 100,000 and 600,000 while probing the sensitivity of our
results to alternative sample denitions. The di¤erential payments for urban counties are
in e¤ect throughout our sample period and apply to a substantial percentage of counties,
as shown in Figure 2.
Our rst set of empirical results demonstrate that in counties with the additional
1Gowrisankaran et al. (2011) consider the e¤ect of MA plan reimbursement on the presence of drug
coverage. However, they do not examine the e¤ects on other plan characteristics. In a more recent paper,
Cabral et al. (2014) consider a broader set of outcomes during the 1998 through 2003 period. We discuss
this paper further below.
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reimbursement (due to the urban oor), there are on average 1.8 additional insurers and
that the average HHI is lower by 873. These e¤ects are substantial, given that our non-
urban control counties have an average of 5.4 insurers and an HHI of 4,308. This rst set of
results indicates that the more generous reimbursement induces more insurers to enter the
MA market and that individuals enrolled in MA then have more plans from which to choose.
We next estimate the e¤ect of the additional reimbursement on the fraction of Medicare
recipients enrolling in MA. All else equal, a higher level of reimbursement would make the
marginal MA enrollee more protable for health insurers, which would lead insurers to aim
for higher enrollment. Plans might achieve this by, for example, improving the quality of
their coverage or by advertising more intensively. Consistent with this, we estimate that the
10.5 percent increase in plan reimbursement in urban counties leads to a 13.1 percentage
point increase in enrollment in MA plans.
One limitation with these analyses is that MA enrollment and insurer entry in urban
counties might di¤er from non-urban counties for reasons unrelated to MA reimbursement
generosity. To explore this possibility, we estimate two sets of di¤erence-in-di¤erences spec-
ications. In the rst, we use non-oor counties, in which FFS expenditures are relatively
high. In these counties, urban status would not a¤ect MA reimbursement. Consistent with
this, we nd no evidence of higher MA enrollment or greater competition in these coun-
ties. Additionally, we estimate a similar set of specications using the period before urban
counties received di¤erential payments. As expected, we nd no evidence of a signicant
relationship between urban status and our outcome variables of interest in this earlier pe-
riod. We include both the broader set of counties and the larger time period in a set of
triple-di¤erence specications and our primary results are unchanged.
Given this evidence of greater competition in markets with higher MA payments,
we next explore the impact on plan price and quality. Here, we nd much more modest
e¤ects. For example, we nd that the 10.5 percent increase in reimbursement resulting
from a countys urban status does not translate into signicantly lower monthly premiums.
Estimates that incorporate additional expected out-of-pocket costs to consumers suggest
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that around one-eighth of the additional reimbursement is passed through, and we can rule
out pass through of more than 49 percent at the 95 percent level of condence. These
ndings suggest that less than half of the additional reimbursement is passed on to con-
sumers through lower premiums, deductibles, or co-payments. Despite evidence of limited
pass-through on average, we also nd substantial heterogeneity, with greater pass-through
in more competitive counties.
One possible explanation for our low estimated pass-through is a di¤erence in the
composition of insurers across urban and non-urban oor counties. To investigate this issue,
we split the sample between Humana, which is the largest provider of MA coverage and
operates in virtually all of our markets, and all other insurers. If the additional insurers
that enter in response to the enhanced reimbursement o¤er less generous coverage than
those already operating, we would expect to nd greater pass-through for Humana plans.
Consistent with this, our estimates imply signicant pass-through of 19 percent for Humana
plans versus (an insignicant) 0.5 percent for all other plans. We also nd the greatest
pass-through in the most competitive counties as measured by the county-level HHI for
insurer-level MA enrollment.
Of course, plans may respond to reimbursement increases by improving the quality
of medical care, rather than decreasing their enrolleesnancial costs. For example, plans
could contract with better providers, cover additional services, or expand the breadth of
their provider networks in response to the additional revenues. To investigate this possi-
bility, we use detailed individual-level data from the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare
Providers and Systems (CAHPS), which contains information on MA plan satisfaction rat-
ings, utilization, and health outcomes for approximately 160,000 MA enrollees per year. We
nd no evidence of increased patient satisfaction or increased utilization of care in urban
oor counties, relative to their non-urban counterparts. Similarly, we nd no impact on
self-reported (overall or mental) health or satisfaction with care. Finally, while selection
and composition e¤ects could partially explain our low estimated pass-through, we nd
no evidence of signicant compositional di¤erences between MA recipients in urban and
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non-urban oor counties.
Taken together, our results indicate that the increased reimbursements paid to ur-
ban oor counties substantially increase the number of enrollees in Medicare Advantage,
even though plan quality is not substantially di¤erent. How could insurers increase enroll-
ment in counties above the MSA population threshold, without making signicant changes
to plan quality? We present suggestive evidence that rms accomplish this by advertising
more aggressively in counties with higher benchmarks.2
The recently enacted A¤ordable Care Act instituted many changes to the Medicare
Advantage program, including a reduction in the generosity of MA reimbursement, with
the magnitude of these reductions growing steadily over time. Our estimates indicate that
the nancial incidence of these cuts will fall to a signicant extent on the supply side of
the market. While we cannot measure the direct impact on rm protability, we can look
to stock returns as a proxy. In April 2013, following reversals of planned cuts to the MA
program, the stock market valuation of major health insurers rose substantially (see Figure
3).3 At the same time, the stock price of the largest publicly traded hospital operator (HCA)
was unchanged. Insurers, rather than providers, appear to be the primary beneciaries of
MA reimbursement increases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Medicare Advantage
program, while Section 3 describes the data on Medicare Advantage enrollment, cost, and
quality along with insurer participation; it also outlines our identication strategy. Section
4 presents our main results, and Section 5 describes the impacts of benchmarks on plan
quality. Section 6 presents results on rm advertising and returns. Section 7 concludes.
2The increase in advertising spending, meanwhile, suggests that not all of the rents associated with
market power are captured by insurers. To the extent that the market for hospital or physician services is
imperfectly competitive, some of the benets of additional reimbursement may be passed through to them
as well.
3See Al-Issis and Miller (2013) for an examination of the e¤ect of the A¤ordable Care Act on the stock
prices of a broader set of rms in the health care sector.
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2 The Medicare Advantage Program
First introduced in 1982 as Medicare Part C, the forerunners to contemporary Medicare
Advantage plans allowed consumers to opt out of traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare
and into private managed care plans. The federal government hoped to achieve quality as
well as cost improvements by harnessing competition between private insurers (see McGuire,
Newhouse, and Sinaiko 2011, for a comprehensive history). In contrast to the FFS frame-
work used by Medicare, private Medicare Advantage plans provide care through a managed
care model. Under traditional FFS, patients have substantial freedom in selecting physi-
cians as well as treatment options, with relatively few restrictions placed on the scope of
care. Under managed care, greater restrictions exist on physician access, with consumers
often limited to a plans provider network. Furthermore, many managed care plans require
special approval for specialist visits and certain procedures. They may also make e¤orts to
coordinate patient care, which could yield e¢ ciency improvements.
2.1 Plan Description
While all Medicare Advantage plans must cover the services that are included under
traditional Medicare Parts A and B, individual plans can di¤er in the supplemental benets
that they provide, such as vision or prescription drug coverage. Plans can also di¤er in their
nancial characteristics, including the premium charged and consumer co-payments (which
a¤ect the level and variance of predicted out-of-pocket costs). Private insurers can enter
county-level markets by o¤ering a variety of plans, and an insurer can selectively introduce
a Medicare Advantage plan to certain counties and not to others. An insurer can o¤er
multiple plans within the same county and vary the characteristics of these plans. However,
Medicare Advantage plans are guaranteed-issue, and the insurer is required to o¤er coverage
to all interested Medicare recipients in the counties in which a given plan is active.
Plans can also di¤er in the specic type of managed care framework that they
utilize. All Medicare Advantage plans were operated as health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) through 2003. However, following the passage of the Medicare Modernization
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Act, these plans could also operate as POS (point of service), PPO (preferred provider
organization), or PFFS (private fee-for-service). HMO, POS, and PPO plans all rely on
provider networks, while PFFS plans were not required to construct networks prior to 2011.
Medicare Advantage HMO plans do not allow enrollees to see physicians or hospitals outside
of their provider network, barring a medical emergency. POS enrollees, meanwhile, have
the option of visiting physicians and hospitals outside of the network, but require explicit
approval to do so. Under PPO plans, out-of-network physician visits would not require plan
approval, but would entail greater cost sharing. Finally, as part of PFFS plans, enrollees
would have the option to visit any physician, so long as that physician accepts the payment
terms of the PFFS plan (cost sharing terms for the patient would remain the same across all
physicians). Di¤erences between these plan types could ultimately shape insurersmarket
entry decisions, in terms of the plan types o¤ered within a county. For instance, given that
PFFS plans were not required to form provider networks during our study period, the xed
costs of market entry for PFFS plans could be much lower than for other types of plans.
2.2 Plan Reimbursement
Payments to Medicare Advantage plans are based on payment benchmarks, which
correspond to a given enrollees county of residence. The benchmark payment is risk-
adjusted for that enrollees demographic and health characteristics. Originally, county-level
payment benchmarks for Medicare Advantage plans were set at 95% of a countys per
enrollee, risk-adjusted Medicare fee-for-service spending. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced a payment oor in 1998, primarily to encourage plan
entry to rural counties. As a result, government spending on MA enrollees in many counties
(particularly rural ones) substantially exceeded spending on similar enrollees in Medicare
FFS. In 2001, CMS introduced a second payment oor, which was set at an approximately
10.5 percent premium to the existing oor, and which applied only to urban counties. CMS
dened a county as "urban" if the metropolitan area in which it is included had a population
of 250,000 or more.
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The relationship between a countys average per-capita fee-for-service spending and
its benchmark, as of 2004, can be seen in Figure 4. As this gure shows, counties with
relatively low FFS spending had benchmarks set at the payment oor. More specically, a
non-urban county with average per-capita FFS spending below $555 per month had a oor
of $555 while an urban county with average per-capita FFS spending below $613 had a oor
of $613. Counties with per-capita FFS spending above $613 were in this year essentially
una¤ected by the payment oor while only urban counties between $555 and $613 are
a¤ected. As the gure shows, the magnitude of the impact of the payment oor is quite
substantial for some counties. Consider an urban county with per-capita FFS spending of
$500. Its benchmark is 23 percent greater than it would be in the absence of the payment
oor. The corresponding gap is considerably smaller for an urban county with per-capita
FFS spending of $600, where the oor increases the benchmark by just 2 percent.
Our analysis focuses on the 2007-2011 period, throughout which payment oors
continue to be functionally (albeit not formally) present; benchmarks after 2004 were set at
the highest of the previous years benchmark (adjusted for ination) or a countys average
FFS level. As such, 2004 oor counties would have 2007-2011 benchmarks set at the ination
adjusted 2004 oor rates, so long as the ination adjusted oor, from 2004, exceeded that
countys contemporaneous FFS costs. Ultimately, over 90% of the original, 2004 oor
counties remained oors in the subsequent period. The relationship between benchmarks
and a countys average per-capita fee-for-service spending, for this period, can be seen in
Figure 5; as expected, this relationship is largely consistent with what was observed in 2004,
though it becomes somewhat less tight.4
In 2003, the Medicare Modernization Act introduced an additional component to
the reimbursement mechanism, in the form of a bidding system. Beginning in 2006, if a
rm placed a bid that was lower than the existing reimbursement benchmark, 25% of the
4To the extent that a countys FFS level rose above the oor level in one or more years, its benchmark
would subsequently exceed the ination-adjusted oor. This explains why some counties in 2007 have a
benchmark above the linear relationships displayed in Figure 4. Similarly, counties with non-binding 2004
oors would have subsequent rates that always exceeded the corresponding, ination adjusted oor level,
irrespective of their subsequent FFS costs. After 2004, a county can go from being oor to non-oor, but
cannot go from being non-oor to oor.
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di¤erence got returned to the federal government. The remaining 75% got passed back
to plans, and had to fund services not covered by traditional Medicare or be passed on
to consumers. In the rst year of these bids, CMS estimated that 65% of these rebates
went towards part A and B cost-sharing reductions, 14% towards providing non-traditional
benets (vision, etc.), 4% towards reducing part B premiums, and 16% towards part D
benets and premium reductions (CHS 2006).5
We focus on the 2007-2011 period for a number of reasons. First, the introduction of
Medicare Part D altered the market. Second, the Medicare Modernization Act led to a shift
in risk adjustment, a bidding system for Medicare Advantage, and higher reimbursements
for MA plans.6 As a result, the program grew dramatically during our sample period.
Finally, we believe 2006 represents a transition period as consumers became accustomed to
the prescription drug benet; however, our results are robust to the inclusion of 2006. By
focusing on 2007-2011, we can analyze a period in which MA exists in nearly every county
(eliminating concerns about selection) under a stable set of policies (after the introduction
of stand-alone prescription drug products but before the implementation of the ACA).
A number of papers highlight the benecial e¤ects of competition in Medicare
Advantage, on characteristics such as premium costs (Town and Liu 2003, Lustig, 2010)
and out-of-pocket payment levels (Dunn 2011). Separately, a literature has examined rm
entry in this market (Chernew et al. 2005, Pizer and Frakt 2002, and Frakt, Pizer, and
5Song et al. (2013) explore the e¤ect of benchmark changes on plan bids. They instrument for the county
benchmark with the growth of FFS spending in other counties in the state and with the national changes
in benchmarks (which in dollar terms are larger for those counties with higher baseline FFS spending).
However, this identifying variation is unlikely to be exogenous, given the many factors with which initial
benchmark levels & state-level FFS growth rates may be associated. One of the many outcome variables
that we consider below is the plan rebate, which is three-fourths of the di¤erence between the bid and the
benchmark.
6These signicant changes to the MA program may have a¤ected the degree of pass-through from this
earlier period. Also whereas essentially all counties have at least one MA plan in recent years, during the
1998 through 2003 period, just one-in-eight counties had an MA plan in all years. The incidence of the
payment oors for this select set of counties - not all of which were oor counties - may be di¤erent from the
broader set of oor counties that were ultimately a¤ected. Similarly, while MA enrollment declined steadily
during their study period (from 18 percent in 1999 to 13 percent by 2003), it has steadily increased in more
recent years, from 13 percent in 2005 to 30 percent in 2014. It is possible that the average incidence of
reimbursement in oor counties is di¤erent during a period of program contraction from during a period
of expansion. The authors also do not have data on enrollees ratings of their health plans, which would
incorporate factors such as broader or better provider networks.
125
Feldman 2009), and a broad literature has considered other aspects of the program, including
consumer choice (Dafny and Dranove 2008), and disparities in health care (Balsa, Cao, and
McGuire 2007). A number of papers have examined the impact of MA enrollment on
mortality: Gowrisankaran, Town and Barrette (2011) nd no e¤ect for plans with drug
coverage and increased mortality for plans without drug coverage, which we measure. By
contrast, in a later period, Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler (2013) nd evidence of reduced
mortality. Our paper adds to this literature by examining the e¤ect of policy-induced
variation in plan generosity on market structure, MA plan enrollment, and on the nancial
and non-pecuniary generosity of MA coverage.
Our paper also adds to an expanding literature on the role of insurance market
competition in shaping negotiations with providers (Ho and Lee 2013, Gowrisankaran, Nevo,
and Town 2013), and premiums (Dafny 2010, Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanaryan 2012).
Furthermore, our paper is similar in spirit to a number of papers that evaluate the impact
of the Medicare program on private insurers and consumers (see Cabral and Mahoney 2013
and Starc 2014 on Medigap, Abaluck and Gruber, 2011, Ketcham et al. 2012, Kling et
al. 2012, or Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf 2013 on demand in Medicare Part D, and
Clemens and Gottleib 2013 on the relationship between public and private reimbursement).
Finally, Gaynor and Town (2012) provide a nice summary of competition in health care
markets more broadly.
In a complementary study to the current one, Cabral et al. (2014) examine the
e¤ect of the payment oor for urban counties on plan premiums and on other measures
of plan quality. In that study, the authors focus on the 1998 through 2003 period, and
examine within-county changes in plan characteristics following the introduction of urban
oor payments. Their ndings suggest that 45 percent of the additional reimbursement
passes through to consumers and that the additional reimbursement had little impact on
insurer entry. However, the program is signicantly di¤erent today from what it was then.
For example, whereas essentially all U.S. counties were served by one or more MA plans
during our more recent study period, only one in ve oor counties had non-zero MA
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enrollment during their study period. Additionally, the introduction of the Part D program
in 2006 and the move to risk adjustment and plan bidding in Medicare Advantage around
the same time a¤ected rm incentives. Furthermore and as shown in Figure 1, enrollment
was substantially higher in our more recent study period, partially reecting more generous
program reimbursement. Our study complements theirs by exploring pass-through across
a wider range of oor counties and during a time of MA growth. Despite these di¤erences,
Cabral et. al. estimate of a 45 percent average pass-through rate lies (just) within our
condence interval. Both studies argue that imperfect competition plays an important role
in determining the e¤ect of the program on consumers.
3 Data and Identication Strategy
We use a number of administrative datasets from CMS that contain MA plan enrollment
levels, the number and type of MA plans, plansnancial generosity, survey measures of plan
quality and patient utilization, government payment amounts to Medicare Advantage plans,
and FFS spending levels per enrollee. We construct measures of MA enrollee composition
at a plan, county, as well as year level, using CAHPS survey data and Medicare enrollment
data. These data are nationwide in scope, covering more than three thousand US counties.
We initially di¤erentiate between three types of counties - those with monthly per-
capita FFS spending below $662 in 2007, those between $662 and $732, and nally those
above $732. For the rst group, for any given level of FFS spending, the benchmark is
typically 10.5 percent higher in urban counties than in non-urban counties and is set at the
payment oor. For the third group, the benchmarks are essentially the same in each of the
two types of counties for any given level of FFS spending. And for the second group, the
gap in benchmarks between the two types of counties declines linearly from about $70 at
per-capita FFS spending of $662 to 0 by $732. Urban counties in this group typically have
their benchmarks set at the payment oor while non-urban counties do not.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between average fee-for-service expenditures and
county benchmarks for the three types of counties as of 2004, while Figure 5 presents the
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comparable relationship for 2007.7 As these gures show, the e¤ect of being designated
an urban county is largest for those with average fee-for-service spending below $662 and
this e¤ect declines steadily from that threshold to the threshold of $732, at which point the
oor no longer binds for urban counties. It is worth noting that a countys oor status can
change from one year to the next. More specically, a oor county in which per-capita FFS
spending grows relatively rapidly may move out of the oor category. This is of course more
likely for counties close to the kinks in the schedule displayed in Figure 4. Rather than
redening the oor "treatment" each year, we use a countys 2007 FFS expenditures and
its status as an urban or non-urban county in that year as our primary source of variation
in the generosity of plan reimbursement below.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all counties and then separately for each
of these three types of counties. For each county, we calculate the annual average of each
variable during the 2007 to 2011 period, and then take the (unweighted) average across all
counties. Both the fraction of Medicare recipients enrolled in MA plans and the average
HHI concentration index are comparable across the three types of counties. However, the
composition of MA enrollment is quite di¤erent, with PFFS plans relatively more important
in low-FFS counties. Additionally, counties with high FFS spending have greater popula-
tions on average and , as expected, substantially higher MA benchmarks. The last several
rows of the table provide average nancial characteristics for MA plans, including plan pre-
miums, rebate payments, and average out-of-pocket costs. For these averages, each plan
is weighted by its share of MA enrollment in the county, and each year from 2007 to 2011
receives an equal weight. However, one might be concerned that other factors correlated
with urban status are biasing our estimates. We therefore consider whether other county
characteristics, unrelated to MA policy, might di¤er across the urban threshold. Undertak-
ing a balance test, we show in Table 2 that demographic and other county characteristics
are stable around the population threshold, at the same time that MA benchmarks and MA
market share di¤er substantially.
7As of 2007, a number of of counties-approximately 7%-no longer have benchmarks determined in the
same manner as in 2004. The reasons for this are described in Section 2.2.
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3.1 Plan Enrollment Data
We obtain Landscape les from CMS on Medicare Advantage enrollment levels for the
combination of the following: county, month, insurer, and the insurance package o¤ered by
that insurer (which has the technical term contract). Our nal dataset is at the county-
year-insurance contract level. For any given year, we exclude contracts with 10 or fewer
enrollees, as CMS does not report enrollment for these contracts. In addition, we obtain
information on county-year level Medicare enrollment levels, which allows us to calculate
Medicare Advantages share of each countys Medicare population. For counties with 10 or
fewer MA enrollees, this number is not reported. Given the small number of counties in our
analysis sample missing this data, our empirical results below are not sensitive to whether
we exclude these counties from our sample or assume that MA enrollment there is equal to
0.
Across all counties nationwide with MA enrollment exceeding ten, the average num-
ber of insurers o¤ering an MA plan is 4.0 and the average HHI concentration index is 5,117.
These market measures treat PFFS, HMO, and PPO types of Medicare Advantage simi-
larly. In Table 3, we list the most active insurers in the MA market, based on the number of
county-years in which they operate from 2007 through 2011, and also break out each rms
activity by county type as in Table 1. As Table 3 shows, Humana is by far the most active
MA insurer, in terms of county-years in which it is present (comprising 87 percent of all
possible markets) and in terms of the number of enrollees it covers.
3.2 Plan Characteristics Data
To measure plan nancial characteristics, we draw on plan-year level data from the
CMS landscape les for measures of monthly plan premiums and whether each plan provides
prescription drug coverage.8 To calculate an average for each county in each year, we weight
8We also obtain information from CMS on the parent companies operating each specic insurance plan, as
well as the type of coverage o¤ered (HMO/HMOPOS, PFFS, or PPO). Following the literature, we consider
the plan with the lowest plan ID to be most representative of the insurance contract as a whole (Hall, 2007
and Nosal, 2012). In matching contract enrollments to individual plan characteristics, we match enrollments
to the characteristics of the lowest plan ID within the contract.
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each plan by its share of county-specic MA enrollment in that same year. As shown in
Table 1, the average monthly MA plan premium during our study period is approximately
$31, while the average fraction of MA enrollees in a county with drug coverage is 69 percent.
The table also lists an average monthly plan rebate amount. Beginning in 2006, if an insurer
bid below the county benchmark for providing its coverage to an enrollee with an average
risk score, it was required to devote 75 percent of the di¤erence to improving consumer
benets in the form of a rebate of added benets (CHS, 2006). Thus if a plan submitted
a bid of $680 per month when a countys benchmark was $720, the monthly rebate would
be equal to $30. Plans typically allocate rebates to decreasing the Part B premium paid by
consumers, towards reduced cost-sharing, or to supplementary benets like drug coverage.
When the estimated cost of supplementary benets exceeds the rebate amount, plans can
charge consumers an additional premium: there exist many plans that receive rebates, yet
simultaneously charge a premium.
We obtain additional data for each plan-year on an MA recipients total expected
out-of-pocket costs as compiled by CMS. These gures are featured as part of the Medicare
Compare database that is used by many Medicare recipients, and, therefore, are likely to be
salient to consumers. To the extent that a plan provides drug coverage or subsidizes a por-
tion of the Part B premium, it would be captured by this measure (though the plan-specic
premium is not included in this measure). In addition to measures of overall expected
out-of-pocket costs, this data includes estimated costs for individual components (such as
Part B premiums, inpatient hospital costs, and prescription drugs). Further, these data
break down expected out-of-pocket costs across di¤erent demographics by age as well as
self-reported health status. For example, the database provides an expected out-of-pocket
cost for a 65-72 year old in excellent health, enrolled in a given insurance contract. We
average these estimates across demographic groups to construct a single composite metric.
As with the other plan-year measures, variation across counties in this measure is driven
by di¤erences in the relative share of each plan in each county.
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3.3 Plan Quality Data
For measures of plan quality, we rely on the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare
Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey data, which contains enrollees ratings of plans,
self-assessments of health status, and other measures of plan experience, such as the self-
reported number of physician visits. The CAHPS survey is administered yearly, and covers
every Medicare Advantage plan that is at least one year old (including HMO, PPO, as well
as PFFS plans). As part of the survey, 600 individuals from each MA contract are selected
for questioning (if a contract has fewer than 600 enrollees, then all of its enrollees are se-
lected). While 600 are selected for questioning, fewer respond and the average non-response
rate is approximately 25%.
Our individual-level data include responses from approximately 160,000 MA en-
rollees in each year from 2007 through 2011. This CAHPS data identies the insurance
contract in which each survey respondent is enrolled, along with that respondents age,
race, education, and county of residence. Additionally, the data contains the respondents
answers to each of the survey questions. The rst column of Table 4 provides the average
measures (on a 0-10 scale) for several quality measures including overall satisfaction with
health plan and with primary care physician. As this table shows, MA enrollees are on
average quite satised with their plans, with especially high ratings for the two physician
measures.
3.4 Identication Strategy
To estimate the e¤ect of MA reimbursement on several outcome variables of interest, we
make use of the federal policy described above that induces higher reimbursement in urban
(metropolitan population of 250,000 and up) than in non-urban counties. For our empirical
analyses, we focus mainly on counties in metropolitan areas close to the 250,000 population
threshold so as to have a more comparable set of counties with which to estimate our e¤ects
of interest. More specically, we restrict to counties belonging to metropolitan areas with
populations between 100,000 and 600,000. The population range is set larger above the
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threshold because the density of metropolitan area populations is somewhat thicker in the
range below the threshold than above. These criteria yield a sample of 576 counties, with
304 below the population threshold and 272 above. These 576 counties are included in 280
metropolitan areas, with approximately half of the metro areas having just 1 county, 20
percent having exactly two counties, and the remaining 30 percent having between 3 and 6
counties.
As shown in Figure 4, only those MA plans in counties with relatively low fee-
for-service spending would receive the full 10.5 percent reimbursement increase as a result
of urban status. Figure 5 reveals that the relationship between a countys fee-for-service
spending is somewhat noisier in 2007 than in 2004. This continues into subsequent years
and reects the e¤ect of a provision that set a minimum growth rate for the benchmark
from one year to the next beginning in 2004. As a result, even if a county saw a substantial
decline in its average FFS expenditures from one year to the next, its benchmark would not
fall. This explains why many of the data points in Figure 5 lie above the payment oors
and the 45 degree line.
More than 60 percent of counties have average monthly FFS spending in 2007 less
than $662 and would therefore tend to receive the full 10.5 percent increase if they are
urban. We refer to these counties as "group one" counties. Of the 576 counties with metro
populations between 100,000 and 600,000, approximately 60 percent (348) are below this
expenditure threshold. These 348 counties represent our primary analysis sample.
As shown in Figure 5, both urban and non-urban counties with per-capita FFS
expenditures of $662 or less in 2007 typically had benchmarks set at the urban or non-
urban oor. In contrast, the payment oor did not bind in counties above $732 in per-
capita FFS spending. Urban counties between these two thresholds usually had benchmarks
at the urban oor while the non-urban oor was not binding in comparable counties in
metropolitan areas with a population of less than 250,000. We refer to counties with average
2007 FFS expenditures of $662 to $732 as group two and counties above $732 as group three.
Our key sources of variation is the urban population threshold, which causes bench-
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marks to be 10.5 percent higher in urban than in non-urban oor counties. To account for
the possibility that other factors vary smoothly with population, we control exibly for both
the county population and for the population of the countys metropolitan area. We also
include each countys per-capita FFS expenditures. As FFS expenditures increase among
oor counties, the gap between the oor and the county benchmarks declines. All else
equal, this change would have the opposite e¤ect of the policy-induced increase in bench-
marks at the urban population threshold. But because many other factors - such as patient
preferences and provider treatment patterns - are likely to co-vary with per-capita FFS
expenditures, we do not assign a causal interpretation to our estimates for the coe¢ cient
on this covariate.
We begin by estimating the e¤ect of urban status on the level of benchmarks and
then proceed to estimate the e¤ect on market outcomes such as the number of insurers and
the HHI concentration index along with measures of plan quality such as plan premiums
and enrollee satisfaction with care. While the observation level in our data is at a county-
year, our identifying variation stems from each countys associated metro population, and
our sample restrictions are also based on metro population. To prevent metro areas with
equal populations but a greater number of constituent counties from being mechanically
over-represented in our sample, we inverse weight our regressions based on the number of
counties making up a given metropolitan area. We control for a countys per-capita level of
FFS expenditures and exibly for both the county and metropolitan area population when
estimating specications of the following type:
Yjt = b0+ b1 FFSj;2007+ b2 Urbanj+f(CountyPopj;2007)+g(MetroPopj;2007)+gt: (1)
In this equation, our coe¢ cient of particular interest is b2, which represents our estimate of
the average impact of urban status on outcome variable Yjt.
One concern with this equation is that there may be other factors associated with ur-
ban status - being part of a relatively large metropolitan area - that are not adequately
captured by our controls for county and metropolitan area population and fee-for-service
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expenditures. This concern is to some extent reduced by focusing on a smaller and more
comparable set of counties that are close to the population threshold. To probe the ro-
bustness of our results, we estimate additional specications that vary the range of the
population window that is included in our analysis sample and also vary our method of
controlling for county and metropolitan population. In addition to these cross-sectional
analyses, we perform di¤erence-in-di¤erences and triple di¤erence specications. First, we
compare high FFS and low FFS counties. We control for our urban denition and a low
FFSvariable that captures the extent to which oor payments bind. This variable takes
on a one if FFS costs are below the rural oor ($662/month) and a zero if FFS costs are
above the urban oor ($732/month). We assign counties with FFS costs between the two
oors a value between 0 and 1 that captures the linear interpolation of the two endpoints.
We estimate the following equation:
Yjt = b0 + b1  FFSj;2007 + b2  Urbanj + b3  Lowj + b4  (Urbanj  Lowj) (2)
+f(CountyPopj;2007) + g(MetroPopj;2007) + gt; (3)
where the coe¢ cient of interest is b4, on the interaction of the urban indicator and
the low variable. Similarly, we estimate di¤erence-in-di¤erence specications using the pre-
2001 period as a control group. We construct the variable Postto take on a one after the
di¤erential oors take e¤ect. We estimate the following equation:
Yjt = b0 + b1  FFSj;2007 + b2  Urbanj + b3  Postjt + b4  (Urbanj  Postjt) (4)
+f(CountyPopj;2007) + g(MetroPopj;2007) + gt; (5)
where again the coe¢ cient of interest is b4, on the interaction of the two indicators.
Finally, we combine these two analyses in a triple di¤erence specication.
One nal concern could be the indirect manner through which county benchmarks
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a¤ect plan reimbursement; insurers submit bids for how much it would cost to provide
traditional Medicare services, for an average enrollee, with the county benchmark serving
as an important reference point. Insurers can bid up to the county benchmark. However,
they have some incentive to bid below the benchmark, as they can then allocate 75 percent of
the di¤erence between the bid and benchmark towards additional services, which could help
attract additional enrollees. In Table 5, we show that a $1 increase in the county benchmark
in urban relative to non-urban counties is accompanied by a $0.91 average increase in plan
bids. Given this, we argue that county benchmark increases are transmitted almost fully
to insurers, even in the presence of this bidding mechanism. As such, we can abstract away
from this bidding structure, for the remainder of our analyses.
Under perfect competition and constant marginal costs (perfectly elastic supply),
we expect full pass-through of reimbursements to consumers.9 However, competition may
be imperfect and there may be (adverse or advantageous) selection, even conditional on
risk adjustment, leading to incomplete pass-through. Our research design allows us to
identify pass-through by exploiting three primary sources of variation. First, we compare
urban and non-urban "oor" counties to estimate the e¤ect of the policy-induced increase
of 10.5 percent in MA county benchmarks. Second, we explore whether our estimates
for urban status are similar in high FFS counties in which urban counties do not receive
additional reimbursement in a set of di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates. Finally, we explore
the relationship between urban status and our outcome variables of interest in our analysis
sample before the urban increase was introduced in 2001. These multiple approaches allow
us to obtain a credible estimate of the impact of policy-induced variation in reimbursement
on several outcome variables of interest in this rapidly growing area of the health care sector.
9Therefore, the reimbursement is optimal when the marginal consumer in Medicare Advantage places a
value on the additional coverage provided at an amount equal to the shadow price of public funds. A more
detailed theoretical treatment can be found in the appendix.
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4 Results
4.1 The Impact on County Plan Benchmarks
To investigate the e¤ect of urban status on county benchmarks and on other outcome
variables of interest, we primarily focus on the 2007 through 2011 period. We do this be-
cause Medicare Advantage changed substantially in 2006 with the introduction of Medicare
Part D (and our results are quite similar if we include 2006 as well). Additionally, the
shift to full risk adjustment in 2007 and the introduction of bidding in 2006 suggest that
the MA program is quite di¤erent during our study period than in the preceding years.
For the reasons outlined in the preceding section, our analysis sample includes counties
in metropolitan areas with populations between 100,000 and 600,000, though we test the
sensitivity of our results to alternative sample denitions.
The rst column of Table 6 summarizes the results of a specication for "group
one" counties - those with average FFS expenditures below $662 in 2007.10 As discussed
above, the e¤ect of urban status should be largest for these counties. The specication
also controls (with a linear and quadratic term) for both the county population and the
metropolitan area population along with monthly FFS expenditures. Standard errors are
clustered at the metropolitan area level given the level of variation of the urban indicator.
The point estimate of 68.57 for the urban coe¢ cient is very precisely estimated and suggests
an increase of more than 10 percent in the average monthly MA benchmark. None of the
four coe¢ cients on the population variables are statistically signicant. The estimate for the
FFS expenditure coe¢ cient is statistically signicant though the magnitude of the estimate
(0.04) is small. The positive point estimate reects the fact that counties with spending
close to $662 are more likely to rise above this oor in 2008 and later years.
The next column repeats this specication though focuses on "group two" counties
- those with average 2007 FFS expenditures between $662 and $732. The statistically
signicant point estimate of 21.81 for our key explanatory variable indicates that urban
10By using the 2007 oor denitions, we guarantee a balanced panel. If we used the contemporaneous
payment rate to dene the sample, we would lose 25 counties in 2009 and 2010.
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counties in this intermediate range of per-capita FFS spending did experience an increase in
their monthly benchmarks relative to their non-urban counterparts. Not surprisingly given
the noisy relationship between benchmarks and FFS spending in this range displayed in
Figure 5, this coe¢ cient estimate is less precise, with a standard error that is approximately
ve times larger than for group one counties.
The analysis sample for the third specication in Table 6 includes counties with per-
capita FFS expenditures above $732 per month. For these counties, urban status should not
lead to an increase in monthly benchmarks, as payment oors do not bind for either type
of county. Consistent with this, the coe¢ cient estimate is actually negative though is even
less precisely estimated than for group two counties. When we pool together group 2 and
group 3 counties in the nal specication, we nd little evidence of an increase in monthly
benchmarks resulting from urban status. Taken together, the results in this table strongly
suggest that relatively low FFS counties in urban areas experience a large policy-induced
increase in monthly MA benchmarks while high FFS counties do not.
The urban payment oor for MA plans, which is 10.5 percent higher than the non-
urban payment oor, was introduced in 2001. To the extent that our estimates are capturing
a causal e¤ect of this policy, we should detect little relationship between urban status and
monthly MA benchmarks in the preceding years. To investigate this issue, we estimate a
specication analogous to the rst one in Table A.1 for the 1998 through 2000 period with
the same sample of group one counties. The results from this specication are summarized
in the rst column of Table A.1. The point estimate of -4.11 is insignicant and precisely
estimated.
We next estimate this same specication using data from the 2001 through 2003
period, the period just following the increase in MA reimbursement, with the results sum-
marized in the third column of Table A.1. The point estimate for b2 of 24.69 is precisely
estimated though is considerably smaller than the corresponding one estimated for the 2007
through 2011 period. This is primarily because CMS categorized counties somewhat di¤er-
ently during this period, so that many counties with an urban designation after 2003 did not
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have an urban designation previously. In specication 4 we account for this by adding an
indicator variable with the pre-2004 denition. The point estimate for the coe¢ cient on this
second indicator variable is approximately twice as large at 49.58. Figure 6 describes the
evolution of the coe¢ cient on the urban indicator in year-specic benchmark specications
over time. Before 2001, there is no signicant di¤erence in benchmarks between urban and
non-urban counties. Between 2001 and 2003, the urban indicator coe¢ cient is signicantly
positive, and this approximately doubles in 2004. In that same year, both the urban and
rural oors were increased, leading to a higher proportion of our sample being classied as
a oor county. Furthermore, it may take time for rms to submit new bids and consumers
to react to changes in reimbursement. As seen in Figure 7, we only see large e¤ects of the
urban dummy on MA enrollment in 2006 and beyond.
While we do not have enough counties near the urban threshold to employ the
techniques of a standard regression discontinuity design, Figure 8 presents a graphical illus-
tration of the monthly change in benchmarks for group one counties using a uniform kernel
and the optimal bandwidth of Imbens and Kalaynaraman (2012). The gure shows a clear
discontinuity in payment rates at the urban threshold.11
The results presented in this section demonstrate that urban counties with rela-
tively low FFS spending had signicantly higher MA benchmarks than did comparable
non-urban counties. We nd no similar relationship for counties with high FFS spending,
in which the payment oors rarely bind. Additionally, our results using data from an earlier
period (and the year-by-year estimates shown in Figure 7) reveal that this relationship did
not exist before 2001 and emerged immediately after urban oors were introduced in that
year. As shown in Table 2, with respect to demographic characteristics, average income,
and average fee-for-service expenditures, the two sets of counties are quite similar. In the
subsequent sections, we explore how this policy-induced variation in the generosity of plan
reimbursement a¤ects market outcomes and the quality of MA coverage.
11The specication in these gures is slightly di¤erent and more exible than any in the tables, yet the
pattern is similar.
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4.2 Market Structure and MA Enrollment
We next explore the e¤ect of the policy-induced increase in MA plan reimbursement
on two measures of market structure - the number of insurers and the HHI concentration
index. As our model above suggests, increases in the generosity of reimbursement may
cause additional rms to enter the MA market and incumbent rms to increase the quality
of their product in response. Here, we consider counties in the rst group described above,
with FFS expenditures per enrollee below $662 in 2007. For this group of counties, the
average number of insurers o¤ering an MA plan during the 2007 through 2011 period was
6.5 and the average HHI concentration index 3,907 (measured on a 10,000 scale). We once
again control for both county population and metropolitan area population (with both a
linear and quadratic term) and for average per-capita FFS expenditures in 2007.
The rst specication summarized in the rst panel of Table 7 considers the e¤ect of
urban status on the number of insurers. The point estimate of 1.78 for the urban indicator
variable represents more than 25 percent of a countys mean number of insurers for our
analysis sample. This estimate is highly signicant with a t-statistic of 3.8. The signicantly
negative point estimate of -.69 for the per-capita FFS expenditures variable suggests that
fewer insurers enter as a countys fee-for-service expenditures gets closer to the $662 monthly
FFS spending upper bound for group one counties. This makes sense as the gap between the
plan reimbursement and FFS expenditures is declining in that measure (as shown in Figure
4), though we emphasize that other factors may vary with per-capita FFS expenditures and
thus stop short of a causal interpretation for this estimate.
The second specication yields a similar picture by considering the e¤ect of urban
status on the HHI concentration index. Urban counties in metropolitan areas with a popu-
lation of 250,000 or more are signicantly less concentrated, with the point estimate of -873
representing almost one-fourth the mean HHI in our analysis sample. The HHI increases
as FFS spending rises and thus the gap between this and the payment oor declines. As
expected, the point estimates in column 2 have the opposite sign to those for the previous
specication given that here a larger number represents fewer insurers operating. Our HHI
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measures are the least robust across specications. This is not surprising, as HHI is a highly
non-linear measure and the e¤ect of additional entrants is not necessarily large. In a com-
panion set of results not summarized here, we nd that the percentage of plans sold by the
three largest insurers in a market is not signicantly di¤erent in urban counties. Therefore,
our results suggest that higher reimbursement leads additional fringe insurers to enter, but
not to capture large market shares.
Columns 1 and 2 in the rst panel of Table 7 suggest that the additional reim-
bursement available to plans in counties with the urban designation leads to more entry
and a reduction in concentration. The specications summarized in the next three columns
investigate whether and to what extent the additional reimbursement leads to more MA
enrollment. The third column shows that the fraction of Medicare recipients enrolled in
Medicare Advantage HMO or PPO plans increases by 7.1 percentage points as a result of
the greater reimbursement, while column 4 shows a corresponding increase of 5.9 percent-
age points in the share enrolled in MA private fee-for-service plans. Both estimates are
substantial relative to the sample means for our analysis sample. Figure 9 presents a graph-
ical illustration of the e¤ect of the urban threshold on MA penetration. MA penetration
averages 10 percent immediately to the left of the threshold and 20 percent immediately to
the right, providing additional evidence of a causal e¤ect.
In subsequent panels of Table 7, we test the robustness of these results in a number
of ways. The second and third panels use narrower population windows when constructing
the analysis sample. The advantage of the wide range used in the preceding specications
(100,000-600,000) is that roughly one-fourth of Medicare eligibles are in metropolitan areas
in this population range. The disadvantage is that by including such a broad population
range, we may introduce bias. The specications summarized in the second panel include
only counties in metropolitan areas with populations from 150,000 to 350,000. All of our
results are qualitatively similar (though the estimate in the HHI specication is no longer
statistically signicant) and suggest that the policy-induced increase in reimbursement leads
to substantially more entry and an increase in MA enrollment in urban counties. Table A.2
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shows that our results are also robust to alternative methods of controlling for population
and the inclusion of the race and gender controls described in Table 2 (as suggested by
Altonji et al. 2005). Finally, we present coe¢ cients on the population variables in Table
A.3.
We also present di¤erence-in-di¤erences and triple di¤erence specications. First,
we compare oor counties in our sample to non-oor counties in the same population range.
Because urban status does not lead to additional reimbursement in non-oor counties, this
allows us to account for the possibility that market outcomes are di¤erent for other reasons
in urban counties. The estimates for the coe¢ cient on the interaction between urban status
and being a oor county are displayed in the fourth panel of Table 7 (with the full results
reported in Table A.4). The coe¢ cient estimate of 1.53 in column 1 reveals that there is a
signicantly larger di¤erence in the number of insurers between urban and non-urban oor
counties than between the corresponding non-oor counties. Similarly, urban oor counties
have an average HHI that is lower by 1087 points and MA penetration that is higher by
4.7%. These results strongly support the estimates that use only oor counties and all of
the estimates are statistically signicant.
Next, we investigate the pre-2001 period for our analysis sample. In this earlier
time period, there were no di¤erential oors by urban status. By comparing the results for
this period to those for our study period, we can control for time-invariant features of urban
oor relative to non-urban oor counties that may be driving our results. Our results are
largely consistent with Table 7, with the exception of HHI. This is largely a compositional
issue, as 67% of oor counties had no MA insurers pre-2001. If we replace these missing
values with a monopoly-level HHI, we obtain a negative (though not statistically signicant)
coe¢ cient.
Finally, we implement triple di¤erence specications that utilize both the non-oor
counties and the earlier time period. The results from these specications are summarized in
Appendix Table A.5. The results are also consistent with Table 7 with the exception of HHI.
If we replaced missing HHI values with the monopoly values, the results would be large,
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but not statistically signicant (a reduction of 1280 points). Taken together, these results
provide additional evidence that the di¤erences in market structure and MA enrollment
between urban and non-urban oor counties are due to di¤erential reimbursement rather
than other unobserved factors.
4.3 Financial Characteristics of Plans
We next consider how the nancial generosity of MA coverage varies with the additional
policy-induced reimbursement. As discussed above, insurers may respond to the higher
benchmarks in urban counties and to the resulting increase in competition by reducing their
premiums or out-of-pocket costs or by o¤ering additional services. To test this possibility,
we begin by exploring the relationship between urban status and the monthly MA plan
premium, which has an average value of approximately $30 in our analysis sample. This
premium data is available at the county-plan-year level, and our county-year measures are
enrollment weighted-averages. As shown in the rst column of the rst panel of Table 8, the
point estimate for the urban indicator is very small in magnitude (-0.88) and statistically
insignicant. This suggests that despite the substantially higher benchmarks in urban
counties, MA enrollees do not benet in the form of much lower premiums.
In the second column we consider the e¤ect on the amounts that insurers allocate
toward supplemental Medicare services through the rebates they are provided by CMS (if
and when their bids fall below the benchmarks). We only have rebate data for 2007 through
2010, and so our analysis sample is 20 percent smaller as a result, and the average value of
this variable for our analysis sample is $55 per month. Consistent with our estimate for the
premium measure, our results provide little evidence to suggest that signicantly greater
plan reimbursement leads to substantial additional benets to enrollees. The point estimate
of 3.38 for the benchmark represents about 5 percent of the additional reimbursement and
we can rule out an increase in the rebate of more than $12 at the 95 percent level of
condence.
In the third column, we investigate the e¤ect on out-of-pocket costs (OOPC). To the
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extent that an insurer responds to the additional reimbursement by, for example, reducing
deductibles or o¤ering supplemental services such as vision coverage, it would be reected
in this measure. This measure weights by MA enrollment, and the average OOPC in our
analysis sample is approximately $365 per month. The point estimate of -7.02 for the urban
coe¢ cient is statistically insignicant. With this point estimate, we can rule out an out-of-
pocket cost reduction of more than $24 per month at the 95 percent level of condence.12
In the fourth column, the outcome variable is a measure of total expected costs
for the enrollee, based on the sum of premiums and out-of-pocket costs indicators and
with rebates subtracted out (given that higher values represent more generous coverage).
The statistically insignicant point estimate of -8.30 suggests only about one-eighth of the
additional reimbursement is passed on to consumers and we can rule out a benet of more
than $34 (49 percent of the benchmark e¤ect) at the 95 percent level of condence.
In the fth column, we consider the provision of drug coverage and - consistent with
the previous measures - nd little evidence that this benet is more likely to be o¤ered by
plans in urban counties, as the point estimate on the urban indicator is actually negative.
And as with the OOPC variable, Part D coverage seems if anything to be less generous in
counties with lower FFS reimbursement, where more insurers enter. This could once again
reect marginal entrants being less generous than incumbent rms on this dimension.
For all ve of the outcome variables considered here, we weight by each plans share
of county-specic MA enrollment in the year. If MA recipients in urban counties were, for
example, less likely to choose low-premium plans or plans with generous cost sharing, our
estimates could provide a misleading estimate of average plan quality. To investigate this
possibility, we estimate a companion set of specications in which we weight each plan in
a county-year with non-zero MA enrollment equally. As shown in Table A.6, our point
estimates for the urban indicator are qualitatively quite similar and also suggest limited
12The statistically signicant negative estimate for the FFS variable in the OOPC specication suggests
that, as the wedge between the oor and FFS spending grows, plans become less generous. However, as
we emphasize above, other factors likely vary with FFS expenditures, and thus we do not assign a causal
interpretation to this estimate.
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pass-through.13
We probe the robustness of these results in a number of ways. For example, in
the next two panels we investigate whether the results are similar for narrower population
ranges than in our main analysis sample. While the point estimates become less precise,
they remain small in magnitude. For example, the insignicant point estimate of 5.80 for
the sum of plan premiums and other OOPC and with rebates subtracted out in the fourth
column actually suggests plans in urban counties o¤er somewhat less generous coverage.
Our estimates in the fourth and fth panels, which represent di¤erence-in-di¤erences speci-
cations for high FFS spending counties and in the pre-period, respectively, further support
our ndings, though we do not have data on all of the outcome variables of interest in the
pre-2001 period. While our earlier results provide evidence of a signicant e¤ect of MA
reimbursement on MA penetration and market structure, these results suggest that more
generous reimbursement has little impact on the nancial features of MA plans.
4.4 Heterogeneity
We can also explore heterogeneity in the e¤ect of reimbursement across insurers and
markets. First, we restrict our analysis to Humana, the market leader. Humana operates
in 87% of markets and 86% of oor markets, nearly twice the number of the next largest
insurer, UnitedHealth. Humana also captures 18% of the national MA market. The results
in Table 9 show that Humana plans are more generous in urban oor counties than non-
urban oor counties. The sum of premiums and OOPC are $14 lower in urban oor counties.
This indicates that more of the benchmark increase is being passed through to Humana
consumers.
What drives the di¤erence between these estimates and those in Table 8? Increased
benchmarks may be attracting marginal insurers who are not as e¢ cient as incumbents or
13 Interestingly, the point estimates for the coe¢ cient on FFS expenditures in the OOPC specications
change sign in these unweighted specications, and now indicate that as the wedge between the oor and
FFS spending declines, plans become less generous. This suggests that MA recipients in areas with higher
FFS spending are more likely to choose plans with generous cost-sharing. As with the other point estimates
for this FFS variable, we do not assign a causal interpretation.
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must incur xed costs of entry. These new insurers attract consumers who prefer their
plans due to di¤erential networks, idiosyncratic errors, or behavioral biases (Stockley et
al. 2014). While these consumers are made better o¤ by the increased reimbursement, the
plans chosen are not necessarily better in purely nancial terms. Therefore, we are cautious
about drawing conclusions about welfare from our results.
These results also suggest that the e¤ects of benchmarks may be both heterogeneous
and non-linear. Therefore, we also replicate our analysis across more and less competitive
markets. Table A.10 presents the results of this analysis. We nd nearly full pass-through in
the most competitive quintile of markets, but limited e¤ect of benchmark generosity outside
of this subset, consistent with ndings in Cabral et al. (2014). These specications support
our basic results and provide additional evidence on mechanisms and heterogeneity.
5 Plan Quality
5.1 Quality Characteristics
Higher MA reimbursements could also be passed on to consumers in the form of quality
improvements. To identify possible changes to the quality of health care coverage (as distinct
from the nancial measures considered above), we use respondent-level survey data from
the federal governments Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems for
the 2007 through 2011 period. These data contain information on respondentscounties
of residence, allowing us to examine the relationship between county-level reimbursement
variation and the measures included in the CAHPS. We have nearly 82,000 person-year
level observations for the counties in our analysis sample during our study period.
We examine the impact of additional plan reimbursement on respondentsoverall
ratings of plan quality along di¤erent dimensions: health care received, the primary care
provider, specialists seen, and the plan overall. We run our results on data aggregated to a
county-year level, while restricting to counties in the 100,000 to 600,000 metro population
range, with 2007 FFS values below the $662 monthly amount described above. The main
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results are displayed in Table 10. We nd no signicant relationship between a countys
urban status and each of these rating measures, with the exception of ratings for primary
care physicians. Using the approach introduced in Kling et. al. (2007), we calculate
standardized treatment e¤ects, to examine whether urban status has an impact on these
ratings measures, as a collective. These results also indicate no signicant relationships
between higher MA benchmarks and plan ratings.
We further examine the e¤ect on plan quality by looking to plan-level quality mea-
sures ("star ratings") compiled by CMS, relating to health outcomes, chronic care manage-
ment, customer service, and the plan overall. These results, displayed in Table A.7, also
show no signicant relationship between a countys urban status and various metrics of
plan quality. We can rule out a percentage increase in consumers rating of "Overall Health
Plan" of greater than 3.1 percent at a 95 percent level of condence.
We also consider the impact on measures of utilization and outcomes contained
in the CAHPS, such as number of specialist visits, number of personal MD visits, and
self-reported health status. To the extent that additional reimbursement leads plans to
expand access to care or to improve enrollee health more, it would potentially be captured
by these estimates. These results, which are presented in Table 11, provide no evidence of
a signicant relationship between urban status and utilization or health outcomes across
the counties in our analysis sample. These results - and those presented in Table 10 - are
robust to sample denition as shown in Tables A.8 and A.9.
It is worth noting that these results on quality and intensity of care could be biased if
the increase in MA enrollment that we nd in urban counties leads to a signicant change in
the composition of enrollees. If, for example, MA plans in urban counties had patients who
were substantially sicker on average, that might bias our estimate of the e¤ects of additional
reimbursement on enrollees satisfaction and other measures of plan quality. This motivates
our analyses in the next section.
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5.2 Compositional E¤ects
We do not nd evidence of increased reimbursements being passed through to con-
sumers to a signicant extent in the form of lower cost-sharing or increased quality. How-
ever, our results could be biased by reimbursement-driven changes to enrollee composition
within Medicare Advantage. As we showed in Table 7, the 10.5 percent increase in bench-
marks for oor counties resulting from urban status leads to a substantial increase in MA
enrollment. As such, we test for possible compositional changes to MA enrollment, which
could accompany these increases to enrollment.
Using data from the CAHPS, we once again restrict to counties in the 100,000 to
600,000 metro population range, and with average per-capita FFS expenditures in 2007 of
less than $662. We then compile demographic and health metrics for enrollees in urban and
non-urban counties, respectively. As shown in Table 12, we do not nd substantial di¤er-
ences in age, gender, or race across enrollees in these counties. This does not denitively
rule out the possibility of unobserved di¤erences between the marginal and average MA
enrollee. But we nd very little evidence that compositional di¤erences could be driving
the very large di¤erence between our results for a substantial e¤ect on market structure and
very little e¤ect on the measured quality of MA coverage. In Table A.7, we consider addi-
tional metrics - the average risk score of MA enrollees (which is increasing with the number
of conditions that a Medicare recipient has) and the average costs of those remaining in FFS
- to test for possible reimbursement-driven changes to enrollee composition. These results
also do not provide any evidence of signicant changes in enrollee composition as a result
of increased reimbursement. Finally, Table 5 presents the results of a regression with bids
as a fraction of the benchmark, rather than prices or measures of quality, as the outcome
of interest. There is no signicant di¤erence between urban and non-urban counties on
this measure, indicating that bids average 90 percent of benchmarks in both types of oor
counties. This suggests that rms are attuned to benchmarks, especially in oor counties,
and bid to maximize payments.
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6 Advertising and Firm Returns
Our empirical results show that larger subsidies to Medicare Advantage plans lead to
signicantly more insurers operating and to less concentrated insurance markets. Further-
more, more generous subsidies lead to higher Medicare Advantage penetration rates. One
might assume that the higher subsidies are passed on to consumers in the form of lower
premiums, out-of-pocket costs, or higher quality. Our empirical results do not support this
conclusion. While higher margins seem to stimulate competition, competition has a limited
e¤ect on the price and quality of MA plans.
Firms in this market may compete on advertising, rather than price or quality.
Numerous studies suggest that both framing and advertising can substantially impact con-
sumers making complicated nancial decisions. There is substantial evidence that seniors
have a hard time choosing cost minimizing Medicare Part D plans (Abaluck and Gruber
2011). Furthermore, informational interventions that inform consumers that lower cost
plans are available can have a substantial impact (Kling et al. 2012). Search frictions, com-
parison frictions, and behavioral biases can impact the health insurance purchase decision.
The complexity of reimbursement in this market may lead rms to advertise zero premium
plans, rather than focusing on the overall expected medical costs, including rebates, and
the variation in those costs. Furthermore, advertising may help rms select favorable risks
(Aizawa and Kim 2014).
Advertising competition is an important feature of the market for a wide range of
complex nancial products. Hastings et al. (2013) nd that exposure to sales personnel
in the market for investment funds decreases price sensitivity and increases brand loyalty.
Taken together, these e¤ects increase fees paid by consumers. Guren et al. (2013) show
that mortgage lenders who advertise more tend to sell more expensive mortgages, target
unsophisticated borrowers, and advertise teaser, rather than reset rates. These studies are
consistent with a theoretical literature highlighting the impact of complex pricing rules
(primarily add-on pricing, but similar logic could be applied to cost sharing or interest
rates). Complex pricing rules can arise from incentives to price discriminate (Ellison 2005)
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or behavioral biases such as myopia (Laibson and Gabaix 2006).
To explore the impact of reimbursements on rm advertising, we utilize data from
Kantar Media. Kantar Ad$pender contains advertising data at the media-product-year-
designated market area (DMA) level. Because DMAs are bigger than counties, we need
to aggregate our reimbursement data. We create variables that represent the percentage
of Medicare beneciaries in a DMA that live in an urban, urban oor, and oor county.
We examine the impact of these variables on TV spot advertising spending per Medicare
beneciary in a DMA. We dene this measure in two ways. In the rst, we restrict our
analysis to products with "Medicare" in their name. This includes Medicare Advantage
plans, but also Part D and Medicare supplement plans as well. Furthermore, not all carriers
report a specic Medicare line. The Kantar data does not allow us to distinguish between
these products and data may be an overestimate or an underestimate of the amount of
advertising for MA plans. However, we have no reason to believe that advertising for
Medicare supplement or Part D plans would vary with oor status. Average spending per
Medicare enrollee is $5.90 per year. In the second denition and panel of Table 13, we take
Kantar denition of "health insurance" as given, noting that not all Medicare products are
denoted by name. While we would prefer to restrict to only Medicare Advantage products
within health insurance, the products are not coded nely enough in the data. However,
Medicare products comprise the bulk of individual insurance plans sold (and, presumably,
targeted advertising) within all DMAs.The dependent variable is skewed, with only about
half of DMAs having advertising, but total spending in the 90th percentile of DMAs is $2.2
million per year.
In Panel A of Table 13, we summarize the results from specications of the following
type:
Yjt = b1+b2% Urbanj+b3% Urban F loorj+b4% Floorj+dFFSj+g(MetroPopj;2007)+Xjt+jt:
In all specications, we include year xed e¤ects as well as a spline that controls for
the DMA-year population. There are 210 DMAs and we observe four years of advertising
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data (2007 through 2010), giving us 840 total observations, and we therefore cluster our
standard errors at the DMA level. If more generous MA reimbursements in urban oor
counties leads to increases in advertising, we would expect a positive estimate for b3. It
is important to note that, due to the level of aggregation in the advertising data, we are
unable to restrict attention to the counties in metropolitan areas with populations between
100 and 600 thousand as we did in the preceding sections. Instead, the analysis sample in
these specications includes essentially all geographic areas in the U.S., which could make
it more di¢ cult to disentangle the e¤ect of MA reimbursement from other factors.
The rst specication summarized in Panel A indicates that urban oor counties
have signicantly higher advertising for Medicare products. The estimate of $6.35 is sub-
stantial, as it slightly exceeds the mean of our dependent variable, though its precision is
limited with a standard error of $2.23. This is not surprising given that we have just 210
DMAs and the dependent variable is highly skewed. The corresponding estimate in Panel
B, which uses the broader health insurance measure as the dependent variable, is also large
in magnitude and statistically signicant. Both estimates are robust to the inclusion of ad
prices (specication 2) and per-capita FFS expenditures (specication 3) in the DMA-year.
One concern with this rst set of estimates is that urban oor counties may attract
more advertising for reasons unrelated to MA reimbursement generosity. To address this
concern, in the fourth specication we add a control for per-capita credit card advertising in
the DMA-year. This variable should not be a¤ected by the generosity of MA reimbursement
though should control for unobserved factors that inuence the intensity of advertising in
an area. While this variable is signicantly positively related with both of our dependent
variables, it has little impact on our coe¢ cient estimates of interest.
In the fth and nal specication, we introduce controls for the share of a county
residing in an urban county and in a oor county. This reduces both the magnitude and the
precision of our key coe¢ cient estimate in Panel A. However, it has essentially no impact on
the estimate that uses the broader measure of health insurance as our advertising measure,
which remains statistically signicant and economically large.
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Taken together, the results in this section suggest that the more generous reimburse-
ment given to MA plans in urban oor counties leads to substantially more advertising. We
believe these results can rationalize much of the increase in rm entry and MA enrollment
in urban oor counties. While the precision of our estimates is limited due to the level of
aggregation in the advertising data, it provides some insight as to why pass-through of MA
reimbursement may be limited, and suggests that increased benchmarks need not accrue to
insurers. Additionally, our ndings are consistent with much previous literature regarding
the importance of advertising in the market for complex nancial products.
Despite dissipation of some rents through marketing costs, it is plausible that in-
surers also capture part of the increased benchmarks. Figure 3 shows dramatic increases
in stock prices for the four publicly traded health insurers with the most MA enrollment
(Humana, United, Cigna, and Aetna) as a result of a surprisingly large increase in bench-
marks on April 1, 2013. Interestingly, it is Humana, the most active insurer in the Medicare
Advantage market from Table 3, with the biggest increase. A simple pre-post comparison
of market capitalization for these four rms, which accounted for about 44 percent of MA
enrollment at the time of the policy change, indicates a market capitalization increase of
approximately $2.7 billion. The announced benchmarks represented an increase of approx-
imately 5.6 percent relative to what otherwise was specied by legislation. Multiplying
this percentage by our estimate of baseline MA revenues for each insurer (calculated by
multiplying enrollment weighted benchmarks for each insurer by the average risk score of
its enrollees) yields an estimated increase in annual MA revenue of about $2.9 billion.
It is important to note that investors apparently expected a signicant increase
in benchmarks around this time. For example, according to Humanas press release, the
rm had expected a 4.4 percent increase in benchmarks instead of 5.6 percent. If one
assumes that this also accurately captures the assumptions of investors, this would suggest
that just $0.62 billion of the $2.9 billion increase in annual MA revenues was a surprise.
Using a discount rate of 5 percent, this implies an increase in the present value of MA
revenues of approximately $12.4 billion. Combining our estimate of a $2.7 billion increase
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in market capitalization with the $12.4 billion increase in the present value of MA revenues,
we estimate that 22 percent of the increase in benchmarks is passed through to insurers
in the form of higher prots. Of course, the precision of this estimate is necessarily more
speculative than our estimates relating to consumers. But the sharp stock market reaction
to changes in the level of MA reimbursement strongly suggests that insurers capture much
of the benet of policy-induced increases in plan reimbursement.14
Our estimates and back of the envelope calculations indicate that at most 45 per-
cent of the increased reimbursement goes to consumers and approximately 22 percent goes
to insurers. Our advertising results suggest that some of the increased expenditure is dis-
sipated through marketing costs. Theory suggests that hospitals, physicians, and other
health care providers could also capture some of the increased reimbursements, by virtue of
market power.15 We believe that a combination of increased nancial generosity, increased
insurer prots, and increased marketing account for nearly all of the increased government
expenditures.
7 Conclusion
Our results strongly suggest that increased subsidies for private insurance in the Medicare
Advantage market result in increased insurer advertising, but little additional monetary or
medical benet for consumers.16 Low pass-through cannot be attributed to selection and
14The benchmark increase of 5.6% applied not only to 2014 benchmarks, but also to all future year
benchmarks; for 2014, this resulted in a benchmark that was 1.2% higher than the expectation. In our
calculations, we thereby assume that all future year benchmarks would also be 1.2% higher than expected.
However, for some of these years, higher benchmarks may have already been anticipated; congressional action
on Medicare SGR policies would produce a benchmark increase of commensurate magnitude and would
supercede CMSs action. While CMS preempted such legislation through its unilateral action, following any
Congressional legislation, past CMS action (or lack thereof) would not a¤ect subsequent benchmarks. In
our calculations, we do not account for this possibility. As such, our estimate of the unexpected revenue
increase, from CMSs action, represents an upper-bound, meaning that our estimated pass-through rate to
insurers represents a lower-bound.
15However, the aforementioned calculations leave relatively little for providers. The absence of stock price
reaction from the largest publicly-owned hospital operator, HCA, on April 1, 2013, is also suggestive of
limited benets to providers.
16The advertising is clearly market expanding if Medicare Advantage is the relevant market. However,
the extent to which this is welfare enhancing depends on the view of advertising. We simply highlight that
insurers in this market, as well as other insurance markets (Starc, 2014), tend to compete on advertising,
rather than plan generosity or innovative benet packages.
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is, more likely, a result of market power. Altogether, the results indicate that incidence
of the subsidy falls primarily on the supply side of the market. This nding is further
supported by insurer stock price movements throughout the passage and implementation of
the A¤ordable Care Act.
While our results indicate that insurers capture much of the increase in reimburse-
ments (similar to Curto et al. 2015), we are hesitant to draw conclusions about welfare. For
example, MA plans may be more e¢ cient than traditional Medicare by reducing low-value
care or improving health status. This would imply that increased reimbursements induce
consumers to switch to more cost-e¤ective plans, even if the primary mechanism is increased
advertising. Furthermore, while we nd no direct evidence that benchmarks meaningfully
benet consumers, such benets could exist. Additional choice, due to insurer entry, could
lead to meaningful gains in consumer welfare through better matching. Given that MA
penetration rates increase alongside reimbursements, a revealed preference argument would
imply that MA is more valuable to consumers when the benchmark is higher. The impact
on consumer surplus may also depend on the welfare consequences of advertising. Further-
more, higher benchmarks may improve treatment quality and health outcomes in ways that
we are unable to measure. Finally, our analysis focuses on low FFS counties and may not
be applicable to the one-third of counties with FFS spending signicantly higher than the
oor thresholds. All of this notwithstanding, the measures of plan nancial characteristics
and quality that we use suggest that only about one-eighth of the policy-induced increase
in plan reimbursement is captured by consumers.
While reimbursement increases have an ambiguous welfare impact on consumers,
they unambiguously increase costs, through increased numbers of MA enrollees and through
increased government spending per MA enrollee. A back-of-the-envelope estimate suggests
that this additional spending amounted to approximately $6.7 billion during the nal year of
our sample period.17 Therefore, given the deadweight loss associated with taxation, policy-
17Approximately 5.0 million MA enrollees resided in oor counties in 2011. In non-oor counties, the
benchmark is on average 6.1 percent higher than the lagged 5-year average FFS expenditure measure. If this
same 6.1 percent ratio existed in oor counties, monthly (annual) benchmarks would be $63.09 ($757.08)
lower and spending for the 5.0 million MA enrollees would be $3.8 billion lower. Additionally, our estimates
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makers should carefully weigh the possible gains in consumer welfare against the costs to
the federal government. Future work should attempt to quantify the full welfare benet
of increased reimbursements and quantify the costs and benets of alternative policies,
including vouchers that allow Medicare beneciaries to actively opt into traditional Medicare
or private plans.
for the e¤ect of benchmarks on MA enrollment suggest the benchmark increase leads to about a 13 percentage
point increase in MA enrollment. With 20.1 million Medicare recipients in oor counties, this represents
about 2.6 million additional MA recipients. Recent research (Brown et al., forthcoming) indicates that
switching into MA increases Medicare spending by more than $1,200 per recipient because of favorable
selection and this suggests about $2.9 billion more in Medicare spending.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: County & Financial
All Sub-Group 1 Sub-Group 2 Sub-Group 3
Per Cap 2007
FFS Rest: None <662 662 732
& <732
Metro Pop (thousands) 472 239 616 1,109
(1,209) (661) (1,103) (2,180)
County Pop (thousands) 96 50 104 246
(306) (105) (243) (631)
Monthly Per Cap. FFS 652.2 590.4 702.2 805.6
(99.6) (57.1) (27.8) (68.8)
Medicare Enroll (thousands) 14.79 8.33 15.98 35.98
(39.66) (14.93) (33.28) (79.47)
MA Penetration Rate 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13)
PFFS Penetration Rate 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
HHI Index 5,117 5,168 5,070 5,002
(2,212) (2,244) (2,168) (2,155)
Floor Status (2007) 0.62 0.92 0.27 0.00
(0.49) (0.26) (0.44) (0.00)
MA Benchmark (Monthly) 733.0 696.5 740.3 852.2
(72.1) (30.8) (30.8) (80.9)
N 3044 1850 667 527
Out of Pocket Costs (monthly) 365.3 376.5 355.1 338.5
(37.3) (31.4) (31.7) (44.9)
Rebate Payment (monthly) 56.6 52.2 57.6 71.1
(21.8) (15.4) (17.2) (35.8)
Premium (monthly) 30.8 29.7 31.8 33.1
(19.0) (17.7) (18.4) (23.5)
Premium+OOPC 396.2 406.5 386.9 371.6
(41.8) (34.1) (36.5) (56.9)
Premium+OOPC-Rebate Pmt 345.6 361.2 333.9 304.9
(59.1) (43.4) (49.8) (88.7)
Percent O¤ering Drug Cov 68.9 65.1 73.4 76.6
(23.5) (23.8) (21.5) (22.2)
N 3028 1840 666 522
Notes: The rst panel presents summaries of demographic, MA penetration, and other characteristics for
di¤erent sets of counties. The second panel presents summaries of the nancial characteristics of MA plans,
across di¤erent sets of counties. Measures are denoted per enrollee, per month. These measures cover the
2007-2011 period, and are at a county level. All nancial measures are ination-adjusted, and represented
in 2007 dollars. The source data, which is at a plan level, is rst aggregated to the county-year level;
weighting is done based on plan enrollment levels. The county-year data is then aggregated to a county-
level, with each year weighed equally; thus the nal observation level is at a county level. The original
data is obtained from publicly available CMS les, including simulated out of pocket cost information,
premium metrics, as well as other data.
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Table 2: Covariate Balance for Full Analytic Sample
Full Sample Boundary Analysis
Low Side High Side Di¤erence in Test of
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean Means Di¤erence
County Bnchmk 747 46 714 784 70 51.06
Market Structure
No of Insurers 6.17 2.64 5.41 7.02 1.61 4.95
HHI Index 3,970 1,634 4,308 3,592 -716 -3.16
MA Share 0.167 0.104 0.128 0.211 0.083 4.93
PFFS Share 0.074 0.049 0.063 0.087 0.024 3.14
PPO Share 0.039 0.040 0.029 0.051 0.022 3.4
HMO Share 0.053 0.080 0.036 0.072 0.036 2.59
Financial Chars
Drug Cov 0.66 0.20 0.63 0.69 0.06 1.74
Rebate Pmt 55.7 13.1 53.2 58.5 5.3 2.88
Prem 29.0 17.6 30.3 27.5 -2.9 -0.98
OOPC 367.4 27.5 371.6 362.8 -8.8 -1.97
OOPC+ Prem 396.4 31.3 401.9 390.2 -11.7 -2.40
OOPC+Prem-Rebate 348.0 40.3 355.2 340.1 -15.1 -2.56
County Chars
5 yr FFS 591.7 47.0 590.4 593.2 2.8 0.40
Medicare Enroll 15,666 14,920 12,877 18,795 5,918 3.87
County Pop 97,827 97,344 80,178 117,627 37,449 3.79
Metro Pop 273,234 139,752 160,358 399,873 239,515 16.62
Percent White 88.22 14.15 88.45 87.95 -0.50 -0.23
Percent Black 7.98 13.16 7.13 8.92 1.79 0.83
Percent Hispanic 5.99 10.45 7.07 4.78 -2.29 -1.89
Percent Female (Among 65+) 0.57 0.02 0.57 0.57 0.00 0.81
Personal Income 28,415 4,681 27,935 28,921 986 1.66
Number of Counties 348 184 164
Notes: Table presents a test for covariate balance between urban and non-urban counties in our sample. The unit of observation is at the
county-level, and is aggregated across the 2007-2011 period. All nancial measures are ination-adjusted, and represented in 2007 dollars.
We restrict to counties in the baseline analytic sample; this limits to counties in 100-600k metro population range, and with 2007 FFS levels
below the lowest oor value. Counties classied as High Sideare those in metro areas with populations of 250-600k, while those classied
as Low Sidehave population of 100-250k. The original data is obtained from publicly available CMS les, including enrollment and other
data. The original data is aggregated rst to a county-year level, while weighing by plan enrollment; subsequently, it is aggregated to a
county-level, while weighing all years equally.
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Table 3: Most Active Firms in Markets of Interest
All Sub-Group 1 Sub-Group 2 Sub-Group 3
Per Cap. 2007 FFS: None Blw 662 Above 662 Above 732
& Blw 732
Humana Inc. 12,998 8,094 2,840 2,064
UnitedHealth Group, Inc. 7,146 4,444 1,407 1,295
Universal American Corp. 5,844 3,511 1,356 977
Coventry Health Care Inc. 5,463 3,427 1,121 915
WellPoint, Inc. 5,100 3,303 1,082 715
Aetna Inc. 4,042 1,826 1,077 1,139
XLHealth Corporation 2,099 974 677 448
WellCare Hlth Plans, Inc. 1,910 980 410 520
BCBS of Michigan 1,466 620 425 421
15,020 9,430 3,160 2,430
Notes: Table presents number of county-year units through which any given rm o¤ers contracts,
where enrollment exceeds 10. This analysis extends for the period 2007-2011. The original data
is obtained from publicly available CMS les, including contract-county level enrollment data and
contract characteristics data.
163
Table 4: Summary Statistics: CAHPS Data
All 100-600k 100-600k, FFS Blw Floors
Urban Non-Urban
Overall Healthcare Received 8.45 8.49 8.52 8.48
(0.71) (0.49) (0.38) (0.60)
Primary Care Physician 9.00 9.02 9.03 9.03
(0.58) (0.37) (0.31) (0.45)
Specialist Physicians Seen 8.85 8.90 8.92 8.89
(0.79) (0.50) (0.32) (0.69)
Overall Health Plan 8.30 8.34 8.42 8.30
(0.80) (0.58) (0.43) (0.70)
Prescription Drug Benets 8.32 8.33 8.40 8.27
(0.86) (0.57) (0.38) (0.69)
Specialists Seen 1.66 1.70 1.67 1.64
(0.44) (0.31) (0.24) (0.35)
Visits to Personal MD 2.01 1.97 1.94 1.89
(0.63) (0.51) (0.39) (0.59)
Visits for Routine Care 2.29 2.33 2.28 2.29
(0.66) (0.48) (0.35) (0.62)
Self-Reported Overall Health Status 2.96 2.95 2.93 2.94
(0.41) (0.31) (0.26) (0.37)
Self-Reported Mental Health Status 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.28
(0.42) (0.31) (0.26) (0.37)
No. Obs 2,923 560 167 195
Notes: This panel presents summaries of self-reported plan ratings, utilization, and outcomes for MA
enrollees, across di¤erent sets of counties. The unit of aggregation is at the county-year level. The original
measures were denoted for each enrollee, per year. The original data is taken from the CAHPS and is
originally provided at an individual respondent level. Plan ratings are coded on a 0-10 scale, while self-
reported health ratings are coded on a 1-5 scale. CAHPS survey data only covers plans that are at least
a year old. As such, counties that have only new MA plans or no MA plans whatsoever do not appear in
the data. SRH refers to self-reported health.
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Table 5: MA Bid Analysis
(1) (2)
Bid As
Fraction of Total
Benchmark Amount
Urban 0.004
(0.008)
Instr. County Benchmark 0.906***
(0.080)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 0.004 2.538
(0.003) (2.351)
Metro Pop (100k) -0.006 -4.007
(0.009) (6.047)
Metro Pop (100k) Sq 0.001 0.496
(0.001) (0.783)
Cnty Pop (100k) 0.001 0.759
(0.003) (2.327)
Cnty Pop (100k) Sq -0.001 -0.530
(0.001) (0.667)
Counties Metro 100-600k,
& 2007 FFS 5 yr Blw 662
Mean 0.897 645.25
(0.034) (44.73)
N 1,360 1,360
R-squared 0.339 0.815
Notes: Table presents linear regression model; outcom e variab le include p lan bids, represented
as fractions of county b enchmarks and in absolute month ly term s. The unit of observation is
aggregated to the county-year level. The underly ing data is from CMS and covers the 2007-2010
p eriod . In our sample construction , we exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was
ab ove that of the lowest p ossib le oor. Further, we restrict to those counties in the 100-600k metro
p opulation band. We include year-level ind icators and also contro l for 5-yr p er cap ita M edicare
FFS sp ending, from 2007. Populations are stated in term s of 100k. Standard errors are clustered
at the m etro-level.
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Table 6: First Stage Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES County Benchmark
Urban 68.57*** 21.81* -21.23* 0.75
(2.27) (11.08) (12.42) (9.27)
County Pop (100k) -1.61 -1.59 -7.97 -6.32
(1.44) (4.90) (7.52) (4.62)
County Pop (100k) Sq 0.49 0.17 0.59 0.69
(0.46) (0.91) (1.39) (0.87)
Metro Pop 0.59 1.55 22.04* 12.92
(2.90) (13.03) (12.77) (10.10)
Metro Pop Sq -0.09 -0.27 -2.14 -1.35
(0.36) (1.54) (1.67) (1.28)
2007 FFS 5-yr 0.04*** 0.53*** 1.02*** 1.00***
(0.01) (0.13) (0.06) (0.04)
FFS Restriction Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Groups 2 & 3
Observations 1,740 650 490 1,140
R-squared 0.96 0.51 0.77 0.84
Notes: Table presents resu lts of our rst-stage regression , a linear model w ith County-Level M onth ly MA Benchmarks as the outcom e
variab le. Benchmark values are ination-adjusted , and represented in 2007 dollars. The Urban variab le serves as the instrum ent of
interest. The unit of observation is at the county-year level, for the 2007-2011 p eriod . The regression resu lts are weighed inversely
w ith the number of counties in a m etro area, such that each metro area is equally represented in the regression . Year xed e¤ects are
included in the analysis. The county sample is restricted to a variety of FFS cost groupings, w ith b enchmark oors typ ica lly b ind ing
for G roup 1, partia lly b ind ing for G roup 2, and not b ind ing for G roup 3. We include year-level ind icators and also contro l for 5-yr
p er cap ita M edicare FFS sp ending, from 2007. Standard errors are clustered at the m etro level. The orig inal data is obtained from
public ly availab le CMS les, includ ing enrollm ent and other data. Note that p opulations are stated in term s of 100k.
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Table 7: Reimbursement Impact: Market Structure and Plan Penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Insurers HHI HMO+PPO Sh. PFFS Sh. MA Sh.
Mean (Baseline Sample) 6.49 3,907 0.097 0.068 0.166
Urban 1.78*** -873** 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.131***
(0.47) (370) (0.019) (0.013) (0.023)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) -0.69*** 558*** -0.041*** -0.031*** -0.072***
(0.23) (187) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015)
N 1,740 1,728 1,740 1,740 1,740
Sample Baseline: 100-600k Metros, 2007-2011, 2007 FFS < 662
Urban 1.89*** -541 0.070*** 0.041** 0.111***
(0.52) (373) (0.021) (0.016) (0.026)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) -0.35 486* -0.034*** -0.021** -0.054***
(0.37) (252) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015)
N 750 739 750 750 750
Sample Robustness: 150-350k Metros
Urban 1.98*** -29 0.070** 0.026 0.096***
(0.66) (503) (0.028) (0.022) (0.030)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) -0.10 421 -0.023 -0.024* -0.048*
(0.47) (361) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024)
N 395 386 395 395 395
Sample Robustness: 200-300k Metros
Urban*Low 1.53*** -1,087*** 0.028 0.019* 0.047*
(0.46) (370) (0.027) (0.009) (0.028)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) -0.50** 407*** -0.032** -0.021*** -0.053***
(0.21) (144) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013)
N 2,880 2,855 2,880 2,880 2,880
Sample Di¤-in-Di¤ : Comparing Low and High FFS
Urban*Post 1.14*** 6 0.050*** 0.050***
(0.30) (506) (0.017) (0.017)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) -0.38* 388** -0.046*** -0.051***
(0.20) (187) (0.016) (0.013)
N 2,784 2,072 2,784 2,784
Sample Di¤-in-Di¤ : Comparing Pre and Post
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcom e variab les are m easures of MA market structure. The unit of observation
is aggregated at the county-year, for the p eriod sp ecied , w ith the aggregation weighed by plan enrollm ent. The regression resu lts are
weighed inversely w ith the number of counties in a m etro area, such that each metro area is equally represented in the regression . The
orig inal data is obtained from public ly availab le CMS les, includ ing enrollm ent, landscap e, OOPC , and other data. For the baseline
sample, we exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was ab ove that of the lowest p ossib le oor, and also fo cus on the 2007
to 2011 post-p eriod . We also restrict to those counties w ith in the sp ecied population band. In one alternate sp ecication shown, we
expand the baseline sample to include H igh FFS counties; in another, we expand the baseline sample to include the pre-2001 p eriod
(while still exclud ing the 2001 to 2006 p eriod). In these alternate sp ecications, h igh FFS counties/pre-2001 observations serve as
a contro l group, g iven that Urban status would not exp lic itly impact b enchmarks for those observations. P rior to 2004, on ly HMO
plans cou ld b e o¤ered , m eaning that the MA share and HMO+PPO share levels are identica l for the pre-p eriod analysis. We include
year-level ind icators and also contro l for 5-yr p er cap ita M edicare FFS sp ending, from 2007. We also include quadratic p opulation
contro ls, for counties as well as m etros. Populations are stated in term s of 100k. Standard errors are clustered at the m etro-level.
167
Table 8: Reimbursement Impact: Plan Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Premium Rebate OOPC Premium+OOPC-Reb Drug Coverage
Mean (Baseline Sample) 31.96 54.80 364.92 348.82 0.66
Urban -0.88 3.38 -7.02 -8.30 -0.064
(5.97) (4.11) (8.48) (12.87) (0.070)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) 2.18 -1.00 -9.73** -7.86 0.106***
(3.23) (1.93) (4.16) (6.48) (0.032)
N 1,701 1,360 1,701 1,360 1,701
Sample Baseline: 100-600k Metros, 2007-2011, 2007 FFS < 662
Urban 1.37 -1.15 2.58 5.80 0.020
(7.38) (5.87) (11.75) (17.87) (0.098)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) 0.44 2.87 -24.43*** -30.06*** 0.099*
(4.41) (3.04) (5.56) (8.55) (0.050)
N 711 568 711 568 711
Sample Robustness: 150-350k Metros
Urban 7.27 5.55 0.40 3.51 -0.050
(8.07) (8.58) (17.98) (26.67) (0.147)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) 4.20 -2.18 -25.95*** -18.47 0.081
(4.82) (4.42) (7.35) (11.88) (0.073)
N 361 288 361 288 361
Sample Robustness: 200-300k Metros
Urban*Low 6.56 -5.71 1.02 11.2 -0.036
(6.35) (6.86) (8.79) (17.32) (0.050)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) -0.81 2.68 -12.38*** -16.40** 0.096***
(2.74) (3.22) (3.95) (7.79) (0.025)
N 2,809 2,246 2,809 2,246 2,809
Sample Di¤-in-Di¤ : Comparing Low and High FFS
Urban*Post -2.28 0.063
(7.09) (0.105)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) 0.63 0.091***
(3.25) (0.034)
N 1,786 1,360 1,701 1,360 1,786
Sample Di¤-in-Di¤ : Comparing Pre and Post
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcom e variab les are m easures of the nancia l characteristics of MA
plans. A ll outcom e measures are ination-adjusted , and represented in 2007 dollars. The unit of observation is aggregated at
the county-year, for the p eriod sp ecied , w ith the aggregation weighed by plan enrollm ent. The regression resu lts are weighed
inversely w ith the number of counties in a m etro area, such that each metro area is equally represented in the regression .
The orig inal data is obtained from public ly availab le CMS les, includ ing enrollm ent, landscap e, OOPC , and other data.
For the baseline sample, we exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was ab ove that of the lowest p ossib le
oor, and also fo cus on the 2007 to 2011 post-p eriod . We also restrict to those counties w ith in the sp ecied population
band. In one alternate sp ecication shown, we expand the baseline sample to include H igh FFS counties; in another, we
expand the baseline sample to include the pre-2001 p eriod (while still exclud ing the 2001 to 2006 p eriod). In these alternate
sp ecications, h igh FFS counties/pre-2001 observations serve as a contro l group, g iven that Urban status would not exp lic itly
impact b enchmarks for those observations. P rior to 2004, on ly HMO plans cou ld b e o¤ered , m eaning that the MA share and
HMO+PPO share levels are identica l for the pre-p eriod analysis. We include year-level ind icators and also contro l for 5-yr
p er cap ita M edicare FFS sp ending, from 2007. We also include quadratic p opulation contro ls, for counties as well as m etros.
Populations are stated in term s of 100k. Standard errors are clustered at the m etro-level.
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Table 9: E¤ect on Insurers
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES HMO+PPO Sh. PFFS Sh. MA Sh. Prem Rebate OOPC Prem+ Prem+ Drug Cov
OOPC OOPC-Reb
Restriction Top Insurer by Market Penetration (Humana)
Urban 0.008 0.011* 0.018** -0.50 2.34 -13.83 -14.33* -13.29** -0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (3.61) (1.96) (9.39) (8.04) (6.29) (0.002)
2007 FFS 5 yr 0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 2.769** -0.71 -5.34 -2.57 -1.02 0.001
(in 100s) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (1.23) (0.71) (3.54) (3.31) (2.80) (0.000)
Mean 0.014 0.024 0.038 30.44 41.34 395.39 425.83 393.23 1.000
(0.028) (0.025) (0.035) (30.65) (23.20) (52.00) (40.43) (44.01) (0.007)
N 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,623 1,316 1,623 1,623 1,316 1,623
Restriction Non-Top Insurer by Market Penetration
Urban 0.064*** 0.048*** 0.112*** -0.85 -0.11 -3.05 -3.74 -0.35 -0.007
(0.020) (0.011) (0.023) (7.24) (5.75) (10.19) (13.57) (16.88) (0.086)
2007 FFS 5 yr -0.045*** -0.023*** -0.068*** 3.02 0.50 -13.10*** -10.08* -13.87* 0.10**
(in 100s) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (3.64) (2.37) (4.45) (5.65) (7.41) (0.040)
Mean 0.084 0.044 0.128 32.10 59.17 353.51 385.64 332.06 0.499
(0.100) (0.051) (0.106) (28.48) (19.71) (40.49) (50.18) (57.87) (0.321)
N 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,681 1,344 1,682 1,681 1,344 1,682
Additional FEs Year
Counties Metro 100-600k, FFS 5 yr Under 662 (from 2007)
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcom e variab les are m easures of MA market structure and the nancia l characteristics of MA plans. A ll nancia l
m easures are ination-adjusted , and represented in 2007 dollars. The regression resu lts are weighed inversely w ith the number of counties in a m etro area, such that each
metro area is equally represented in the regression . In the top panel, the sample is restricted to the MA insurer w ith the greatest geographic p enetration : Humana. The
resu lts here capture the impact on MA enrollm ent across these two insurers, as a share of a ll M edicare, a long w ith the impact on characteristics of th is insurers p lans.
In the b ottom panel, the sample is restricted to all insurers, exclud ing Humana, w ith the resu lts accord ingly capturing the impact across non-top insurer. A ltogether,
these resu lts capture whether pass-through di¤ers across incumbent insurers and new insurer entrants. The unit of observation is aggregated at the county-year, for the
p eriod sp ecied , w ith the aggregation weighed by plan enrollm ent. The orig inal data is obtained from public ly availab le CMS les, includ ing enrollm ent, landscap e,
OOPC , and other data. For the baseline sample, we exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was ab ove that of the lowest p ossib le oor, and also fo cus
on the 2007 to 2011 post-p eriod . We also restrict to those counties w ith in the sp ecied population band. We include year-level ind icators and also contro l for 5-yr
p er cap ita M edicare FFS sp ending, from 2007. We also include quadratic p opulation contro ls, for counties as well as m etros. Populations are stated in term s of 100k.
Standard errors are clustered at the m etro-level.
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Table 10: CAHPS Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall Overall PCP Specialist Drug
Health Plan Healthcare Seen Benets
Mean (Baseline) 8.39 8.51 9.02 8.9 8.35
Urban -0.044 -0.177 -0.204** -0.050 -0.067
(0.157) (0.126) (0.083) (0.116) (0.126)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) 0.061*** 0.010 -0.000 0.003 0.023
(0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018)
Stand. Treat. E¤ect -0.119
(.083)
N 1,657 1,641 1,625 1,545 1,588
Urban*Low -0.200 -0.146 -0.040 -0.011 0.119
(0.127) (0.096) (0.057) (0.073) (0.111)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) 0.041** -0.008 -0.009 0.000 0.012
(0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017)
Stand. Treat. E¤ect -0.065
(0.056)
N 2,607 2,584 2,565 2,455 2,525
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are enrollee-reported ratings of
plan quality. The unit of observation is at the county-year level, for the 2007-2011 period. The regression
results are weighed inversely with the number of counties in a metro area, such that each metro area is
equally represented in the regression. The original data is obtained from CMS, from the CAHPS survey of
MA enrollees; while the data was originally at an individual respondent level, we aggregate this data to the
county-year level for purposes of our analysis, with each observation weighed equally. We exclude counties
whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was above that of the lowest possible oor. Further, we restrict to
those counties within the 100-600k metro population band. Plan ratings are coded on a 0-10 scale, while
self-reported health ratings are coded on a 1-5 scale; higher corresponds to better. CAHPS survey data
only covers plans that are at least a year old. As such, counties that have only new MA plans or no MA
plans whatsoever do not appear in the data. We include year-level indicators and also control for 5-yr per
capita Medicare FFS spending, from 2007. We also include controls for age categories, race, and gender. In
addition, we include quadratic population controls, for counties as well as metros. Populations are stated
in terms of 100k. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-level. Standardized treatment e¤ects are
calculated consistent with the approach in Kling et al (2007) and Finkelstein et al (2012).
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Table 11: CAHPS Utilization and Health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specialist Personal Routine SRH SRH
Visits MD Visits Visits Overall Mental Health
Mean (Baseline) 1.66 1.90 2.27 2.92 2.26
Urban -0.029 0.054 -0.070 0.094 0.121
(0.080) (0.110) (0.121) (0.081) (0.084)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 0.011 0.007 -0.001 -0.012 -0.005
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009)
Stand. Treat. E¤ect 0.071
(0.110)
N 1,554 1,651 1,661 1,661 1,662
Urban*Low 0.059 0.041 0.084 0.064 -0.020
(0.050) (0.094) (0.085) (0.066) (0.061)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 0.011 0.014 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002
(0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009)
Stand. Treat E¤ect 0.020
(0.061)
N 2,467 2,598 2,611 2,612 2,614
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are enrollee-reported utilization
levels and health status. The unit of observation is at the county-year level, for the 2007-2011 period. The
regression results are weighed inversely with the number of counties in a metro area, such that each metro
area is equally represented in the regression. The original data is obtained from CMS, from the CAHPS
survey of MA enrollees; while the data was originally at an individual respondent level, we aggregate this
data to the county-year level for purposes of our analysis, weighing each observation equally. We exclude
counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was above that of the lowest possible oor. Further, we
restrict to those counties in the 100-600k metro population band. Plan ratings are coded on a 0-10 scale,
while self-reported health ratings are coded on a 1-5 scale; higher corresponds to better. CAHPS survey
data only covers plans that are at least a year old. As such, counties that have only new MA plans or
no MA plans whatsoever do not appear in the data. We include year-level indicators and also control for
5-yr per capita Medicare FFS spending, from 2007. We also include controls for age categories, race, and
gender. In addition, we include quadratic population controls, for counties as well as metros. Populations
are stated in terms of 100k. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-level. Standardized treatment
e¤ects are calculated consistent with the approach in Kling et al (2007) and Finkelstein et al (2012).
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Table 12: MA Enrollment: Demographic Composition Analysis
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Age Demographics
65-74 75-80 81-84 85+ Unknown White Female
Urban 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 0.00 0.00 -0.02** -0.02** -0.01** -0.06** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Metro Pop (100k) -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
Metro Pop (100k) Sq 0.01** -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Cnty Pop (100k) 0.00 0.01 0.03** 0.03** 0.01 -0.09** 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
Cnty Pop (100k) Sq -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Additional Controls Year
Counties Metro 100-600k, FFS 5 yr Under 662 (from 2007)
Mean 0.296 0.222 0.143 0.104 0.061 0.895 0.535
(0.196) (0.158) (0.128) (0.115) (0.094) (0.190) (0.186)
N 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618
R-squared 0.25 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.02
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are enrollee-reported demographic
characteristics. The unit of observation is at the county-year level, for the 2007-2011 period. The regression
results are weighed inversely with the number of counties in a metro area, such that each metro area is
equally represented in the regression. The original data is obtained from CMS, from the CAHPS survey
of MA enrollees; while the data was originally at an individual respondent level, we aggregate this data to
the county-year level for purposes of our analysis, weighing each observation equally. We exclude counties
whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was above that of the lowest possible oor. Further, we restrict to those
counties in the 100-600k metro population band. CAHPS survey data only covers plans that are at least
a year old. As such, counties that have only new MA plans or no MA plans whatsoever do not appear in
the data. We include year-level indicators and also control for 5-yr per capita Medicare FFS spending, from
2007. In addition, we include quadratic population controls, for counties as well as metros. Populations are
stated in terms of 100k. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-level.
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Table 13: Advertising Spending in $ per Medicare Beneciary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Health Insurance Products denoted "Medicare" Lines
% Urban Floor 6.352*** 7.263*** 6.024*** 5.176*** 2.805
(2.228) (2.188) (2.269) (1.952) (2.252)
% Urban 3.722
(2.501)
% Floor -0.399
(1.235)
FFS Spending -1.730 -1.346 -1.904
(1.263) (1.138) (1.210)
Credit Card Ad Spending 0.0837* 0.0859**
(0.0440) (0.0427)
Observations 840 840 840 840 840
R-squared 0.059 0.109 0.113 0.156 0.160
Panel B: All Health Insurance Products
% Urban Floor 20.69*** 25.92*** 20.50*** 14.70*** 15.80**
(7.455) (6.720) (6.390) (5.263) (7.810)
% Urban 1.527
(9.292)
% Floor -4.356
(3.092)
FFS Spending -7.571* -4.943 -6.522*
(4.155) (3.244) (3.345)
Credit Card Ad Spending 0.573*** 0.575***
(0.140) (0.139)
Observations 840 840 840 840 840
R-squared 0.097 0.204 0.213 0.406 0.407
Advertising Price Controls no yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table present results of an OLS regression with TV spot advertising expenditures for Medicare
insurance products per Medicare beneciary per year as the dependent variable. All measures are ination-
adjusted, and represented in 2007 dollars. The unit of observation is the DMA-year. The key explanatory
variables of interest, % Urban Floor and % Rural Floor are aggregated from the county-level dataset using
the same crosswalk provided by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008). Population controls include a quadratic in
metro-area population, and are included in all specications. Advertising price index is given in SQAD
points.
173
Figure 1: Medicare Advantage Penetration by Year
Note: Enrollment data are taken from publicly available CMS les and aggregated to the
year level. The X-axis denotes year, while the Y-axis denotes the % of Medicare recipients
enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans.
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Figure 2: Nationwide Distribution of Floor Counties
Note: Benchmark data are taken from publicly available CMS les. Dark and light green
counties correspond to urban and non-urban oor counties, respectively. Meanwhile, white
areas correspond to non-oor counties.
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Figure 3: Stock Returns of Major MA Insurers, 3-4 pm on April 1, 2013
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Note: Figure plots stock returns on April 1, 2013, when CMS announced a reversal to a
planned cut to MA benchmarks (at 3 pm). The stock price change observed among
health-insurance stocks-over this period-was absent for other rm types. Stock price data
is taken from CRSP.
176
Figure 4: County Benchmark and FFS Costs in 2004
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Note: FFS cost and benchmark data are taken from publicly available CMS les. The
X-axis denotes 2004 FFS costs (based on CMSs 5-yr look-back average), while the y-axis
denotes the 2007 benchmark payment amount.
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Figure 5: 2007 FFS Costs and County Benchmarks
Note: FFS cost and benchmark data are taken from publicly available CMS les. The
X-axis denotes 2007 FFS costs (based on CMSs 5-yr look-back average), while the y-axis
denotes the contemporaneous benchmark payment amount.
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Figure 6: E¤ect of Urban Status on Benchmarks, by Year
Note: Benchmark data are taken from publicly available CMS les and aggregated to the
county-year level. Each point represents the coe¢ cient on the urbandummy in a
specication analogous to that in Equation (1), with benchmark as the dependent
variable, restricted to the year denoted in the x-axis. Here, we also plot the 95%
condence intervals.
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Figure 7: E¤ect of Urban Status on MA Penetration Rates, by Year
Note: Enrollment data are taken from CMS enrollment les and aggregated to the
county-year level. Each point represents the coe¢ cient on the urbandummy in a
specication analogous to that in Equation (1), with MA penetration rates as the
dependent variable, restricted to a single year denoted in the x-axis. Here, we also plot the
95% condence intervals.
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Figure 8: E¤ect of Urban Status on Benchmarks
Note: Benchmark data are taken from CMS and aggregated to the county-year level.
Plot lines are constructed separately for each side of the discontinuity, using a second
degree polynomial and an epanechnikov kernel. Alongside this line, we also plot the 95%
condence interval.
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Figure 9: E¤ect of Urban Status on MA Penetration
Note: Market structure data are taken from CMS and aggregated to the county-year
level. Plot lines are constructed separately for each side of the discontinuity, using a
second degree polynomial and an epanechnikov kernel. Alongside this line, we also plot
the 95% condence interval.
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Appendix: For Online Publication
A.1 Theory
This section describes the theoretical framework that informs the empirical specica-
tions and highlights the fact that incidence depends on the degree of competition in the
market as well as selection. For simplicity, we consider the case of linear demand. Just as
manufacturers face upward sloping supply curves because the last plant location is not as ef-
cient as the rst plant location, insurance companies may face upward sloping average cost
curves as well. If there is advantageous selection, then the marginal Medicare Advantage
consumer is sicker and more costly to insure than the average. The average cost curve for
a plan traces out costs from those who value the plan the most to those who value it least.
Under advantageous selection, the low cost enrollees have the highest valuation for Medicare
Advantage plans. In this case, we should expect a pass-through rate of less than one. As
the amount of the subsidy increases, Medicare Advantage penetration rates increase, and
sicker consumers begin to enroll in plans. As a result a dollar increase in the subsidy must
fund the health costs of the sicker enrollees in addition to providing additional benets to
existing enrollees. Figure A.1 illustrates that incomplete pass-through under advantageous
selection into Medicare Advantage policies.18 Let AC1 be average costs under initial reim-
bursement generosity. If generosity increases by some amount m, there is a downward shift
in the insurers average cost curve to AC2. If demand were completely inelastic, the price
would fall from p1 to p1 m. However, if demand is not completely inelastic, the price will
fall to some intermediate level p2: the incidence of the increased generosity depends on the
relative elasticity of supply (determined by selection) and demand.19
18We collapse this average out-of-pocket cost to an e¤ective price p and assume no di¤erences in plan
quality. We will relax this assumption in the empirical section and explore the relationship between contract
generosity and plan quality.
19The intuition is reversed if there is adverse selection. Pass-through is greater than one because the
increased subsidy serves to internalize part of the asymmetric information problem. If there is relatively
little selection (and thus a at AC curve) and the market for MA plans is perfectly competitive, then virtually
all of the additional spending passes through to consumers in the form of a lower premium.
The intuition is reversed if there is adverse selection. Pass-through is greater than one because the
increased subsidy serves to internalize part of the asymmetric information problem. If there is relatively
183
Furthermore, various studies (Dafny, 2010, Lustig, 2010, and Starc, 2014) have
argued that perfect competition is a poor benchmark in insurance markets, and the inci-
dence of the MA subsidy also depends on market structure. Consider pass-through under
monopoly. Figure A.2 shows a downward shift of the average cost curve and assumes no
selection; the marginal consumer and average consumer are the same. When the monopo-
list sets price equal to marginal revenue, the decrease in price is smaller than under perfect
competition because the marginal revenue curve is steeper than the demand curve. In our
example with constant marginal costs, linear demand would imply a pass-through rate of
one-half, as the marginal revenue curve is twice as steep as the demand curve. Advanta-
geous selection amplies this e¤ect. Therefore, both advantageous selection and imperfect
competition theoretically reduce pass-through rates. Weyl and Fabinger (2013) expand this
analysis to intermediate cases and more exible models of demand. They nd that the less
competitive the conduct in a market is, the smaller the pass-through rate.20
In addition, more rms may enter as a result of increased plan generosity. If entry
is costly, then an increase in government benets could induce additional rms to enter.
This is socially benecial if the benets to consumers in the form of increased competition
and product variety are greater than the additional xed costs incurred and the deadweight
loss of taxation to fund any increase in Medicare spending. However, if increased generosity
spurs excess entry, xed and marketing expenditures are real economic costs. A model
describing the full strategic interaction of imperfectly competitive rms is outside the scope
of this paper; however, we can describe the strategic decisions made by insurers.
First, the rm must decide which markets to enter. Second, conditional on being
active in a market, they must design insurance products, and then set premiums for those
insurance products. Finally, the rm may choose to make ongoing quality investments over
the course of the year, and earn variable prots on each policy. If the discounted sum of
little selection (and thus a at AC curve) and the market for MA plans is perfectly competitive, then virtually
all of the additional spending passes through to consumers in the form of a lower premium.
20Similarly, Mahoney and Weyl (2013) specically consider the case of selection markets.
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future variable prots is higher than the xed cost of entry, the rm enters the market.21
Therefore, in order to predict rm entry and the associated increase in competitive pressure,
we are interested in a comparative static that links benchmarks to rm variable prots. This
comparative static depends on four e¤ects.
The rst is the direct e¤ect, where increased benchmarks lead to higher reimburse-
ments for rms. The second is a price e¤ect: for the same vector of bids, an increased
benchmark means a lower price for consumers, depending on the pass-through rate.22 Third,
there is a cost e¤ect, where higher benchmarks could change the composition of enrollees.
For example, increasing penetration rates may lead to rms attracting sicker consumers,
increasing costs, if there is advantageous selection in the market. Finally, there is a mar-
ket power e¤ect, in which high benchmarks may lead to more entry. As more rms enter,
consumers have access to more plans that may prove to be closer substitutes, driving down
markups. The overall e¤ect of more generous plan reimbursement is ultimately an empirical
question.
21A rm f may have a number of products j in market m. The rms variable prots from that policy
can be written as:
jm =
P
i
(bm + pj   cijm) sijm
where bm is the benchmark (which in practice is adjusted by the individuals risk score), pjm the plans
premium (if any), cijm the cost of individual i covered by plan j in market m, and sijm the probability
that the same consumer purchases the plan. In order to get rm-level variable prots in a given market,
aggregate over all plans within a market o¤ered by the rm and subtract any xed or sunk cost of entry.
22A higher benchmark need not change the competitive environment or optimal prices; increased bench-
marks may simply a¤ect rm prots by increasing quantity, as decreased premiums may increase Medicare
penetration rates, and, therefore prots.
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A.2 Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: Pass-Through Under Advantageous Selection
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Figure A.2: Pass-Through Under Constant Average Cost and Monopoly
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Table A.1: First Stage Regression Results: Pre-Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES County Benchmark
Urban -4.11 -4.97 24.69*** 1.11
(7.28) (7.34) (5.59) (1.60)
Pre-2003 Urban 1.82 49.58***
(4.89) (1.29)
County Pop (100k) -4.41 -4.72 7.93*** -0.32
(4.10) (4.16) (2.43) (0.88)
County Pop (100k) Sq 1.35 1.38 -0.63 0.19
(1.28) (1.28) (0.57) (0.27)
Metro Pop 5.15 4.98 3.33 -1.15
(8.36) (8.36) (3.57) (2.08)
Metro Pop Sq -0.63 -0.62 -0.15 0.15
(1.11) (1.10) (0.55) (0.26)
2007 FFS 5-yr 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.07*** 0.03***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
FFS Restriction Group 1
Population Restriction 100-600k Metro Areas
Year Range 1998-2000 2001-2003
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.66 0.94
Notes: Table presents results of our rst-stage regression, a linear model with
Monthly, County-Level MA Benchmark as the outcome measure; urban serves as
the instrument of interest. The unit of observation is at the county-year level, for
the period specied. The regression results are weighed inversely with the number of
counties in a metro area, such that each metro area is equally represented in the re-
gression. The sample is restricted to counties in the 100-600k metro population range,
as well as to counties with 2007 FFS levels below the lowest oor value. We include
year-level indicators and also control for 5-yr per capita Medicare FFS spending,
from 2007. The original data is obtained from publicly available CMS les, including
enrollment and other data. Note that populations are stated in terms of 100k.
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Table A.2: Stability Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Insurers HHI HMO/PPO Sh. PFFS Sh. MA Sh.
Urban 1.64*** -756** 0.068*** 0.054*** 0.122***
(0.44) (324) (0.021) (0.013) (0.024)
Controls Linear Metro Population
Urban 1.78*** -873** 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.131***
(0.47) (370) (0.019) (0.013) (0.023)
Controls Quadratic Metro Population
Urban 1.61*** -698* 0.051** 0.058*** 0.109***
(0.50) (398) (0.022) (0.015) (0.026)
Controls Cubic Metro Population
Urban 1.74*** -593 0.063*** 0.050*** 0.112***
(0.52) (420) (0.023) (0.017) (0.027)
Controls Quartic Metro Population
Urban 1.88*** -494 0.065*** 0.034* 0.098***
(0.51) (472) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020)
Controls Spline Metro Population
Urban 1.48*** -351 0.053** 0.039*** 0.092***
(0.48) (382) (0.025) (0.014) (0.026)
Controls Linear Metro Population Trend on Each Side of Discontinuity
Urban 2.03*** -406 0.077*** 0.037** 0.114***
(0.56) (414) (0.025) (0.018) (0.022)
Controls Quadratic Metro Population Trend on Each Side of Discontinuity
Urban 2.00*** -1,008*** 0.074*** 0.055*** 0.129***
(0.47) (370) (0.020) (0.013) (0.023)
Controls Quadratic Metro Population, Demographic Controls
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables include measures
of MA plan penetration, market structure, and plan nancial characteristics, as specied by
the column. All nancial measures are ination-adjusted, and represented in 2007 dollars.
Each panel presents results using a di¤erent type of control. The unit of observation is
aggregated at the county-year, for the 2007-2011 period, with aggregation weighed by plan
enrollment. The regression results are weighed inversely with the number of counties in a
metro area, such that each metro area is equally represented in the regression. The original
data is obtained from publicly available CMS les, including enrollment, landscape, OOPC,
and other data. We exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was above that
of the lowest possible oor. In addition, we restrict to those counties within the metro
population band of 100,000 to 600,000. We include quadratic controls in county and metro-
area population. We also control for 2007 per capita Medicare FFS spending, and include
year-level indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-area level.
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Table A.3: Market Structure Baseline Analysis-Expanded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Insurers HHI HMO+PPO Sh. PFFS Sh. MA Sh.
Urban 1.78*** -873** 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.131***
(0.47) (370) (0.019) (0.013) (0.023)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) -0.69*** 558*** -0.041*** -0.031*** -0.072***
(0.22) (187) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015)
Metro Pop (100k) -0.57 435 -0.014 -0.022* -0.036
(0.59) (465) (0.023) (0.013) (0.024)
Metro Pop (100k) Sq 0.05 -38 0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.09) (65) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Cnty Pop (100k) 0.37 -574 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
(0.49) (407) (0.021) (0.012) (0.023)
Cnty Pop (100k) Sq -0.38*** 169** -0.005 -0.001 -0.005
(0.07) (77) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Mean 6.49 3,907 0.097 0.068 0.166
(3.072) (1,802) (0.105) (0.060) (0.108)
N 1,740 1,728 1,740 1,740 1,740
R-squared 0.61 0.167 0.303 0.277 0.320
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are measures of MA market
structure and the nancial characteristics of MA plans. The unit of observation is aggregated at the
county-year, for the 2007-2011 period, with aggregation weighed by plan enrollment. The regression
results are weighed inversely with the number of counties in a metro area, such that each metro area is
equally represented in the regression. The original data is obtained from publicly available CMS les,
including enrollment, landscape, OOPC, and other data. We exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-
as of 2007-was above that of the lowest possible oor. Further, we restrict to those counties within the
100-600k metro population band. We include a control for 5-yr per capita Medicare FFS spending, from
2007, and also include year-level indicators. We also include quadratic population controls, for counties as
well as metros. Populations are stated in terms of 100k. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-level.
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Table A.4: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Specications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cnty Bnchmk Insurers HHI MA Sh. Prem Drug Cov
Urban*Low 70.326*** 1.529*** -1,087*** 0.047* 6.561 -0.036
(8.379) (0.464) (370) (0.028) (6.355) (0.050)
Urban -12.460 -0.529 650* 0.043 -8.735 0.035
(9.089) (0.484) (385) (0.028) (7.980) (0.066)
Low -27.476*** -0.630 241 -0.062* -1.725 0.051
(9.679) (0.584) (401) (0.032) (6.233) (0.061)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) 30.472*** -0.502** 407*** -0.053*** -0.810 0.096***
(4.673) (0.207) (144) (0.013) (2.740) (0.025)
N 2,880 2,880 2,855 2,880 2,809 2,809
Urban*Post 66.271*** 1.136*** 6 0.050*** -2.276 0.063
(4.369) (0.303) (506) (0.017) (7.094) (0.105)
Urban -3.522 0.358 -794 0.053** 1.224 -0.090
(5.512) (0.422) (545) (0.022) (8.143) (0.118)
Post 184.964*** 3.014*** -4,017*** 0.124*** -29.184*** 0.099
(3.284) (0.223) (332) (0.012) (5.470) (0.078)
2007 FFS 5-yr (100s) 15.734*** -0.381* 388** -0.051*** 0.626 0.091***
(1.924) (0.204) (187) (0.013) (3.245) (0.034)
N 2,784 2,784 2,072 2,784 1,786 1,786
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are measures of MA market
structure and the nancial characteristics of MA plans. All nancial measures are ination-adjusted, and
represented in 2007 dollars. The unit of observation is aggregated at the county-year, for the 2007-2011
period, with aggregation weighed by plan enrollment. The regression results are weighed inversely with the
number of counties in a metro area, such that each metro area is equally represented in the regression. The
original data is obtained from publicly available CMS les, including enrollment, landscape, OOPC, and
other data. We exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was above that of the lowest possible
oor. Further, we restrict to those counties within the 100-600k metro population band. We include a
control for 5-yr per capita Medicare FFS spending, from 2007, and also include year-level indicators. We
also include quadratic population controls, for counties as well as metros. Populations are stated in terms
of 100k. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-level.
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Table A.5: Triple Di¤erence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Cnty Bmk Insrs HHI MA Sh. Prem Drug Cov
Urban*Low FFS*Post 82.127*** 1.921*** -1,283 0.065** 14.720 0.056
(13.751) (0.651) (825) (0.026) (11.856) (0.159)
Urban*Post -16.006 -0.604 1,418** -0.015 -14.964 0.005
(12.598) (0.568) (643) (0.020) (9.521) (0.117)
Low FFS*Post -28.403*** 0.102 -565 0.034** -21.934** -0.013
(9.226) (0.351) (503) (0.016) (8.553) (0.126)
Urban*Low FFS -20.717 -0.445 156 -0.017 -9.047 -0.085
(15.093) (0.457) (701) (0.024) (12.214) (0.164)
Urban 9.422 0.387 -691 0.047** 8.120 0.030
(14.363) (0.420) (513) (0.021) (10.997) (0.134)
Low FFS -23.456* -0.193 632 -0.068*** 18.407* 0.084
(14.108) (0.372) (528) (0.023) (9.908) (0.138)
Post 204.410*** 3.776*** -3,284*** 0.022 -4.965 0.112
(8.504) (0.303) (399) (0.013) (6.408) (0.097)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 0.450*** -0.255 177 -0.030*** -0.021 0.089***
(0.052) (0.162) (137) (0.011) (2.603) (0.024)
Metro Pop (100k) 15.713* -0.274 79 -0.032* -2.169 0.030
(8.116) (0.350) (299) (0.019) (5.702) (0.061)
Metro Pop (100k) Sq -1.989* 0.046 -9 0.005* 0.295 -0.002
(1.102) (0.050) (43) (0.003) (0.781) (0.008)
Cnty Pop (100k) -1.388 0.660*** -631*** 0.011 4.603 -0.026
(4.446) (0.230) (205) (0.013) (3.496) (0.025)
Cnty Pop (100k) Sq 0.806 -0.280*** 145*** -0.001 -1.518** 0.009*
(0.933) (0.047) (39) (0.003) (0.667) (0.005)
Additional Controls Year
Counties Metro 100-600k
Mean 668.88 4.270 4,813 0.113 33.880 0.691
(119.41) (3.698) (2,509) (0.115) (26.710) (0.260)
N 4,608 4,608 3,535 4,608 2,975 2,975
R-squared 0.901 0.739 0.424 0.351 0.132 0.134
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are measures of MA market
structure and the nancial characteristics of MA plans. All nancial measures are ination-adjusted,
and represented in 2007 dollars. The triple interaction of Urban, Low FFS, and Post serves as the key
instrument. The unit of observation is aggregated at the county-year, with aggregation weighed by plan
enrollment. The regression results are weighed inversely with the number of counties in a metro area, such
that each metro area is equally represented in the regression. The Post period corresponds to 2007-2011,
while Low FFS counties correspond to those with 2007 5-yr FFS below the lowest oor. For counties with
2007 5-yr FFS in between the two oors, we scale the Low FFS coe¢ cient accordingly. The original data is
obtained from publicly available CMS les, including enrollment, landscape, OOPC, and other data. The
market structure data covers the period from 1998-2000 and 2007-2011; meanwhile, the nancial measures
are only available for 2000, and 2007-2011. We restrict to counties in metros with population of 100-600k.
We include a control for 5-yr per capita Medicare FFS spending, from 2007, and also include year-level
indicators. We also include quadratic population controls, for counties as well as metros. Populations are
stated in terms of 100k. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-level.
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Table A.6: Plan Financial Characteristics Results, Not Weighted by Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Prem OOPC Premium+OOPC Rebate Drug Cov
Mean (Baseline Sample) 33.29 362.90 396.19 53.50 0.570
Urban 0.451 -12.512** -12.060* -0.575 -0.010
(3.512) (5.843) (7.175) (3.552) (0.050)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 1.755 -5.876** -4.121 1.677 0.038**
(1.689) (2.588) (2.943) (1.201) (0.019)
N 1,701 1,701 1,701 1,360 1,701
Sample Baseline: 100-600k Metros, 2007-2011, 2007 FFS < 662
Urban 2.210 -12.946 -10.736 -1.627 -0.013
(4.414) (8.356) (9.835) (5.508) (0.062)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 1.479 -12.743*** -11.264** 3.139 0.031
(2.464) (3.619) (4.482) (2.232) (0.039)
N 711 711 711 568 711
Sample Robustness: Narrower Bandwidth Sample (150-350k Metros)
Urban 6.243 -1.547 4.696 2.903 -0.026
(6.363) (13.659) (15.859) (8.790) (0.092)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 0.683 -12.081** -11.398** 2.846 -0.012
(3.012) (5.099) (5.517) (3.444) (0.050)
N 361 361 361 288 361
Sample Robustness: Narrower Bandwidth Sample (200-300k Metros)
Urban 0.231 -2.998 -2.767 -1.441 0.045
(6.200) (7.172) (11.374) (5.216) (0.050)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 0.050 -4.753* -4.703 3.073 0.023*
(1.746) (2.709) (3.898) (2.151) (0.012)
N 1,108 1,108 1,108 886 1,108
Sample Falsication: High FFS Cnty Sample (2007 FFS > 662)
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are nancial characteristics
of MA plans. All nancial measures are ination-adjusted, and represented in 2007 dollars. The
unit of observation is aggregated at the county-year, for the 2007-2011 period, with the variables
NOT weighed by plan enrollment. The regression results are weighed inversely with the number
of counties in a metro area, such that each metro area is equally represented in the regression.
The original data is obtained from publicly available CMS les, including enrollment, landscape,
OOPC, and other data. We restrict to counties with associated metro pop of 100-600k. Further, we
exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was above that of the lowest possible oor.
Finally, we restrict to those counties within the specied population band. We include year-level
indicators and also control for 5-yr per capita Medicare FFS spending, from 2007. We also include
quadratic population controls, for counties as well as metros. Populations are stated in terms of
100k. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-level.
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Table A.7: Additional Metrics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FFS Costs Risk Scores Star Ratings
Health Outcomes Chronic Care Mgmt Cust Service Plan Ratings
Urban 1.11 0.021 0.147 0.099 -0.061 0.271*
(14.03) (0.025) (0.145) (0.144) (0.116) (0.139)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 0.065*** 0.019 -0.025 0.027 0.029
(0.009) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Metro Pop (100k) 26.97 0.013 -0.057 -0.035 0.078 -0.184
(16.79) (0.009) (0.159) (0.142) (0.126) (0.148)
Metro Pop (100k) Sq -3.51 -0.003 0.007 0.001 -0.010 0.020
(2.21) (0.002) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Cnty Pop (100k) 7.52 0.005 0.176 0.225* -0.011 0.054
(14.81) (0.029) (0.129) (0.121) (0.075) (0.141)
Cnty Pop (100k) Sq 2.13 -0.002 -0.037** -0.028* 0.005 -0.024
(2.02) (0.004) (0.019) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018)
Additional Controls Year
Counties Metro 100-600k, FFS 5 yr Below 662 (from 2007)
Mean 616.84 0.886 3.147 2.460 3.760 3.300
(56.14) (0.081) (0.570) (0.570) (0.630) (0.580)
N 1,740 1,724 1,270 1,224 1,387 1,394
R-squared 0.11 0.197 0.139 0.281 0.268 0.213
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables include county-year level measures of MA & FFS enrollee composition, along with
measures of MA plan quality. These include measures of per capita FFS spending, MA risk scores, as well as plan star ratings. FFS costs are ination adjusted,
and represented in 2007 dollars. The unit of observation is aggregated at the county-year. The regression results are weighed inversely with the number of counties
in a metro area, such that each metro area is equally represented in the regression. The enrollee composition measures cover the 2007-2011 period, while the star
ratings cover 2007-2010. The original data is obtained from publicly available CMS les, including enrollment, star ratings, and other data. We exclude counties
whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was below that of the lowest possible oor. We restrict to those counties within the metro population band of 100,000 to
600,000, also as of 2007. We include quadtratic controls in county and metro-area population. We also control for 2007 per capita Medicare FFS spending, and
include year-level indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-area level
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Table A.8: CAHPS Ratings, 150-350k Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall Overall PCP Specialist Drug
Health Plan Healthcare Seen Benets
Urban -0.018 0.064 -0.081 0.074 -0.021
(0.198) (0.200) (0.108) (0.145) (0.157)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 0.022 0.042 0.012 0.017 0.038
(0.033) (0.046) (0.020) (0.030) (0.026)
Metro Pop (100k) -0.026 0.295 -0.254 0.450 -0.257
(0.930) (0.736) (0.414) (0.594) (0.623)
Metro Pop (100k) Sq -0.001 -0.089 0.052 -0.111 0.038
(0.181) (0.150) (0.080) (0.118) (0.116)
Cnty Pop (100k) 0.068 -0.014 -0.079 0.212 -0.122
(0.242) (0.225) (0.170) (0.200) (0.197)
Cnty Pop (100k) Sq 0.029 0.089 0.079 0.003 0.093
(0.066) (0.065) (0.049) (0.059) (0.057)
Standarized Treatment E¤ect -0.002
(0.104)
Mean 8.41 8.51 9.04 8.88 8.39
(0.99) (0.82) (0.62) (0.93) (0.94)
N 650 642 635 598 622
R-squared 0.039 0.037 0.029 0.011 0.044
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are enrollee-reported levels of plan quality,
levels of utilization, and health status. The unit of observation is at the county-year level, for the 2007-2011 period.
The original data is obtained from CMS, from the CAHPS survey of MA enrollees; while the data was originally
at an individual respondent level, we aggregate this data to the county-year level for purposes of our analysis. The
regression results are weighed inversely with the number of counties in a metro area, such that each metro area is
equally represented in the regression. We exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was above that of
the lowest possible oor. Finally, we restrict to those counties within the 150-350k population band. We include
a control for 2007 per capita Medicare FFS spending and include year-level indicators. We also include quadratic
population controls, for counties as well as metros. Populations are stated in terms of 100k. Standard errors are
clustered at the metro-level. Standardized treatment e¤ects are calculated consistent with the approach in Kling et
al (2007) and Finkelstein et al (2012). All specications include controls for age categories, race, and gender.
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Table A.9: CAHPS Utilization and Health, 150-350k Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specialist Personal Routine SRH SRH
Visits MD Visits Visits Overall Mental Health
Urban 0.099 -0.111 -0.142 -0.087 0.006
(0.100) (0.159) (0.137) (0.115) (0.116)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) -0.011 -0.042 -0.018 -0.013 0.007
(0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.016) (0.016)
Metro Pop (100k) 0.237 0.202 0.417 -0.517 -0.267
(0.394) (0.597) (0.597) (0.426) (0.453)
Metro Pop (100k) Sq -0.059 -0.011 -0.060 0.130 0.061
(0.078) (0.123) (0.112) (0.082) (0.088)
Cnty Pop (100k) 0.030 -0.206 -0.244 -0.196 0.032
(0.115) (0.199) (0.258) (0.201) (0.180)
Cnty Pop (100k) Sq -0.014 0.043 0.063 0.007 -0.022
(0.037) (0.063) (0.077) (0.056) (0.055)
Standardized Treatment E¤ect -0.057
(0.155)
Mean 1.70 1.89 2.28 2.93 2.25
(0.55) (0.69) (0.78) (0.48) (0.47)
N 602 645 651 652 652
R-squared 0.009 0.038 0.024 0.055 0.016
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are enrollee-reported levels of plan quality, levels of
utilization, and health status. The unit of observation is at the county-year level, for the 2007-2011 period. The regression
results are weighed inversely with the number of counties in a metro area, such that each metro area is equally represented
in the regression. The original data is obtained from CMS, from the CAHPS survey of MA enrollees; while the data was
originally at an individual respondent level, we aggregate this data to the county-year level for purposes of our analysis.
We exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was above that of the lowest possible oor. Finally, we restrict
to those counties within the 150-350k metro population band. We include a control for 2007 per capita Medicare FFS
spending and include year-level indicators. We also include quadratic population controls, for counties as well as metros.
Populations are stated in terms of 100k. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-level. Standardized treatment e¤ects
are calculated consistent with the approach in Kling et al (2007) and Finkelstein et al (2012). All specications include
controls for age categories, race, and gender.
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Table A.10: Pass-Through By HHI Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prem Rebate OOPC Premium+OOPC-Reb Drug Cov
Mean (Baseline Sample) 31.96 54.80 364.92 348.82 0.66
Urban -15.36 7.03 -44.30** -58.683*** 0.119
(15.80) (6.17) (17.03) (21.717) (0.086)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) -7.81 5.40 -6.00 -20.071 0.123***
(11.57) (4.12) (7.29) (12.403) (0.043)
Observations 348 278 348 278 348
Restriction: First Quintile
Urban 0.36 0.08 -7.69 -3.245 -0.041
(7.35) (6.54) (15.75) (22.970) (0.107)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 9.16*** -0.14 -13.44** -5.842 0.099**
(3.07) (2.23) (5.33) (7.836) (0.044)
Obs 338 271 338 271 338
Restriction: Second Quintile
Urban -0.30 11.51* -3.21 -9.213 -0.289**
(7.31) (5.96) (14.67) (20.461) (0.110)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 3.75 -7.83** -6.49 7.310 -0.013
(6.40) (3.48) (8.04) (13.406) (0.065)
Obs 343 274 343 274 343
Restriction: Third Quintile
Urban 14.78* 0.50 -8.80 0.587 0.077
(8.12) (8.49) (19.41) (28.537) (0.102)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) 6.10 -3.16 -9.17 -1.179 -0.006
(5.04) (5.60) (11.08) (18.689) (0.053)
Obs 333 266 333 266 333
Restriction: Fourth Quintile
Urban -3.34 -8.17 -2.93 9.867 0.078
(15.82) (14.35) (20.40) (31.257) (0.217)
2007 FFS 5yr (in 100s) -11.90* -0.14 -7.84 -22.905** 0.203**
(7.01) (3.74) (7.85) (11.018) (0.086)
Observations 339 271 339 271 339
Restriction: Fifth Quintile
Notes: Table presents linear regression models, where outcome variables are nancial characteristics
of MA plans. The panels present results for di¤erent counties, based on the quntile in which their
HHI falls. The unit of observation is aggregated at the county-year, for the 2007-2011 period,
with the variables weighed by plan enrollment. The regression results are weighed inversely with
the number of counties in a metro area, such that each metro area is equally represented in the
regression. Financial measures are ination adjusted, and represented in 2007 dollars. The original
data is obtained from publicly available CMS les, including enrollment, landscape, OOPC, and
other data. We exclude counties whose adjusted FFS level-as of 2007-was above that of the lowest
possible oor. Finally, we restrict to those counties with metro pop of 100-600k. We include year-
level indicators and also control for 5-yr per capita Medicare FFS spending, from 2007. We also
include quadratic population controls, for counties as well as metros. Populations are stated in
terms of 100k. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-level.
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